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Part I
PREFACE

PREFACE
“We absolutely must leave room for doubt or there is no progress and
there is no learning. ¿ere is no learning without having to pose a
question. And a question requires doubts. People search for certainty.
But there is no certainty. People are terried—how can you live and not
know? It is not odd at all. You only think you know, as a matter of fact.
And most of your actions are based on incomplete knowledge and you
don’t really know what it is all about, or what the purpose of the world is,
or know a great deal of other things. It is possible to live and not know.”
—Richard Feynman, 1964
Economics is about striving to understand human behavior in situa-
tions of economic interest, and so it seems almost redundant to speak
of Behavioral Economics as a distinct discipline. Yet it has emerged as a
subeld of economics that keeps a certain distance from neoclassical
thinking. Perhaps this distance is best explained by the fact that decrip-
tivelymodeling human behavior with all its biases, inconsistencies, and
irrational tendencies o en results in intractability and lack of generality.
¿e alternative approach, in which some normatively desirable qualities
are presented, and outcomes of decisions are measured by appealing
to this ideal, enables relatively accurate analyses and predictions under
many circumstances, while maintaining parsimony. In addition, neoclas-
sical economics lends itself to conducting welfare analysis by insisting
that preferences can be recovered from choice data; once we allow for
“mistakes”, such analysis becomes more dicult (but not impossible, as
shown for instance by Kőszegi and Rabin (2008)).
¿ere is hence a tension between parsimony and realism. Parsimony
entails the pursuit of elegance, the quest for maximal power at minimal
structure. Realism, on the other hand, seeks to make precise certain
aspects of behavior, which sometimes comes at the cost of loss in gener-
ality. Compromising between these two desiderata is among the most
important functions a model can hope to accomplish. Striking the right
balance results in models that aspire to be as general as possible and as
realistic as necessary. Put dierently, realism is useful not for its own
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sake, but only insofar as it contributes to our understanding of economic
phenomena.1
Whether it is necessary to diverge from the normatively desirable
assumptions on behavior imposed by the neoclassical school therefore
depends on the objective and scope of the question one hopes to answer.
In some areas, it is sucient to rely on traditional behavioral assump-
tions in order to characterize and predict economic outcomes; in others,
taking into account systematic behavioral variations matters a great
deal. To name but a few, it appears that humans do not always pursue
their narrow self-interest (E. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002), make time-
inconsistent choices (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002),
incorrectly infer population probabilities from observing only a small
sample (the “law of small numbers”, cf. Rabin (2002)), and are sensitive
to outcomes that could have been realized, anticipating that they might
regret their (ex ante correct) choice ex post (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden,
1982; Filiz-Ozbay & Ozbay, 2007).
All in all, I believe that the question ultimately is not whether to
model behavior, but which aspects of it. To judge whether it is necessary
to incorporate some systematic behavioral pattern, the explanatory and
predictive power of behaviorally enriched (relative to standard) models
must serve as guiding principle. To speak of Behavioral Economics as
a somewhat disctinct sub-discipline may therefore be misleading: eco-
nomics is behavioral per se. Yet despite the tautological nature of this
term, it has come to refer to a general acknowledgement of the need to
incorporate into our models systematic behavioral patterns that are rele-
vant to questions of economic interest. ¿e subtitle of this dissertation,
¿ree Essays in Behavioral Economics, reects this line of thought.
It remains to esh out the three terms I use to characterize the chap-
ters of this dissertation:Morals, Markets, and Malleability. Chapter 1 is
concerned with a century-old philosophical debate about the limits of
ethics. It has long been unclear whether animals have a place in ethical
frameworks, which are mostly concerned with interaction among hu-
mans. Immanuel Kant, for instance, denies animals intrinsic rights to
be treated well, but argues that treatment of animals will reect onto
conduct among humans, thereby proposing a consequentialist argument
for including animals in ethical considerations. By asking whether in-
dividuals who have a higher propensity for prosocial behavior towards
1 See Schmidt (2009) for a much more detailed overview of the interaction between
economic experiments, which are designed to study behavior descriptively, and the
development of models and theory.
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other humans are willing to pay more for animal welfare, we contribute
to this debate empirically.2
Chapter 2 is inspired by novel pricing formats that have emerged in
recent years. Instead of setting a xed price, these mechanisms delegate
some pricing power to customers. We are interested in the performance
of Pay What You Want and Name Your Own Price vis-à-vis traditional
posted price sellers. To gain insights into the behavior of customers
and sellers facing these innovative pricing mechanisms, we conduct an
experiment that allows us to vary market structure, valuations, and costs
exogenously.
Finally, Chapter 3 addresses a line of research that has been met with
growing interest by psychology and economics scholars alike. By assum-
ing that preferences are malleable and may be shaped by context, this
research agenda simultaneously repudiates one of the central assump-
tions of neoclassical economics and opens new avenues for explaining
heretofore puzzling behavior. Yet despite the wealth of theoretical mod-
els that aim to capture context dependence in preferences, little is known
from an empirical perspective. In this chapter, I use a speed dating ex-
periment to directly compare the central assumptions of two models,
allowing me to identify one possible mechanism for context dependence
in a natural setting.
Disparate though they may seem, the three chapters of this thesis are
connected by a common thread. On a very broad level, each acts on the
assumption that behavior may not be rational in the canonical sense.
Individuals appear to be willing to pay substantial amounts for animal
welfare, oer positive amounts of money to completely anonymous
experimental subjects if they can get the same good without paying
anything, and are sensitive to the context in which a decision is made.
All three ndings violate the tenets of neoclassical economics, which
is built on self-interest and stable preferences.¿e rst two chapters show
that behavior is not solely driven by selsh interests. Instead, it seems that
2 ¿e fact that Kant proposes a consequentialist argument that aims at improving animal
welfare deserves special notice, considering that his Categorical Imperative is rmly
rooted in a deontological framework. One way of rationalizing this statement is that
at the time, animals were indeed not endowed with intrinsic moral rights, and bet-
ter treatment emerged through utilitarian behavior rather than acceptance of some
universal norm. In recent work, Falk and Tirole (2016) approach the tension between
deontological and consequentialist ethics by introducing narratives and imperatives
into a utilitarian framework. ¿ey show that under certain conditions, a principal
interested in persuading an agent to act in moral ways will use imperatives to do
so. Deontological behavior thus emerges endogenously, even though all agents are
consequentialists.
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other humans, and even non-human animals, can be part of individuals’
utility functions. ¿e third chapter addresses a line of research that
has received a lot of attention in recent years and is connected by the
stipulation that preferences may not be stable across choice contexts.3
I contribute to this literature by providing an empirical test of context
dependence and showing that in the area of speed dating, decision-
making is guided by relative thinking, as conceptualized by Bushong
et al. (2015).
On a more narrow level, the three chapters are connected by a com-
mon methodological approach. Learning about behavior requires tools.
Traditional empirical methods and econometric techniques, using ob-
servational data, have been complemented by controlled experiments.4
Experiments are extremely useful to isolate factors that causally impact
behavior, and as such they are intimately linked to the development of
Behavioral Economics as a sub-discipline.
animal welfare and human ethics ¿e rst chapter of this
dissertation, which is joint work with Konstanze Albrecht and Nora
Szech, describes an experiment aimed at eliciting participants’ willing-
ness to pay for animal welfare.We argue that in order tomeasure concern
for animal welfare, it is informative to use a controlled experimental
setup rather than questionnaire studies or purchasing data. Question-
naire studies have o en been criticized for measuring intent rather than
behavior, and indeed it seems that this phenomenon is quite large in
magnitude when it comes to ethically produced food (cf. Bray, Johns,
& Kilburn, 2010). Purchasing data do not contain information about
underlying reasons for behavior. Since demand for organic food may be
partly determined by advertising, image or health concerns, such data
do not suce to gain insights about concern for animal welfare.
3 ¿is literature extends from models of rational inattention (Sims, 2003, 2006; Matejka
&McKay, 2014) and limited attention (Gabaix & Laibson, 2006;Masatlioglu, Nakajima,
& Ozbay, 2012; Manzini &Mariotti, 2014) to applications of these ideas to public policy
and industrial organization contexts (Chetty, Looney, &Kro , 2009;Heidhues, Kőszegi,
& Murooka, 2016, forthcoming). ¿is class of models also encompasses theories of
salience (Bordalo, Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2012, 2013; Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013; Bushong,
Rabin, & Schwartzstein, 2015), which show how decision weights may be distorted and
thus lead to over- or underweighting of some choice dimensions relative to others.
4 A classication of the dierent types of experiments is beyond the scope of this disser-
tation. ¿e methodological framework underlying laboratory experiments is summa-
rized in Smith (2008). For excellent reviews of eld experiments see Harrison and List
(2004) and DellaVigna (2009).
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To close this gap in the literature and to better understand what moti-
vates consumers to purchase organic foods, we elicit concern for animal
welfare in an incentivized, direct and real setup, in a task that allows to
abstract from self-oriented motives. Subjects choose between intensive
farming and organic farming for a living laying hen. Opting for organic
farming is costly, yet guarantees better food, daylight, and much more
space to the hen. ¿is procedure allows us to elicit subjects’ willingness
to pay for transferring a hen to an environment that is better suited to
its needs. Full anonymity and a single-blind experimental design ensure
that our results are not diluted by image concerns or experimenter de-
mand eects. We can therefore isolate concern for organic agriculture
and animal welfare from other more self-oriented factors that could be
at play when purchasing organic food at a supermarket.
We nd that subjects are willing to pay 14 Euros for animal welfare
on average. ¿ey exhibit substantial heterogeneity: while 37% are willing
to pay at least 25 Euros in order to put a laying hen into better living
conditions, 15% are not willing to pay anything.
We also investigate a question that has received a lot of attention by
philosophers and ethicists, starting with¿omas Aquinas in the 13th cen-
tury. In its most general form, this question concerns the limits of ethics,
i.e. where to draw boundaries between subjects that should or should
not be part of a moral universe. Non-human animals have traditionally
been denied the intrinsic right to be treated well; in a deontological
framework, they would therefore be outside the scope of ethical consid-
erations. However, philosophers like Kant, Locke and Descartes agreed
that treating animals well might result in more civilized conduct among
humans. To be more precise, Kant holds the view that treating animals
well is a means to an end, but not an end in itself: “If he is not to stie his
human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who
is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men” (Gruen,
2014).
Kant thus claims that there is a link between the treatment of animals
and concern for fellow human beings.¿is relationship is key for the cen-
tral question we aim to answer in this chapter: rather than contributing
to the debate about environmental consequences and sustainability of
intensive animal farming, we are concerned with its social importance.
By eliciting prosocial motivations using validated psychological scales,
and combining these with the willingness to pay for animal welfare, our
experiment sheds light on the correlation between concern for animal
welfare and respect towards other humans. ¿e results suggest that this
link exists: subjects who score higher on the tactics dimension of the
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Machiavellianism scale, meaning they are more willing to circumvent
conventional moral standards in order to achieve personal gains, exhibit
a lower willingness to pay for animal welfare.
delegating pricing power to customers ¿e second chap-
ter of this dissertation is joint work with Klaus Schmidt, Martin Spann
and Lucas Stich. It is based on the observation that some rms increas-
ingly use novel types of pricing instruments that delegate price-setting
power to customers, either in part or in full. Full delegation occurs when
customers are at liberty to pay as much as they would like, a mechanism
that has become known as “Pay What You Want” (pwyw). A slightly
dierent pricing format lets sellers set a secret reserve price, against
which potential customers can submit a bid. If the bid is higher than the
reserve price, the transaction takes place at the price of the bid; otherwise
neither party receives a payo. Since buyers have some discretion over
the price by determining the amount they would like to bid, delegation
of pricing power is only partial. ¿is mechanism is commonly known
as “Name Your Own Price” (nyop).
¿e contribution of this chapter is twofold: rst, we document how
pwyw and nyop sellers perform relative to posted-price sellers within
a unied experimental paradigm. ¿is is in contrast to the previous
literature, which studies these mechanisms in isolation. We also explore
the behavior of customers, which enables us to speak to the dierences
we observe across the dierent market structures and pricing mecha-
nisms. Second, we explicitly allow for direct and indirect promotional
benets that may occur as a consequence of using these novel types of
pricing formats.¿eir participatory and innovative nature o en initiates
word-of-mouth recommendations and favorable press coverage (Hinz &
Spann, 2008; Kim, Natter, & Spann, 2009). ¿us, a direct benet is that
they can be a powerful tool to promote a product to a wider audience. In
addition, pwyw and nyopmay result in indirect promotional benets
by increasing demand for complementary products.
Our results indicate that both pwyw and nyop can be protable al-
ternatives to posted prices. However, their scope of application is very
dierent: pwyw is very successful in terms of market penetration, but it
fails to generate sustainable prots in the absence of (exogenously gener-
ated) promotional benets. While a substantial fraction of experimental
subjects are willing to pay strictly positive amounts, and in some cases
even are prepared to compensate sellers for their costs, average payments
are not sucient to keep pwyw sellers in business. Anticipating this,
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pwyw sellers either do not enter the market or elect to use posted prices
in case the promotional benet does not exceed their costs.
¿is picture changes when we take into account promotional benets
that may result from using such an innovative mechanism. Conditional
on entering the market and choosing the pwyw mechanism, a seller
generates high prots, while at the same time driving competing posted-
price sellers out of themarket.¿is observation hints at another function
of pwyw, predatory pricing: by avoiding setting a xed price, pwyw
sellers create incentives for buyers to undercut competitors’ prices. Yet
such a pricing strategy does not run the risk of lowering the reference
price to zero (as would be the case if the product was given away for free).
¿is suggests that pwyw can be protably employed as a short-term tool
to harm existing competitors or to deter entry of new rms.
However, it is debatable whether promotional benets exist, and if
so, whether they are sucient to oset potential losses in revenue that
may result from employing customer-driven pricing mechanisms. In
the rst set of experiments, we presume these benets into existence by
pointing out several channels throughwhich they couldmaterialize.¿is
approach has two main advantages: rst, it can help us understand how
customer-driven pricing mechanisms perform if we account for benets
in a very general sense, i.e. without specifying their exact source. ¿is
should make us immune against claims that the experimental design
fails to capture certain promotional benet channels. Second, exoge-
nously imposing promotional benets reduces the complexity of the
experiment considerably, thereby diminishing the potential for errors
due to incomplete understanding.
While a tractable and general approach in principle, this rst set of
experiments cannot alleviate concerns related to the existence of promo-
tional benets. ¿is is why we report on a second set of experiments, in
which we allow for benets to arise endogenously by implementing one
potential channel, word of mouth. In order to do so, we split buyers into
a well-informed and a follower segment. Well-informed buyers have
complete information over the market structure, whereas follow-up
buyers have to rely on word of mouth in order to see which sellers are
present. We show that in this setting, pwyw continues to monopolize
the well-informed segment of the market, which then leads to monopo-
lization of the entiremarket, since follow-up buyers hardly ever get to see
competing sellers. Despite almost complete market penetration, pwyw
sellers do not generate prots on the follow-up market, an indication
that this particular channel cannot account for promotional benets in
the case of pwyw. Turning our focus to nyop sellers, a dierent picture
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emerges: their market share on the follow-up market is lower, but still
twice as high as that of the competing posted-price sellers. In contrast
to pwyw sellers, nyop sellers are able to translate this increased sales
volume into prots that are considerably higher than those of compet-
ing sellers. ¿e endogenous emergence of promotional benets due to
word of mouth suggests that this is an important determinant of the
protability of nyop.
Going back to the rst set of experiments, in which it was randomly
determined whether benets were present or not, we see that nyop is
protable even in the absence of direct or indirect promotional benets.
In fact, about 60% of buyers choose the nyop seller over a posted price
competitor. Transaction prices are substantial and cover sellers’ costs at
all cost-benet levels. In contrast to pwyw, buyers’ degree of prosociality
has no eect on submitted bids. nyop is much less aggressive in terms of
its competitive eects; it leaves room for competing posted price sellers
and relaxes competition.
In conclusion, pwyw and nyop are pricing mechanisms that delegate
pricing power to customers, albeit to a dierent extent. Despite their
upfront similarities, they serve dierent objectives: pwyw is very suc-
cessful at penetrating the market, which can be advantageous if capacity
constraints are negligible, marginal costs are low, and sellers expect to
prot from spillover eects on complementary products. nyop, on the
other hand, insures the seller against losses even at high cost levels, mak-
ing this a viable alternative to posted prices over extended periods of
time. When being oered a choice between purchasing the same good
at a posted-price seller or a nyop seller, high-valuation customers shy
away from the risk associated with submitting a potentially unsuccessful
bid at the nyop seller. In combination with the fact that the nyopmecha-
nism refrains from setting a publicly observable price, this segmentation
can also help to avert harm from brands that are positioned in high
price segments by allowing them to sell excess capacity via third party
intermediaries.
context dependence in speed dating In the third chapter of
this dissertation I take up an old question that has beenmetwith renewed
interest in the recent economic literature: do preferences depend on
context, and if so, how? Cognitive psychologists propose that perception
depends on context, meaning that objects may be perceived dierently
depending on their surroundings. ¿e question I aim to answer in this
chapter goes one step further by asking whether and how such perceptive
errors translate into behavior.
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To study this question I use data from a speed dating experiment rst
described in Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2006). I argue
that this experiment provides an ideal setup to test for a specic type
of context dependence underlying the theoretical models by Kőszegi
and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et al. (2015). In these frameworks, the
range of utility levels along a given attribute determines whether this
attribute will be over- or underweighted. In order to provide a direct
empirical test of context dependence, one would ideally need a dataset
that contains information about attribute utility values and exhibits
exogenous variation in attribute utility ranges.
I argue that the speed dating experiment ts these requirements per-
fectly. First, and most importantly, participants meet a sequence of part-
ners and are asked to evaluate them a er each date, along with deciding
whether they would like to meet that person again. ¿e evaluation stage
is particularly interesting for my purposes, since it allows to pin down
attribute utility values. Second, the sequential nature of speed dating
generates within person variation in utility ranges along attributes.¿ird,
the order in which participants speed-date each other is eectively ran-
dom.¿is property, in combination with the within-person variation
in utility ranges, ensures clean identication of context eects. Finally,
dimensions used for ranking potential partners are exogenously given,
meaning that they cannot be assumed ex post.
¿e results support the notion of relative thinking, as conceptualized
by Bushong et al. (2015). ¿e same person will hence be evaluated dier-
ently depending on the spread of the utility range, which in turn depends
on previously considered participants. Evaluations translate into behav-
ior (the decision to date) as follows: If the attribute is perceived positively,
a larger range results in a ceteris paribus lower propensity to agree to a
date, while the converse is true for levels of the attribute that provide
disutility. ¿is mirrors the mechanism Bushong et al. (2015) envision
when claiming that xed dierences loom larger the more narrow the
range against which they are evaluated.
On a more cautionary note, these results hold only for attractiveness,
and seem to be much stronger in case the evaluator is female. ¿ey
continue to hold qualitatively when considering the attribute fun, but
are absent for the other three attributes on which participants of the
experiments could rate each other. Reassuringly, neither of these latter
attributes has any predictive power for the decision to date. As the identi-
cation strategy relies on picking up dierences in the signs of the range
coecients across attribute levels, the absence of context dependence
for these three attributes is expected.
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To rule out other mechanisms that could explain the observed behav-
ioral patterns, I control for contrast eects and time trends. In addition,
I present a number of robustness checks, showing that the results are
not driven by the specication of the attribute range I use throughout
the main text, nor potential rescaling or calibration issues. None of
these alternative specications aect the main conclusion substantially.
I therefore conclude that context inuences decision makers, and behav-
ior is in line with the notion of relative thinking proposed by Bushong
et al. (2015). Considering that nding a suitable partner is a decision that
should induce participants to put some thought into their choices and act
according to their sincere preference, it is likely that context dependence
also plays a role in situations with less serious consequences.
¿e three chapters of this dissertation are self-contained and can be
read independently from each other. Appendices for all chapters are
presented in Part iii, and a consolidated bibliography appears in Part iv.
Part II
MORALS, MARKETS, AND MALLEABILITY:
THREE ESSAYS IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS

1
ANIMAL WELFARE AND HUMAN ETHICS
1.1 introduction
With technological progress, animal farming has changed considerably.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century and paralleling the radical
changes of the Industrial Revolution, intensive animal farming soon
replaced more traditional forms of agriculture. Two discoveries were
essential for this development: synthetic vitamin production enabled
farmers to raise chickens indoors (Gordon, 1996), and animals needed
to be given less space since contagious diseases could be contained by
means of antibiotics and vaccines.
Despite its obvious advantages, including cheaper and more ecient
production, it has long been recognized that intensive animal farming
has severe deciencies when it comes to ecological consequences and
results in hardship for the animals involved. Some farmers have therefore
returned to traditional forms of agriculture, which have become known
as organic in order to highlight the distinction to intensive farming
practices. At the same time, demand for organically produced food
has increased substantially and continues to grow (cf. G. D. ¿ompson,
1998).
What motivates consumers to purchase organic food? Some may
genuinely care about animal welfare and intend to support species-
appropriate and sustainable farming. Yet increased demand for organic
food could also be driven by other, self-oriented, reasons: customers may
sometimes follow advertisements without much reection. Furthermore,
they may be motivated by health concerns, e.g. aiming at minimizing
meat consumption of animals that received antibiotics. Consumers may
also want to project a favorable image of themselves onto their peers
if they are part of a subgroup that cares about animal welfare. In short,
demand for organic products could result either from entirely selsh
motives, environmental factors, or a genuine interest in animal welfare.1
Todisentangle between these possible causes, it does not suce to look
at scanner data or aggregate market shares of organic products. ¿ese
1 We use the term ‘animal welfare’ to encompass a general disposition to care about living
conditions of animals. ¿e exact denition depends on our measure of the willingness
to pay for better living conditions of animals and will be explained in detail below.
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data are not informative about determinants of purchasing behavior.
Likewise, hypothetical questionnaire studies have been criticized for
measuring intent rather than behavior. In a rather stark example, Cowe
and Williams (2000) nd a preference for sustainable consumption
among 30% of their sample in questionnaires, but only a 3%market share
of goods that are produced according to ethical standards in the reference
market (UK).2 ¿is suggests that questionnaire studies are misleading
when it comes to measuring the market share of organic products. ¿ey
may be even more inaccurate when assessing motivations for ethical
purchase behavior, as social desirability would likely bias responses away
from image concerns and towards more socially accepted motivations.
To close this gap in the literature and to better understand what moti-
vates consumers to purchase organic foods, we elicit concern for animal
welfare in an incentivized, direct and real setup, in a task that allows to
abstract from self-oriented motives. Subjects choose between intensive
farming and organic farming for a living laying hen. Opting for organic
farming is costly, yet guarantees better food, daylight, and much more
space to the hen. ¿is procedure allows us to elicit subjects’ willingness
to pay for transferring a hen to an environment that is better suited to
its needs.3 Full anonymity and a single-blind experimental design en-
sure that our results are not diluted by image concerns or experimenter
demand eects. We can therefore isolate concern for organic agriculture
and animal welfare from other more self-oriented factors that could be
at play when purchasing organic food at a supermarket.
2 ¿is so-called “30:3 syndrome” or “ethical purchase gap” has been independently
veried by other authors, such as Nicholls and Lee (2006). See Bray et al. (2010) for a
review.
3 While opting for organic farming is a clear statement of opting for animal welfare,
one may also see it as a decision in favor of sustainability. Dening sustainability
is an elusive task. Yet one may consider a responsibility towards other species and
the ecosystem as an important constituent of sustainable behavior. For instance, the
UN follow a three pillar approach with regard to sustainability: “Consisting of three
pillars, sustainable development seeks to achieve, in a balanced manner, economic
development, social development and environmental protection.” (http://www.un.org/
en/ga/president/65/issues/sustdev.shtml). In that case, keeping animals in conditions
in which they typically die from infections in very short time if they do not receive
antibiotics in their feed, and in which they are deprived from nature and daylight, can
easily be classied as non-sustainable. We acknowledge that it may not be possible
to fully disentangle ‘sustainability’ and ‘ethical responsibility’. ¿ese diculties have
been recognized and are widely discussed in the literature, for example by Singhapakdi,
Vitell, Rao, and Kurtz (1999). For the purposes of this article, however, we remain
agnostic about the distinction and view the decision about living conditions as a proxy
for both.
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¿e gap between questionnaire results and buying decisions may
partly arise from the fact that it is cheaper to claim that one cares about
animal welfare if it is costless (Bray et al., 2010; Carrigan & Attalla, 2001;
Nicholls & Lee, 2006). ¿is is why we establish a real tradeo: money
versus organic living conditions for a hen. Yet in addition to introducing
money as an exchange medium, specic market structures may also
aect decisions via other channels. Our setup deliberately abstracts from
these channels, as their inuence could easily vary depending on the
specic market design.
For example, we abstract from the eects of advertisement. ¿rough
advertisement, people’s attentionmay be directed to aspects of an animal
product other than the living conditions of the animals. Similarly, rms
may exploit consumers’ limited availability of cognitive resources by
making certain attributes of products more salient (Bordalo et al., 2013;
Gennaioli & Shleifer, 2010). Furthermore, consumer behavior may be
very dierent depending on whether consumers buy in a small shop or
in a large supermarket. In the latter, they may feel less responsible for
their buying behavior as they can share feelings of guilt with many other
customers and receive more social information (Latané & Nida, 1981;
Bandura, 1999; Rothenhäusler, Schweizer, & Szech, 2015). In addition,
large markets extend the scope for consumers to apply replacement
logics: Consumers might be prone to argue that even if they abstain
from buying factory-farmed animal products, other consumers will buy.
Similar reasoning leads to ‘justication from substitution’ (cf. Sobel,
2010; Falk & Szech, 2014).
We nd that subjects are willing to pay 14 Euros for animal welfare
on average. ¿ere is substantial heterogeneity in our measure: while 37%
of subjects are willing to pay 25 Euros (the highest amount we allowed
for) in order to put a laying hen into better living conditions, 15% are
not willing to pay anything.
We also investigate what kind of people care about animal welfare
when directly exposed to the decision between self-interest (i.e., money)
versus improving the living conditions of a laying hen.
Intensive farming environments keep animals away from daylight and
soil and provide only limited living space. Compared to traditional ani-
mal husbandry, intensive farming requires less human labor and allows
farmers to produce more meat and other animal products in shorter
time spans and in greater quantity. At rst glance, intensive farming
therefore seems to be an innovative and ecient way to structure produc-
tion of animal products. It has even been argued that intensive farming
may increase social welfare, as cheaper access to animal products could
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improve human life (McCarthy & Bennett, 1986). Yet one could ask
whether this reading of the term ‘welfare’ is broad enough: rst of all,
the ecological consequences of industrialized meat production seem
worrying (Eisler et al., 2014). Emissions of greenhouse gases, for instance,
would likely be substantially lower if animals were held in more appro-
priate environments, given that the supply of farming land is limited.
¿e same holds for water use. Second, it is at least questionable whether
eating animal products improves human health or not, specically when
they make up a large part of people’s diets.4
Rather than contributing to the discussion about ecological and health-
related consequences, we aim to understand the social importance of
intensive farming. Put boldly: does the support of intensive farming go
hand in hand with lowermoral standards towards humans?
¿is question has received considerable attention from philosophers
and ethicists, but clean empirical evidence is lacking. In a broad sense,
whether there is an association between caring about animal welfare
and high moral standards towards humans touches the philosophical
debate asking where to legitimately draw ethical boundaries, i.e. which
species to include in ethical considerations. Although our study does
not claim to provide an answer to this very general question, we provide
evidence that in the specic context we consider, enabling a laying hen
to live in a more suitable environment goes hand in hand with a more
empathic, prosocial, and value-oriented personality.
Philosophers like Aquinas, Locke and Kant hypothesized that there
could be a link between the willingness to accept the suering of animals
and the willingness to accept human suering. For example, Immanuel
Kant argues that an appropriate treatment of animals is not a means
in and of itself, but rather an instrument to ensure peaceful relations
among humans (Adams et al., 2011). Aquinas postulates: “If in Holy
Scripture there are found some injunctions forbidding the iniction of
some cruelty toward brute animals [. . . ] this is either for removing a
man’s mind from exercising cruelty towards other men [. . . ] or because
the injury inicted on animals turns to a temporal loss for some man
[. . . ].” (Francione, 1995, p. 6). With regard to educating children, Locke
advises parents that “[. . . ] the custom of killing and tormenting of beasts,
will, by degrees, harden their minds even towards men.” (Locke, 1996, p.
90). More recently, Singer (1995) has argued that human ethics should
extend to certain animals on the grounds that great apes, for instance,
4 For instance, a large, prospective study by Kelemen, Kushi, Jacobs, and Cerhan (2005)
nds that deaths resulting from coronary heart disease decrease by 30% when study
participants substitute vegetable for animal protein.
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clearly show signs of intelligence and are similar to humans in their
ability to suer. Researchers have hence speculated that there could be
a strong link between caring about animal welfare and human ethical
rights.
If there is a link between treating animals well and respecting moral
standards towards other humans, debate of intensive farming must in-
clude potential eects on human social behaviors, besides pure eciency
arguments. In fact, the notion of eciency may be too narrow in this
context, as moral consequences are outside its scope. However, the dier-
ence between humans and animals is o en stressed as the demarcation
line of ethics, suggesting that caring about animal welfare and behaving
ethically towards other humans are two completely distinct issues.
For example, René Descartes proposed a mechanistic view of animals,
which became rather popular in his time: To him, animals were automata,
without soul or mind (Descartes, 1996). In many religions, animals are
depicted as soulless creatures with few or no signs of intelligence. Aris-
totle established a clear hierarchy of humans over animals, arguing that
the latter were made for the sake of human beings.5 In addition, several
dening aspects of humans, such as memory, self-awareness, and the
ability to deliberate and carry out plans that reach far into the future,
are frequently pointed out as constituting the boundary between beings
that should and beings that should not be included in ethical consid-
erations. Following such arguments, it has been concluded that ethical
considerations should only apply to humans, and that the treatment of
animals may be rather unrelated to how humans treat other humans
(Wise, 2014). Our ndings contradict the latter views in the following
sense. ¿ere is a signicant, positive association between caring about
animal welfare and moral standards.
¿e setup of our experiment is simple. Participants are directly ex-
posed to the decision between self-interest (money) versus improving
the living conditions of a laying hen. If subjects opt for money, the hen
will live under minimal legal standards, i.e., in intensive farming. If sub-
jects forgo the money, the hen will instead live in an organic farming
environment for the rest of its life, with access to daylight and soil, much
more space, and organic feed without antibiotics.6 Subjects know that
5 In contrast, Pythagoreans believed that souls could migrate from human to animal
bodies.¿ey accordingly stressed the importance of treating animals well (Wise, 2014).
6 ¿e preventive use of antibiotics is ruled out by Naturland regulations. ¿e regulations
do allow for antibiotic treatment if animals become ill, but conditions are very strict:
farmers must rst use natural remedies. Only if these treatments do not take eect can
antibiotics be used in very limited quantities. If laying hens are treated with antibiotic
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the organic living conditions are certied and controlled by Naturland,
a well-known labeling scheme for high organic farming standards in
Germany.78 We elicit decisions for various amounts of money in a price
list, with monetary amounts increasing from 0.5 to 25 Euros. For each
monetary amount, subjects decide between receiving money and expos-
ing the hen to intensive farming conditions versus receiving no money
and organic living conditions for the hen. Subjects know that one of their
decisions is randomly drawn and implemented with all consequences.
As a measure of moral dispositions towards humans, we elicit subjects’
tendencies to behave in Machiavellian ways. Machiavellianism, named
a er the 15th century philosopher and politician Niccolò Machiavelli,
includes characteristics such as the willingness to manipulate others,
behave opportunistically, neglect morals and show little aect in so-
cial interactions with other humans (Christie, Geis, & Berger, 1970).
Machiavellianism has been measured in various studies and was found
to correlate with economic opportunism (Sakalaki, Richardson, &¿é-
paut, 2007), lying (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979) and delinquency (Muris,
Meesters, & Timmermans, 2013). Machiavellianism therefore serves as a
validated measure of immoral and antisocial dispositions.
To enable a closer look at the personalities of our participants, we elicit
neuroticism, extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and
conscientiousness as part of the Big Five Personality Inventory. Agree-
ableness can be linked to compassion, empathy, altruism and an interest
in other humans’ well-being (Costa &McCrae, 1992). Agreeableness, like
openness, is also associated with personal values such as humaneness
and goodness (Olver & Mooradian, 2003), as well as prosocial motiva-
tions (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007). Openness has also
been associated with empathy and emotional intelligence (Del Barrio,
Aluja, & García, 2004; Van der Zee, ¿ijs, & Schakel, 2002). People
who can easily imagine what life in intensive farming must be like for
an animal may tend to save the hen from such living conditions. As
such, more open personalities can be expected to have a higher willing-
ness to pay for animal welfare. ¿us, the openness-agreeableness nexus
substances more than once a year, their eggs cannot be labeled and sold as organic.
(http://www.naturland.de/verbraucher.html).
7 “Naturland’s farmers and processors work to the highest organic standards, which
are even more stringent than the legal requirements imposed by the EC Organic
Directive.”(http://www.naturland.de/ourdistinguishingfeatures.html).
8 Of course, it remains debatable whether keeping animals in husbandry is acceptable at
all. For a discussion, see, e.g., http://www.albertschweitzerfoundation.org.
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serves as a second validated measure of other-regarding moral values
and attitudes.9
Our data reveal that there is indeed a strong link between caring about
animal welfare and standards in ethical behavior towards humans. Sub-
jects willing to forgo higher amounts of money for the hen’s sake score
lower in the Machiavelli test and hence exhibit more moral, social dis-
positions towards humans. Furthermore, subjects who care more about
the hen also show higher levels of openness in the Big Five Personality
Inventory (Costa &McCrae, 1992). Hence, we nd that people interested
in animal welfare also tend to care more about the well-being of other
humans and are more likely to have an altruistic, cooperative personality.
In addition, we nd that people oriented towards more market-friendly
political parties care less about animal welfare and tend to opt for the self-
ish monetary amount. Maybe these subjects are used to thinking mostly
about direct costs and benets, leading them to ignore the well-being of
a weak third party.
Our study ts into a recent literature discussing morality in economic
transactions. Bartling, Weber, and Yao (2015) conduct two experiments
in Switzerland and China to study whether participants have preferences
for socially responsible behavior when interacting in markets. ¿eir
ndings indicate that both consumers and producers are indeed willing
to reduce negative externalities imposed on third parties, as in 45%
of all transactions the more expensive but externality-free product is
traded. Yet they also attest that the willingness to reduce externalities is
higher still in non-market contexts, which speaks to the erosion of moral
values through markets that had previously been conrmed by Falk and
Szech (2013). In their experiment, subjects decide between saving the
life of a mouse versus receiving 10 Euros and agreeing to kill the mouse.
¿is task is used as a direct, incentivized measure ofmoral transgression
(see Deckers, Armin, Kosse, and Szech (2016) for validation). While
the task bears some resemblance to ours, killing a vertebrate without
justication and appropriate qualications is forbidden by law in many
countries, including Germany.10 In Falk and Szech (2013), subjects are
9 Olver and Mooradian (2003) concisely summarize research on these personality traits
as follows: “[. . . ] the extant empirical studies generally suggest that the more intellec-
tive traits of Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness relate systematically
to Values. Specically, trait Openness to Experience predisposes individuals toward
values related to Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence (most specically, Stim-
ulation, Self-Direction, and Universalism) versus those related to Conservation and
Self-Enhancement (Tradition, Conformity, Security, and Power).” (pp. 114).
10 Compare the German “Tierschutzgesetz” (Protection of Animals Act) as well as Art.
20a of the German constitution.
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thus confronted with a decision that is perceived as morally relevant by
many, that risks breaking some taboo in the sense that an animal is killed
without intending to eat it or defending oneself against a potential threat,
and that creates a strong sense of internal conict. Deciding between
money and better living conditions for a laying hen, in contrast, is very
similar to many consumption decisions we face on a daily basis and
does not violate any conventional norm.¿e two tasks therefore address
dierent aspects of moral behavior.
1.2 experimental design & procedures
1.2.1 Methodology
We use a controlled laboratory experiment to study whether subjects
have a positive willingness to pay for animal welfare. A er eliciting their
willingness to pay, we ask participants to respond to well-validated and
frequently used questionnaires in order to measure their ethical attitude
towards other human beings. To the best of our knowledge, we are the
rst to use a fully incentivized, direct and real setup to study questions
relating to animal welfare.
Previous studies on the relationship between personality traits, demo-
graphic factors and ethically responsible behavior are typically aected
by some methodological features that are worth discussing in more de-
tail. Most importantly, the dependent variable in the bulk of previous
research has been constructed with the help of scenarios or vignettes.11
As noted, for instance, by Marshall and Dewe (1997), the validity of the
conclusions drawn from these types of hypothetical situations rests on
two assumptions: (i), the scenario presented to respondents actually con-
stitutes an ethical dilemma, and (ii), the context of this scenario is viewed
in comparable ways by the respondents. In addition, the elicitation of
moral behavior is not immune to social desirability concerns, rendering
separation of intentions from actual behavior virtually impossible. In
the context of ethical decision-making, this bias is especially worrisome.
In hypothetical scenario and survey studies, the cost of presenting one-
self as an individual that adheres to social norms is low. However, as
evidenced by the gap between the willingness to engage in ethically
11 O’Fallon and Buttereld (2005) nd that 55% of the 174 studies they analyze use hy-
pothetical scenarios or vignettes in order to elicit a measure for ethically responsible
behavior, while less than 4% of the results are based on lab studies or eld experiments.
Other ways to measure ethical behavior include asking subjects to assess their own
behavior or the conduct of rms, as judged by internal audits (p. 404).
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responsible purchase behavior and actual purchases, desired behavior
does not necessarily match observed behavior. We address these poten-
tial concerns by designing an appropriate experimental environment
and by introducing a trade-o between ethical behavior and monetary
disutility.
1.2.2 Design
In order to elicit the degree to which subjects care about animal welfare,
they trade o a monetary benet against the welfare of a hen. Subjects
decide between organic living conditions for the laying hen and forgoing
a monetary amount versus conventional agriculture (intensive farming)
for the hen and receiving a monetary amount.
Subjects know that if they opt for organic farming, the hen will live in
a Naturland-certied farming environment. To be certied as organic
egg producers, farms have to guarantee high standards with regard to
ecologically sustainable production and are not allowed to add antibiotic
substances to the feed. Subjects are informed that our farm is certied
as an organic “Naturland” producer. ¿is label is only given to farms
fullling criteria that are substantially stricter than those prescribed
by EU regulations. Conversely, conventional agriculture refers to legal
minimum standards for livestock breeding.
Subjects know that the hen has been entrusted to their care. To make
the decision more salient and to bridge the gap from the laboratory to a
more natural environment, they are shown two pictures of a hen (Figure
A.1 in Appendix A.1).
Moreover, the two possible living conditions, conventional versus
organic farming, are described in detail and summarized in a table
(Table 1.1).
A er being exposed to the information on living conditions and
the implications of their choices, subjects decide between monetary
amounts versus animal welfare. ¿ey decide on a price list. In each
decision row, they can opt for conventional living conditions for the
hen and a monetary amount versus organic farming and no monetary
amount. Monetary amounts increase over decision rows, from 0.5 Euros
to 25 Euros in 0.5 Euro increments. Subjects know that one of their
choices will later be randomly drawn in order to determine their payo.
¿ey can hence guarantee organic farming to the hen by always choosing
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Conventional Organic
grassy outdoor runs no ∼ 4m2 per hen
canopied outdoor area no available year-round,
possibility to sand-
and dustbathe
size of coop up to 6000 hens up to 3000 hens
feed antibiotics allowed no antibiotics allowed
Table 1.1.—Comparison of Living Conditions
the organic option. We include example payo calculations and control
questions to make sure that subjects understand the task.12
Choosing the price list method rather than a xed monetary amount
enables us to study subjects’ willingness to pay for sustainable farming
and a better life for the hen. ¿e switch point, i.e. the amount of money
at which subjects switch from organic to conventional agriculture, can
hence be interpreted as howmuchmoney subjects are willing to forgo in
order to enable a hen to live in a more sustainable and more appropriate
environment.13
Since the consequences of their actions are not directly observable to
participants in our experiment, we take care to state that their choiceswill
be carried out exactly as specied in the instructions. To emphasize this
point, we repeat the corresponding paragraph in oral form and inform
subjects that they will be able to verify all facts a er the experiment. To
reduce experimenter eects, all sessions are conducted by a research
assistant who is blind to the hypotheses of this study.
Another aspect of our study is worth noting.While subjects take an in-
centivized choice about the animal, we elicit moral dispositions towards
humans via well-established test questions. We chose this combination
of elicitation methods for the following reasons. If subjects rst decided
about forgoing money to improve an animal’s welfare and then took a
real-life decision in an ethical context (e.g. forgoing money to help a
human being versus taking the money), the rst decision could easily
aect the second. ¿is so-called conscience accounting is reminiscent
12 Translated instructions are included in Appendix A.1. Instructions in the original
language (German) are available upon request.
13 Subjects who always choose the monetary reward (i.e., never choose organic farming)
are assigned a switch point of 0.5 Euros. Accordingly, subjects who always choose
organic farming are assigned a switch point of 25.5 Euros.
1.2 experimental design & procedures 25
of the trade in pardons used by the medieval Catholic church to raise
money, and has recently been conrmed experimentally by U. Gneezy,
Imas, and Madarász (2014). In particular, if subjects made a strong link
between animal welfare and human ethics, which is what we aim to
explore in this study, subjects with a bad conscience from harming the
animal could decide to help the human in the second step just to ease
their bad conscience and thereby obtain a better self-image (Bénabou
& Tirole, 2011). ¿is is why we rely on validated questionnaires to elicit
moral and prosocial dispositions instead of providing a second task with
another real third party that may be helped or harmed.
1.2.3 Procedures
¿e experiment was conducted at the University of Bamberg on two con-
secutive days in February 2013 with a sample comprising predominantly
students. In total, 216 subjects (117 female, 94 male, 5 unidentied) par-
ticipated in one of ve sessions with an average duration of 105 minutes.
Average earnings were approximately 13 Euros, including a show-up fee
of 4 Euros. Participants were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
Subjects received written instructions for the experiment. Before re-
ceiving the instructions, they read a text on free will, religion, or brain
activities. Texts were randomly allocated and constitute our treatment
conditions. Since switch points do not dier across conditions, we col-
lapse the data in order to obtain a broader basis for our study (see Ap-
pendix A.2 for details on the text treatments and statistical tests showing
that p-values are not signicant on any conventional level). All analyses
are replicated on the control sample (see Appendix A.3).
A er all subjects had lled out the price list, they were asked to com-
plete the Big Five Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992), a test
for Machiavellian personality traits (Christie et al., 1970), the Bem Sex
Role Inventory (Bem, 1981) and a series of demographic questions. In
order to motivate subjects to respond to these questions with proper
attention, we incentivized this stage by paying an additional 3 Euros.
1.2.4 Implementation
In order to implement the decisions taken by the subjects in our ex-
periment, we cooperated with two local egg farmers. One of these egg
producers keeps the laying hens in large coops that are run according to
conventional standards. ¿e other, neighboring, egg farmer is certied
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as organic according to the high standards of Naturland. We arranged
that for each hen involved in our study, two places were kept open: one
in intensive farming, one in the organic environment. We opted for this
solution as it ensures that there is no scope for a replacement argument,
meaning that the remaining capacity is not lled up with other hens. For
each hen, there are two living options, and the one that is not chosen by
subjects remains unlled.
1.3 predictions
Our research design allows us to study correlations between individual
characteristics and our measure of ethical behavior, the switch point. We
derive hypotheses concerning the direction of eects in the following
section.
1.3.1 Personality Traits
Personality traits are generally more dicult to observe than demo-
graphic and socioeconomic information, yet they o en exhibit a higher
degree of predictive power (De Pelsmacker, Driesen, & Rayp, 2005;
O’Fallon & Buttereld, 2005). ¿e availability of validated and o en
used scales enables us to identify key personality factors that are likely
to play a role for moral judgment. We concentrate on two standard
measures: Machiavellianism (Mach-IV) and the Big Five Personality
Inventory (NEO-FFI). Both have been extensively analyzed in various
contexts. We also include the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) to explore
whether self-ascribed gender roles have an impact on willingness to pay
for animal welfare, over and above that of biological gender.
Machiavellian characters exhibit a high willingness to manipulate
others, behave opportunistically, neglect morals and show little aect
in social interactions (Christie et al., 1970). Machiavellianism as a per-
sonality construct is generally considered to consist of three dimen-
sions, reecting dierent themes in the original writings upon which the
Machiavelli scale is based: “¿e rst theme was the endorsement of such
manipulative tactics as the use of attery and deceit in interpersonal
interactions. ¿e second theme was a cynical view of human nature
in which others are regarded as weak, untrustworthy and self-serving.
¿e third theme was a disregard for conventional morality.” (B. Fehr,
Samsom, & Paulhus, 2013, p. 78). ¿e Mach-IV scale we use accounts
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predominantly for the rst two themes.14 We therefore compute scores
for ‘tactics’ and ‘cynicism’ separately and include them as two regressors
in our analyses.15
Machiavellianism has been shown to be negatively associated with eth-
ical decision making and behavior (Ford & Richardson, 1994; O’Fallon
& Buttereld, 2005). People who score high on the Machiavellianism
scale are more likely to evaluate unethical behavior as appropriate if it is
eective in achieving a personal goal than people with low scores (Geis
&Moon, 1981; Singhapakdi & Vitell, 1990). Furthermore, machiavellistic
people exhibit a higher propensity to lie (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979).
Kahane et al. (2012) suggest that such unethical behavior may be rooted
in a lack of empathy and lack of aversion to harm others. ¿us, if there is
a link between moral standards in social interactions with humans and
caring about animal welfare and sustainability, Machiavellianism should
be negatively associated with decision making that enhances animal
welfare and provides more sustainable living conditions to animals. We
accordingly expect subjects with high Machiavellianism scores to care
less about the living conditions of their hen.
Of the ve personality dimensions that Costa andMcCrae (1992) iden-
tify as basic traits, openness and agreeableness are most closely related to
empathic behavior and prosocial motivation. In their Big Five inventory,
Costa and McCrae (1992) describe an agreeable person as being sympa-
thetic, interested in the well-being of others and compassionate. ¿ey
further link agreeableness to characteristics such as empathy and altru-
ism. It is hence not surprising that agreeable individuals are reported to
be prosocially motivated (Graziano et al., 2007; Wilkowski, Robinson,
& Meier, 2006).
Openness as a concept is rather dicult to grasp, but there is wide-
ranging agreement that it refers to a personality with strong beliefs in
values, a perceptive and curious intellect, and a liberal, adventurous, and
empathic mindset (McCrae & Costa, 1997). ¿e link between openness
and empathy has also been established by Del Barrio et al. (2004), and
it has been shown that subjects who score high on the openness facet
possess higher levels of emotional intelligence (Van der Zee et al., 2002).
Taken together, these results suggest that if there is a relation between
moral behavior and caring about animalwelfare, subjects scoring high on
14 Only two out of 20 questions refer to the morality dimension. Any measurement of
this subfactor by means of the Mach-IV scale is therefore bound to suer from low
precision.
15 ¿is procedure is also recommended by B. Fehr et al. (2013), who provide a thorough
review of the literature spawned by the Machiavellianism scale from 1971 to 1987.
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agreeableness and openness will make more animal welfare-enhancing
and sustainable decisions. We thus hypothesize that agreeableness and
openness will correlate positively with the amount of money subjects
are willing to forgo to increase a hen’s living conditions.
An exploratory questionnaire we use in our study is the Bem Sex Role
Inventory (BSRI). ¿e BSRI is a very useful instrument to abstract from
biological gender and instead focus on self-ascribed sex roles that range
from rather masculine to rather feminine. ¿e questionnaire consists
of a series of attributes that are usually associated with feminine or
masculine behavior. Several questionnaire studies have suggested that
females may behave in more ethical ways thanmales, while other studies
nd no signicant correlation between biological gender and morality
(for instance, Chung and Trivedi (2003) and Ross and Robertson (2003)
report signicant results conrming the positive association between
female gender and morality, while in the majority of scenarios in Lund
(2000) and Radtke (2000) there is no gender dierence in behavior).
Besides biological gender, we are interested in sex roles in order to see
whether self-ascribed gender may play a role for decision-making.
1.3.2 Demographic Variables
As indicated above, demographic criteria are o en found to possess
low explanatory power for ethically responsible or sustainable behavior.
For instance, a study by Straughan and Roberts (1999) examines the
link between demographic and psychographic criteria with ecologically
conscious behavior. ¿ey nd that psychographic criteria are much
better suited to explain observed variation in the dependent measure
than demographic factors.
Our results are largely in line with this general tendency. Across the
spectrum of demographic questions we posed, only those that are highly
correlated with personality traits (like being a vegetarian) possess pre-
dictive power.
1.4 results
We dene the switch point to be the rst decision where a subject
switches from the organic to the conventional agriculture option. A
total of 16 out of 216 subjects switch between the two options multiple
times, and are classied accordingly. We exclude 19 out of the remaining
200 subjects because they switch from conventional to organic farming.
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men women∅ σ N ∅ σ N
Age 23.79 3.09 84 23.38 3.50 106
Vegetarian 0.10 0.30 84 0.20 0.40 106
Vegan 0.01 0.11 84 0.01 0.10 106
Religiosity Index 0.39 0.20 84 0.38 0.19 106
Table 1.2.—Summary Statistics
¿ese subjects either preferred intensive farming to organic farming,
or they did not understand the task. Including multiple switchers, this
leaves 197 subjects in the sample. If subjects switch more than once, we
impute their willingness to pay by taking the rst switch point as a proxy.
As a robustness check, we also present analyses on the sample without
multiple switchers, which comprises 181 subjects.
Table 1.2 summarizesmain demographic characteristics of the subjects
used in this study.
In order to test our predictions, we present regressions with the will-
ingness to pay for animal welfare as dependent variable and personality
measures as well as demographic information as regressors. As is evident
from Figure 1.1, the dependent variable is censored both from above and
from below.16 ¿is would result in an inconsistent estimator when using
OLS. To deal with censored data, Tobin (1958) proposed a maximum
likelihood estimator that Amemiya (1973) subsequently proved to be
consistent. We therefore report regressions using the Tobit model.
1.4.1 Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare
As pointed out before, the nature of our task allows for a clean identica-
tion of willingness to pay for animal welfare. We explicitly abstract from
advertisement and replacement eects and suppress image concerns by
ensuring full anonymity. Our data indicate that the median subject is
willing to pay 11 Euros for animal welfare (the average WTP is 14 Euros).
16 ¿e empirical probability density function of the switch point has mass points both at
0.5 Euros and at 25.5 Euros. It is therefore likely that a signicant fraction of subjects
would have been willing to pay more than 25.5 Euros in order to ensure better living
conditions for the hen, while an equally signicant (yet not quite as large) fraction of
subjects may exhibit a negative willingness to pay for animal welfare.
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Figure 1.1.—Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare
Notes: Empirical cumulative density function of the switch
point, separately by gender.
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Visual inspection of Figure 1.1 reveals substantial heterogeneity in
the switch point. About 37% of participants refuse to accept conven-
tional farming for any amount of money we oered, thereby ensuring
organic farming for their hen. On the other end of the spectrum, 15%
of subjects are unwilling to give up any amount of money in order to
ensure better living conditions for the laying hen.¿ere is no statistically
signicant dierence between men and women regarding the median
and the distribution of the switch point.
As discussed in Section 1.1, a number of studies have shown a gap
between intent to behave in ethical ways and actual behavior in the
marketplace (cf. Cowe & Williams, 2000; Nicholls & Lee, 2006; Bray
et al., 2010). We cannot directly attest to this ‘ethical purchase gap’, since
we lack data on intent. However, according to personal communication
with the two cooperating farmers, the average payment of 14 Euros corre-
sponds almost exactly to the additional cost imposed by organic farming
relative to conventional agriculture. ¿is suggests that participants have
a realistic understanding of the two dierent conditions and are willing
to compensate farmers for additionally incurred costs in full. We may
therefore speculate that in our sample, the willingness to pay for organic
farming conditions is suciently high in order to induce the majority
of subjects to buy organic even in the marketplace.
1.4.2 Animal Welfare and Human Ethics
¿e central question we aim to answer with our study concerns the
social importance of intensive animal farming. Our results show that
lower moral standards towards humans are indeed associated with less
concern for animal welfare. ¿is enables us to speak to a long-running
debate about the relationship between animal and human cruelty. For
instance, Kant makes the following empirical claim: “If he is not to stie
his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he
who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men.”
(Gruen, 2014). It is certainly true that Kant claims a causal relationship
that we cannot show. However, we do fail to reject the hypothesis by
showing that there is a correlation between animal welfare and ethical
standards towards humans.
Put dierently, we provide empirical support for Kant’s claim that “we
can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals” (Kant, 1981),
which is a necesary condition for the claim that cruelty to animals leads
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Excl. Multiple Switchers Incl. Multiple Switchers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Openness 0.549∗∗ 0.473∗ 0.517∗∗ 0.422∗
(0.250) (0.259) (0.218) (0.230)
Agreeableness 0.431 0.295 0.246 0.178
(0.416) (0.414) (0.344) (0.338)
Machiavelli (Tactics) -0.801∗∗ -0.707∗ -0.680∗∗ -0.548
(0.383) (0.401) (0.320) (0.336)
Machiavelli (Cynicism) 0.557 0.458 0.302 0.163
(0.486) (0.484) (0.388) (0.386)
Locus of Control -0.304 -0.223 -0.286 -0.210
(0.230) (0.227) (0.202) (0.199)
Masculinism Score 0.158 0.0512 0.143 0.0559
(0.192) (0.188) (0.174) (0.171)
Feminism Score 0.217 0.203 0.163 0.155
(0.192) (0.200) (0.166) (0.169)
Age 0.580 0.762∗
(0.536) (0.459)
Gender -3.363 -2.590
(3.733) (3.241)
Vegetarian or Vegan 12.47∗∗ 9.178∗
(5.812) (4.700)
Religiosity Dummy -1.150 -1.352
(3.600) (3.021)
Constant -13.86 -16.85 -0.00792 -10.50
(31.32) (31.07) (26.42) (26.28)
N 153 147 168 162
N (uncensored) 68 66 83 81
N (le -censored) 24 22 24 22
N (right-censored) 61 59 61 59
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.034 0.019 0.029
Log Likelihood -370.8 -353.4 -432.1 -414.7
Table 1.3.—Determinants of Concern for Animal Welfare
Notes: Tobit regressions with switch point as dependent variable.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.
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to cruelty towards humans, and an important link in his argument as to
why humans should be good to animals.
As measures for ethical dispositions towards humans, we elicited
two dimensions of Machiavellianism: a cynical view of human nature
and a general disposition to exploit human weakness for personal gains
through manipulative tactics (B. Fehr et al., 2013). ¿e rst dimension
concerns the perception of others without appealing to the moral views
of the respondent himself.¿e second dimension prods subjects for their
willingness to participate in exploitative endeavors, essentially asking
them for their willingness to circumvent conventional moral standards
to achieve personal gains. We therefore focus on the second dimension
(which we term Machiavellianism (Tactics) in the regressions below) to
gain insights into subjects’ personal attitudes regarding ethical behavior.
In addition, we asked subjects to complete the full Big Five personality
inventory and use their agreeableness and openness scores as proxies for
a general disposition to respect ethical standards and endorse humane
and good behavior (Olver & Mooradian, 2003).
Table 1.3 presents our results. Exactly as predicted, we nd a signicant
negative correlation between the switch point and the tactics dimension
of Machiavellianism: ¿e more money a subject is prepared to forgo in
favor of organic farming, the higher are his or her standards concerning
morals and other-regarding behavior in social interactions with humans.
As hypothesized, people who classify as detached from conventional
morality and unemotional according to the Machiavellianism (Tactics)
scale care less about the hen’s living conditions than other subjects. ¿e
eect is statistically and economically signicant: if the Machiavelli (Tac-
tics) score increases by one point, willingness to pay for animal welfare
decreases by 0.8 Euros on average. Measured against the empirical range
of scores (with a minimum of 11 and a maximum of 43), this implies that
a 4 percentage point increase in Machiavellianism results in a 1 Euro
decrease in the switch point. To illustrate the magnitude of this eect,
someone in the rst quartile of the distribution would be willing to pay
at least 5 Euros more than a person in the fourth quartile.
As a second measure of moral dispositions towards humans, we
elicited the subject’s scores in the Big Five facets agreeableness and
openness. We expected a strong link between agreeableness and caring
about animal welfare. Our data do not support this hypothesis. ¿is
may be due to several factors: either the measure of agreeableness as
personality construct is imprecise, or it does not measure what it claims
to measure, or agreeableness is indeed uncorrelated with caring about
animal welfare. Considering the relatively small sample size, we may
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also not have enough power to detect the eect if it is suciently small.
¿e highly signicant negative correlation (ρ = −0.39, p < 0.01) between
the Machiavellianism (Tactics) score and Big Five facet agreeableness
lends some support to the latter explanation.
Reassuringly, we do nd a link between openness and concerns for
animal welfare: a two point increase in openness is associated with a 1
Euro increase in willingness to pay. In terms of economic signicance,
this eect is very similar to the Machiavellianism eect: subjects in the
third quartile of openness are willing to pay at least 5 Euros more for
better living conditions than those in the rst quartile. Openness is not
only associated with characteristics such as creativity, attention to inner
feelings and tolerance, but also with goodness and humaneness (Olver
& Mooradian, 2003), which are likely to aect behavior towards others.
Further, openness is associated with cognitive abilities (DeYoung, Pe-
terson, & Higgins, 2005). Previous research has reported correlations
between cognitive ability and the ability to delay gratication (Dohmen,
Falk, Human, & Sunde, 2010), i.e., the ability for future oriented think-
ing. Cognitive ability, and hence openness, might accordingly also be
connected to ecologically sustainable behavior, for which considerations
of future outcomes play an important role.
Our results are in line with ndings from psychology and sociology
that focus on whether there is a link between aggressive behavior to-
wards animals and aggressive behavior towards humans. Research from
psychology, psychiatry and sociology suggests that children’s aggression
towards animals predicts violence against human beings later in life
(Felthous & Kellert, 1986; Flynn, 1999, 2000). In a review study, Gullone
(2011) investigates the co-occurrence of human-directed and animal-
directed aggression and concludes that children and adults who behave
aggressively against animals are also likely to act aggressively and show
violence against people. Yet if there is a link with regard to aggression,
there could also be a link with regard to compassion. K. L. ¿ompson
and Gullone (2003) argue that contact to animals and developing a bond
with them enhances empathy towards animals in children, which will be
transferred to human beings and thus lead to higher prosocial behavior
towards humans. Our study shows that indeed, caring about animal
welfare correlates strongly with moral dispositions towards human be-
ings. ¿ere seems to be a strong relationship between human ethics and
a preference for more sustainable, more appropriate living conditions
for animals. Conversely, if people are prepared to look away when the
welfare of an animal is concerned, they are also likely to look away when
a human needs their support and cooperation.
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1.4.3 Further Exploratory Findings and Validity of Measure
vegetarianism As a validity check, we investigate the association
of the switch point with being a vegetarian.17 Following a vegetarian diet
can be driven by dierentmotives, including health concerns or religious
convictions. ¿erefore, being a vegetarian does not necessarily have to
coincide with caring about animal welfare. We nevertheless expected
that many vegetarians would likely have a preference for improved liv-
ing conditions for the hen. A Wilcoxon rank-sum test conrms that
vegetarians show a higher willingness to forgo money for the hen’s sake
than non-vegetarians (meannon-vegetarian = 12.84, meanvegetarian = 16.68,
p < 0.1). ¿is association is also apparent in the regressions reported in
Table 1.3. We take this as a sign of validity of our measure of preferences
for animal welfare.
gender differences While the literature onmoral behavior does
not always reveal a gender dierence, it is a standard nding that if
there is a dierence in gender with regard to ethical or moral behavior,
females have the higher standards.18 When it comes to caring about
animal welfare as measured by switching from organic to conventional
farming, we do not observe an overall signicant dierence between
genders (meanfemale = 14.29, meanmale = 12.48, p = .26).
Likewise, we fail to show that feminity (masculinity) assessed with the
Bem Sex Role Inventory correlates positively (negatively) with the switch
point (see Table 1.3). ¿us, neither biological sex nor self-ascribed sex
roles seem to be associated with the willingness to pay for sustainability
and animal welfare.
political orientation We do nd that switch points dier
depending on the political party subjects identify with. ¿e parties
covered the entire political spectrum, with the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) being the most conservative option, and the party¿e
Le (Linke) on the far le . Subjects opting for the CDU are likely to
have a traditional, conservative view on social life and a market-friendly
attitude.¿e Free Democratic Party (FDP) is a traditional liberal, market-
friendly party;¿e Green Party (Gruene) follows policies directed at en-
17 We did not further dierentiate between pesco-vegetarians, ovo-lacto-vegetarians etc.
in our questionnaire. We assessed veganism separately, but include these subjects in
the vegetarian category.
18 Compare the survey articles by Loe, Ferrell, and Manseld (2000) and O’Fallon and
Buttereld (2005).
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Figure 1.2.—Animal Welfare and Political Orientation
Notes:Average switch points by identicationwith political parties.
Bars display standard error of the mean.
vironmental protection, while the Social Democratic Party (SPD) is the
traditional socialist party in Germany. ¿e party¿e Le is a le -wing
party with a sceptic attitude towards capitalism, and the Pirates (Piraten)
represent a more direct democracy and open internet culture.
Interestingly, political orientation bears some explanatory power about
who cares about animal welfare. Our results suggest that a tendency to-
wards market-friendly policies coincides with a low interest in animal
welfare, while subjects with a more socialist or environment-oriented
political view care more about the living standards of animals (Figure
1.2).
¿ere is an overall signicant dierence between switch points accord-
ing to political orientation (Kruskal-Wallis test, p < .05). Specically,
subjects with a preference for rather market-friendly parties (i.e. CDU
and FDP) are less prepared to forgo money for organic living conditions
compared to subjects preferring any other party.19 ¿e fact that conven-
19 CDU/FDP vs. SPD: p < .05; CDU/FDP vs. Gruene: p < .01; CDU/FDP vs. Piraten:
p < .05; CDU/FDP vs. Linke: p < .1.
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tional animal farming is the standard in Germany might serve as an
indication as to why subjects with a preference for the conservative party
CDU seem to care least about their hen’s welfare. Most farm animals
have been kept in factory farming conditions over the last decades in
Germany.20 Hence, following the conventional approach could imply a
preference for keeping animals’ living conditions as is.
1.5 concluding remarks
¿e perspective that animals do not possess innate rights to be treated
well has a long tradition in philosophy, going back to¿omas Aquinas
(1225-1274). Over the course of the centuries, philosophers like Kant and
Locke have conrmed these views, placing animals rmly in the realm
of creatures that deserve to be treated well only if it is in the interest
of humans. ¿us, until not too long ago, there has been a consensus
that ethical considerations should include only other human beings and
leave animals outside. By showing that caring about the conditions farm
animals live in directly relates to acting in accordance with social and
moral norms in human interaction, our results caution against this view.
Our aim in this study was to investigate whether there is a clear link be-
tween caring about animal welfare and having high ethical standards in
general. Our data conrm that this relation exists. People who care about
animal welfare also express higher ethical standards towards human
beings.
¿e design of our study incentivizes decisions about animal welfare by
establishing a trade-o between a monetary benet and the possibility
of enabling a laying hen to live in a more appropriate environment. In
contrast to scenario or vignette studies that cannot avoid biases due
to social desirability concerns, our design therefore allows for a clear
identication of subjects’ interest in animal welfare, abstracting from
self-related aspects like image concerns or social desirability.
Several philosophical treatises have speculated that it is important
to treat animals well because such behavior stimulates ethical conduct
among humans. Our study stresses that such a link could exist. To our
knowledge, this experiment is the rst to isolate interest in animalwelfare
from confounding factors like the market environment and to establish
20 According to the German Statistical Oce, only 16.7% of laying hens were kept
in free range or organic farming conditions at the time of the latest agricul-
tural census (https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/Wirtscha sbereiche/
LandForstwirtscha Fischerei/Landwirtscha szaehlung2010/Tabellen/9_3_
LandwBetriebeHaltungsplaetzeHuehner.html).
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a clean link with Machiavellianism and agreeableness, our measures for
ethical behavior towards humans.
In addition, we conducted exploratory analyses, examining the rela-
tions between various individual characteristics and caring about animal
welfare in order to inform policy makers and social debate. We nd that
there are pronounced dierences in caring about animal welfare depend-
ing on which political party subjects like best. Subjects preferring more
conservative and market-friendly parties care less about animal welfare.
Furthermore, open-minded subjects and participants scoring low on the
Machiavellianism (Tactics) scale care more about animal welfare than
other subjects. Neither biological gender nor self-ascribed sex roles are
good predictors for ethically responsible behavior.
Beyond oering a segmentation of customers by ethical responsibility,
we do not comment extensively on measures a policy maker could take
in order to induce people to care more about animal welfare. However,
we think that this question is a fascinating topic for future research.
2
DELEGATING PRICING POWER TO CUSTOMERS
2.1 introduction
In many service industries such as hotels, airlines, or entertainment,
rms have large xed costs for capacity but face widely uctuating de-
mand. Sophisticated methods of price discrimination such as yield man-
agement have been developed to use capacity optimally by setting (o en
vastly) dierent prices in periods of high and low demand (Weatherford
& Bodily, 1992). However, oering low prices in reaction to o-peak de-
mand bears the risk that consumers’ reference prices are aected, which
may signicantly reduce their willingness-to-pay in periods with regular
and peak demand (Kalyanaram &Winer, 1995).1
Customer-driven pricing mechanisms are a potential solution to this
problem. By delegating the pricing decision to customers, they price
discriminate without setting a reference point: sellers using Pay What
You Want (pwyw) ask consumers to pay any price they like, including
zero (Schmidt, Spann, & Zeithammer, 2015). Sellers using Name Your
Own Price (nyop) ask consumers to submit a bid against a threshold that
is set by the seller but unknown to buyers. A transaction takes place only
if the oered price exceeds this threshold (Spann & Tellis, 2006). nyop
was invented by Priceline, an online travel intermediary selling ights,
hotel rooms, rental cars and vacation packages in the United States (An-
derson, 2009; Dolan & Moon, 2000).2 pwyw has been applied mainly
in service industries such as hotels, restaurants or museums (Kim et al.,
2009).3¿ese pricing mechanisms achieve endogenous price discrimina-
tion because dierent customers pay dierent prices depending on their
1 For example, hotels in New York City experience low booking rates especially in
January and February and apparently try to increase capacity utilization by lowering
prices. See, e.g., http://www.nycedc.com/economic-data/travel-and-tourism. However,
prices are not decreased enough to make full use of capacity, which may be explained
by concerns about reference price eects.
2 Priceline’s business model has been very successful, with a current market cap of
$65.5 bn and gross prot of $7.6 bn (http://nance.yahoo.com/q/ks?s=PCLN+Key+
Statistics). Other current examples of nyop sellers include the Danish website prismin-
ister.dk, or eBay sellers selling via eBay’s Best Oer option.
3 See for example
http://www.bbc.com/travel/feature/20140730-pay-what-you-want-at-a-paris-hotel,
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valuations, their conception of fairness, their beliefs about acceptable
bids, or their degree of risk aversion.
We argue that customer-driven pricingmechanisms oer direct and in-
direct promotional benets to sellers.¿eir participatory and innovative
nature appeals to many consumers and o en initiates word-of-mouth
recommendations and favorable press coverage (Hinz & Spann, 2008;
Kim et al., 2009). ¿us, a direct benet is that they can be a powerful
tool to promote a product to a wider audience, in particular if the rm
has a strong social media position with many fans and followers.
Furthermore, pwyw and nyopmay carry indirect promotional ben-
ets by increasing demand for complementary products. For instance,
the rock band Radiohead pioneered the use of the pwyw format on the
Internet, giving consumers the opportunity to pay what they saw t for
their album In Rainbows. Even though prot margins on the album itself
may have been larger had they used posted prices, by choosing pwyw
they were able to attract many new followers and increase demand for
complementary products. According to Chesbrough (2010), “[w]hatever
revenue Radiohead might have lost through its initial download exper-
iment was more than compensated for by the far greater publicity the
band received, which seems to have accounted for the surge in com-
mercial sales, and no doubt also beneted ticket sales for its subsequent
world tour” (p. 357).
pwyw and nyop can also be used as a temporary promotional tool to
attract customers. For example, the ibis hotel Chennai City Centre has
oered Pay What You Want-Deals for a limited travel period. ¿e deal
was advertised as ‘special oer’ on the hotel’s website, presumably to
increase brand awareness and thereby traveller demand in non-pwyw
periods.4 Even though this may initially result in losses, they can be
overcompensated if customers continue to frequent the service once it
has reverted to regular posted prices. In contrast to the word-of-mouth
eects discussed above, which target a previously untapped customer seg-
ment, here additional benets arise from intertemporal spillover eects.
Rather than catering to a dierent customer segment, intertemporal
spillover eects therefore increase demand from the same customers at
later points in time.
¿is eect need not be limited to pwyw: for a given threshold, a
nyop seller will attract weakly more demand than a posted-price (pp)
seller with an equally high posted price if consumers underestimate the
http://www.freetoursbyfoot.com/new-york-tours/,
http://www.accorhotels.com/owm002740-001-pay-what-you-want.shtml.
4 See http://www.accorhotels.com/owm002740-001-pay-what-you-want.shtml.
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threshold on average.5 Even though not all of these additional consumers
submit successful bids, this provides sellers with the opportunity to cross-
sell alternative products.
In this chapter we compare pwyw and nyop to each other and to
traditional posted prices. We use controlled lab experiments to identify
the driving forces of the behavior of buyers and sellers who are facing
or employing these mechanisms. What determines how much buyers
pay? Under what circumstances are pwyw and nyop viable and when
do sellers choose to use them? In particular, what role do direct and
indirect promotional benets play with regard to the protability of such
mechanisms? How can they be employed as a competitive strategy to
capture market share and to reduce competition? Do word-of-mouth
benets arise endogenously?
We nd strong and important dierences between pwyw and nyop.
pwyw appeals to all customers and achieves (almost) full market pene-
tration. It can be used as a very aggressive strategy that drives competing
posted price sellers out of the market. Many consumers pay positive
prices voluntarily, but pwyw is protable only if costs are low and if there
are additional benets (e.g., press coverage, word-of-mouth recommen-
dations, or spillover eects on complementary products). In contrast,
nyop is a much less aggressive strategy. It relaxes price competition and
leaves a signicant share of the market to the competing posted-price
seller. It is particularly appealing to low valuation customers who do not
lose much if their bid is unsuccessful and for whom the price oered by
a posted-price seller is too high. High valuation customers, on the other
hand, prefer to buy from the posted-price seller in order to avoid the
risk that their bid is unsuccessful. nyop can also be used for goods with
high marginal costs and if there are no additional benets because the
seller can protect himself against selling his good below cost by setting
an appropriate reserve price.
In a second set of experiments we endogenize direct promotional ben-
ets due to media buzz and word-of-mouth advertising. We show that
these benets dier across pwyw and nyop. For nyop the additional
benets triggered by word of mouth are substantial. nyop sellers are
able to capture a larger market share and to make higher prots than
traditional posted price sellers. In contrast, pwyw is even more success-
ful in capturing market share and monopolizes the market, but the high
market share does not translate into high prots because consumers
5 Even if consumers have correct beliefs about the threshold in relation to the posted
price, it is almost costless to submit a bid at the nyop seller before purchasing at posted
prices.
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are paying too little. We conclude that indirect promotional benets are
required for the viability of pwyw.
So far the literature on customer-driven pricing mechanisms has
dealt with pwyw and nyop separately. ¿ere are many case studies and
eld experiments on pwyw in specic industries. ¿ese include the
music industry,6 zoos and museums,7 restaurants and wine bars,8 online
content,9 hotels (Gautier & Klaauw, 2012) and travel agencies (León,
Noguera, & Tena-Sánchez, 2012), souvenir photos in an amusement
park (A. Gneezy, Gneezy, Nelson, & Brown, 2010), or the Google service
Google Answers (Regner, 2014). ¿ese studies are highly instructive but
they cannot identify the causal eects driving behavior in these markets.
¿ere are a few laboratory studies that allow for more control of the
environment. For example, Mak, Zwick, Rao, and Pattaratanakun (2015)
use a laboratory experiment to study how subjects can coordinate their
behavior to make pwyw viable even if they are not motivated by social
preferences. Schmidt et al. (2015) also use laboratory experiments on
pwywmarkets to identify the causal eects that determine voluntary
payments both in monopolistic and competitive markets. However, they
focus on an environment in which (a few) buyers and a seller interact
repeatedly, so that buyers have an incentive to keep the seller in business.
¿is is an important concern for neighborhood restaurants and other
local service industries with a stable customer base. In contrast, the
present chapter is concerned with industries in which rms face an
anonymous customer base with one-shot interaction. With one-shot
interaction between buyers and sellers it ismuchmore dicult for pwyw
to be viable.
A key innovation of the present study is the introduction of addi-
tional benets that accrue to sellers employing a customer-driven pricing
6 pwyw has been used by the bands “Radiohead”, “Nine Inch Nails”, and “Moby” (John-
son & Cui, 2013) as well as by the online music label “Magnatune” (Regner & Barria,
2009).
7 ¿e zoo in Augsburg, Germany has successfully employed pwyw during the advent
season in 2013, 2014 and 2015. One reason for doing so is to compete for consumers’
attention when there are many other distractions (christmas markets etc.) on oer.
¿is strategy seems to work well: according to the data we received, visitor numbers
tripled in pwyw periods (relative to the same period in previous years). pwyw is also
employed by many museums such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York or
the Museum König in Bonn, Germany.
8 Examples include the restaurant Kish in Frankfurt, Germany (Kim, Natter, & Spann,
2010), or Der Wiener Deewan in Vienna, Austria, and wine bars likeWeinerei in Berlin,
Germany.
9 Wikipedia and Humble Bundle are a case in point.
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mechanism. We not only examine how additional benets aect market
outcomes when at least one seller uses pwyw or nyop, but we also show
that such benets can arise endogenously. Finally, to the best of our
knowledge, we are the rst to compare and contrast how pwyw and
nyop perform relative to each other as a function of the environment.
Research on Name Your Own Price has been strongly inuenced by
the business model of Priceline. ¿e majority of the related research
focuses on nyop sellers’ design decisions such as repeated bidding and
bidding fees (Fay, 2004; Spann, Zeithammer, & Häubl, 2010), joint bid-
ding for multiple items (Amaldoss & Jain, 2008), bid/price elicitation
(Chernev, 2003; Spann, Häubl, Skiera, & Bernhardt, 2012) and haggling
(Terwiesch, Savin, & Hann, 2005). In addition, there are some papers
studying the eects of competition on the protability of a nyop channel
(Fay, 2009; Shapiro, 2011) and reasons for the existence of the channel
itself (Wang, Gal-Or, & Chatterjee, 2009).
Another stream of research on nyop is concerned with buyers’ bid-
ding behavior and related papers analyze the role of bidders’ emotions
(Ding, Eliashberg, Huber, & Saini, 2005), expectations about changes in
sellers’ threshold level (Fay & Laran, 2009; Fay & Lee, 2015), information
diusion about seller’s threshold level (Hinz & Spann, 2008) and adapt-
ability of the threshold level (Hinz, Hann, & Spann, 2011) on buyers’
bidding behavior. Further, empirical research using historic nyop bid-
ding data analyzes bidder characteristics such as frictional costs (Hann
& Terwiesch, 2003; Terwiesch et al., 2005), rationality (Spann & Tellis,
2006), risk aversion (Abbas & Hann, 2010) or willingness to pay (Spann,
Skiera, & Schäfers, 2004).
¿e remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 2.2,
we describe the experimental design and procedures of our rst set
of experiments. Section 2.3 provides theoretical predictions for seller
and buyer behavior in pwyw and nyop. ¿e results are discussed in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 reports the experimental design and results
for the second set of experiments, in which one particular channel of
additional benets (i.e., word of mouth) is derived endogenously and
explored in more detail. Section 2.6 concludes. All formal proofs and
the experimental instructions can be found in Appendix B.
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2.2 experimental design & procedures
2.2.1 General Setup
To compare the functioning and the performance of pwyw and nyop
to traditional posted prices we consider three pairs of treatments.
1. In the rst two treatments two sellers compete for customers. ¿e
rst seller has to quote a posted price.¿e second seller can choose
between quoting a posted price and delegating the pricing deci-
sion to customers. In treatment PCFlex (PWYW, Competition,
Flexible role) the exible seller can opt for pwyw, in treatment
NCFlex (NYOP, Competition, Flexible role) he can opt for nyop.
With these treatments we analyze under what conditions sellers
choose to use customer-driven pricing mechanisms if they have
to compete against traditional posted-price sellers.
2. In two control treatments one seller again has to quote a posted
price while the other seller is now constrained to either using
pwyw (in treatment PCFix) or to using nyop (in treatment NC-
Fix). Here the question is notwhether the customer-driven pricing
mechanism is preferred to quoting a posted price, but rather un-
der what conditions these mechanisms are viable in a competitive
environment.
3. Finally, we conducted two monopoly treatments in which there
is just one seller. In treatment PM (PWYW,Monopoly) the mo-
nopolistic seller has to use pwyw, in NM (NYOP,Monopoly) he
has to use nyop. ¿ese treatments show how much customers are
willing to pay voluntarily in the absence of alternative suppliers.
¿ey are also interesting in their own right because there are some
markets with very little competition in which customer-driven
pricing mechanisms are frequently used (e.g., museums, churches,
etc.).
At the beginning of each session instructions are read aloud. ¿en
subjects have to answer a set of control questions before the experiment
starts. At the end of each session we elicit information about risk prefer-
ences and social preferences of the participants and their demographic
characteristics.10 In each treatment, subjects are randomly assigned to a
10 For risk preferences we use a menu of ten paired lottery choices adapted fromHolt and
Laury (2002). For social preferences we rely on the six primary social value orientation
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role (i.e., buyer or seller) that remains xed throughout the experiment.
Each session consists of 24 subjects which gives us three markets in the
competition treatments (two sellers facing six buyers in each market)
and six markets in the monopoly treatments (one seller facing three
buyers). All treatments are repeated for 20 periods, and subjects are
randomly rematched every period. We conduct eight sessions of the
competition treatments and another eight sessions of the monopoly
treatments. In order to perfectly control the valuations of the buyers and
the cost of the sellers we use an induced-value design (Smith, 1976).
A novel feature of our experimental design is a per-unit benet that
may accrue to sellers using a customer-driven pricing mechanism. In
this rst set of experiments the benet is exogenously given.¿is reduces
the complexity of the experimental design and allows for both direct ben-
ets (media buzz and word-of-mouth recommendations that increase
the customer base) and indirect benets (promoting complementary
products of the same seller). In a second set of experiments, reported
in Section 2.5, we generate direct promotional benets endogenously in
the lab.
¿e benet b ∈ {0, b} is proportional to the number of units sold. In
order to identify the eect of b we assigned b randomly to 50 percent
of all markets. Sellers know whether they enjoy a positive benet from
using a customer-driven pricing mechanism while customers know only
that these benets exist with probability 0.5. ¿is design choice reects
the fact that most buyers do not know how large the positive external
eects on sellers using customer-driven pricing mechanisms are, while
they may have better idea of the marginal cost of production.11
A total of 384 subjects participated in the experiment, 192 in the
monopoly treatments and 192 in the competition treatments. Sessions
lasted about two hours and subjects earned on average 18 Euros (about
24 US Dollars at the time of the experiment), including a show-up fee
(SVO) slider items of Murphy, Ackermann, and Handgraaf (2011). ¿e SVO measure
consists of a series of allocation decisions that can be used to classify the social pref-
erences of the decision maker. At the end of the experiment, one randomly selected
decision of the Holt & Laury-task and one randomly selected allocation decision from
the SVO measure are paid out.
11 ¿is argument rests on the assumption that customers may infer costs from the degree
of competition within a given industry, which should provide an indication for the
size of the markup charged by sellers. Alternatively, prices during sales periods may
serve to narrow down the range of potential actual costs, eectively revealing an upper
bound.
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of 4 Euros.12 All sessions were conducted at the experimental laboratory
of the University of Munich (MELESSA). ¿e subject pool consisted
mainly of students from a wide range of majors. Treatments were im-
plemented using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited
using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
2.2.2 Competition Treatments
competition with flexible roles In treatments PCFlex and
NCFlex one of the two sellers can choose whether to use posted prices
or to use pwyw (nyop, respectively) while the other (traditional) seller
has to use a posted price. At the beginning of each period all subjects
observe the per-unit production cost of the good which is the same for
both sellers and drawn from c ∈ {10, 30, 50}. ¿e exible seller privately
learns the per-unit benet b ∈ {0, 40} from using a customer-driven
pricing mechanism and each buyer privately learns his valuation of the
good which is drawn independently from v ∈ {10, 25, 40, 60, 120, 200}.13
¿en each seller decides whether to enter the market, and the exible
seller decides which pricing method to use. ¿erea er all buyers and
sellers are informed about the market structure. Now the posted-price
sellers set their prices, and a nyop seller sets the (secret) threshold above
which all price oers are accepted. Finally buyers decide whether and
if so from which seller to buy. If they go for a posted-price seller they
have to pay the posted price. If they go for a pwyw seller they get the
good with certainty and can choose how much to pay for it voluntarily
(including a price of zero). If they go for a nyop seller they submit a bid.
If the bid is greater than or equal to the secret threshold set by the seller,
they pay their bid and receive the good. If the bid is smaller than the
threshold, they do not receive it and do not have to pay. Finally, payos
are made.
12 In all competition treatments, subjects received an additional payment for completing
a survey at the end of the experiment. ¿is payment was announced upon completion
of the main experiment, so that the decisions in the experiment cannot be distorted by
income eects.
13 ¿e timing of uncertainty resolution with respect to the benet implies that sellers
can perfectly anticipate whether there is a benet or not. One interpretation of this
design feature is that sellers know about their users’ activities in social networks, i.e.
whether they are highly engaged or rather passive. Sellers with a highly engaged user
community should therefore expect that their consumers will be more likely to spread
positive word of mouth. As a consequence, these sellers will be able to acquire more
new customers.
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t
Buyers learn their own
valuation and sellers’ costs
Sellers learn cost/ exible
sellers learn benet
Sellers decide on entry/
exible sellers choose mechanism
Buyers observe entry
decisions and mechanism choice
Sellers observe entry
decisions and mechanism choice
Sellers set
prices/thresholds
Buyers choose seller
and pay/submit bid
Figure 2.1.—Sequence of Events Flexible Competition
Figure 2.1 summarizes the time and information structure of the
competition treatments with exible roles.
A seller who stays out of the market gets a payo of zero. If seller j
with cost c quotes a posted price pP his payo is given by
piPj = 6∑
i=1 1
j
i[pP − c], (2.1)
where 1 ji is an indicator function equal to one if buyer i decides to buy
from seller j. If seller j uses pwyw/nyop his payo is
pipwyw/nyopj = 6∑
i=1 1
j
i[pi − c + b], (2.2)
where pi refers to the price paid in pwyw and the submitted bid in
nyop, respectively, and b is the per-unit benet. Here, 1 ji is equal to one
if buyer i decides to buy from seller j (and his submitted bid is greater
than or equal to the threshold in the case of nyop) and zero otherwise.
¿e payo of buyer i is given by vi − pi if a transaction takes place, and
zero otherwise, where vi is his valuation and pi the price he paid.
competition with fixed roles ¿e competition treatments
with xed roles (treatments PCFix and NCFix) are identical to the
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t
Sellers learn
cost and benet
Buyers learn their own
valuation and sellers’ costs
Sellers decide on entry
nyop sellers set thresholds
Buyers observe
entry decision
Buyers decide whether to buy
and which price to pay/bid to submit
Figure 2.2.—Sequence of Events Monopoly
treatments with exible roles except for the fact that one of the sellers
has to use either pwyw or nyop if he enters the market.
2.2.3 Monopoly Treatments
In two monopoly treatments (PM and NM) there is only one seller who
is forced to use pwyw (nyop, respectively) if he enters the market. Here
there are only three buyers in each market. Costs and benets are param-
eterized as in the competition treatments, while buyers’ valuations are
drawn from a restricted set, v = {40, 60, 120, 200}.14 All sellers have the
same cost-benet combination in a given period as in the competition
treatments and learn that combination before market entry. ¿e time
structure of the monopoly treatments is depicted in Figure 2.2.
Seller j’s payo is given by
14 ¿e competition treatments comprise a larger market and contain the additional valu-
ations of 10 and 25. ¿erefore, prots cannot be directly compared between monopoly
and competition treatments. However, in the monopoly treatments we are mainly in-
terested in the behavior of buyers. For each given valuation of a buyer we can compare
the behavior in the monopoly and the competition treatments.
2.3 theoretical predictions 49
pi j = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑3i=1 1i[pi − c + b], if he entered the market
0, if he did not enter the market.
(2.3)
Again, 1i is an indicator function equal to one if buyer i decides to buy
(and his submitted bid is greater than or equal to the threshold in the
case of nyop) and zero otherwise. ¿e payo of buyer i is again vi − pi .
2.3 theoretical predictions
As a benchmark for the experimental results we analyze the experimen-
tal treatments under the assumption that all buyers and sellers are fully
rational and purely self-interested. To avoid uninteresting case distinc-
tions we treat prices as continuous variables. Furthermore, we start out
with the assumption that all subjects are risk neutral. ¿e eects of risk
aversion are discussed at the end of this section.
We solve the experimental games by backward induction. In the case
of pwyw the analysis is straightforward:
Proposition 2.1. A purely self-interested buyer facing a pwyw seller pays
p = 0 and gets a strictly positive payo pii = vi − 0 > 0. In all three pwyw
treatments all buyers buy from the pwyw seller if this seller entered the
market.
• In PCFix and PM the pwyw seller enters the market if and only if
his benet exceeds his cost, i.e., b = 40 and c ∈ {10, 30}. In this case
he captures the entire market and makes a strictly positive prot
while the pp seller makes a prot of zero. If the pwyw seller does
not enter, the pp seller charges the monopoly price.
• In PCFlex the exible seller always enters the market and chooses
pwyw if and only if his benet exceeds his cost, i.e., b = 40 and
c ∈ {10, 30}. In this case he captures the entire market and makes a
strictly positive prot. If the exible seller chooses to oer a posted
price, both sellers engage in Bertrand competition and make zero
prots.
Proposition 2.1 gives rise to the following prediction:
Prediction 2.1. In all three pwyw treatments sellers use the pwyw pricing
mechanism if and only if b = 40 and c ∈ {10, 30}. If pwyw is oered,
then it captures the entire market, but all buyers pay a price of 0. ¿e
performance of pwyw is independent of competition.
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¿ese results suggest that the additional benets generated by pwyw
(e.g., via word-of-mouth eects) are the only reason to use this mecha-
nism. However, these results are based on the assumption that all buyers
are purely self-interested. If some buyers have social preferences and are
motivated by fairness or reciprocity, they may be willing to pay positive
prices voluntarily. Furthermore, if a buyer feels obliged tomake a positive
payment under pwyw but does not want to engage in moral delibera-
tions about how much to pay, he may prefer to buy from a posted-price
seller, if such a seller is available.
Let us now turn to the nyop treatments. In these treatments we ignore
the entry decision because sellers could always guarantee non-negative
prots if they entered. In fact almost all sellers choose to enter in the
nyop treatments.15 If a seller uses the nyopmechanism he has to set a
secret threshold t. A buyer gets the good if and only if the price he bids
exceeds this threshold, i.e., p ≥ t. ¿e following lemma shows how a
nyop seller optimally sets this threshold:
Lemma 2.1. If a seller uses nyop it is a (weakly) dominant strategy to set
t∗ =max{c − b, 0} in all treatments.
Proof. See Appendix A.
¿e intuition for this result is straightforward. ¿e seller’s “eective”
marginal cost is c − b, and he cannot set a threshold smaller than zero.
Clearly, it cannot be optimal to set the threshold below his eective
marginal cost. Setting the threshold strictly above eective marginal
cost cannot be optimal either, because the threshold is not observed
by customers and cannot aect their behavior. ¿us, the only eect of
a threshold greater than the eective marginal costs is to reject some
protable price oers.
In the following we restrict attention to Perfect Bayesian equilibria in
which a seller using the nyopmechanism always chooses his (weakly)
dominant strategy.16
15 ¿e fraction of sellers entering the market is above 98 percent in each of the three
nyop treatments.
16 In the monopoly treatment this assumption is without loss of generality because t = t∗
is strictly optimal. In the duopoly treatments there are Perfect Bayesian equilibria in
which the nyop seller chooses a threshold t¯ > c, the posted-price seller oers pP such
that c ≤ pP < t¯ and all buyers with v i > pP buy from the posted-price seller. ¿ese
equilibria are sustained by the beliefs of the buyers that the nyop seller sets the high
threshold t¯ > c, so they never buy from this seller. Given that they do not buy, the
thresthold t¯ is (weakly) optimal. However, these equilibria are not trembling hand
perfect. If there is an arbitrarily small probability that a buyer makes an oer to the
nyop seller, it is strictly optimal for the nyop seller to set t = t∗.
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Lemma 2.2. In the competition treatments a posted-price seller chooses
pP ≥ c and makes zero prots in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix A.
¿e intuition is again straightforward. Either both sellers use posted
prices, inwhich case Bertrand competition drives prices down tomarginal
costs and prots to zero, or the exible seller uses nyop. Given his opti-
mal threshold consumers can always get the good by bidding c.¿us, the
posted-price seller may either set p = c (in which case he may capture
some market share) or p > c in which case all consumers shop with the
nyop seller, but the posted-price seller’s prots are zero in any case.
What is the optimal behavior of a risk neutral and self-interested
buyer? ¿e buyer rationally anticipates that the nyop seller chooses
threshold t∗ =max{c − b, 0}. In NCFix and NM the buyer knows that
the actual benet is b = 40 or b = 0 with equal probability.
Lemma 2.3. In treatments NCFix and NM a risk neutral buyer facing a
nyop seller oers
p = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
c if v ≥min{2c, c + 40}
max{c − 40, 0} if v <min{2c, c + 40} (2.4)
Proof. See Appendix A.
¿e proof follows directly from Lemma 2.2 and the buyer’s payo
function. Note that the buyer will bid aggressively only if his valuation
is suciently small. Table 2.1 displays the optimal prices oered by a
risk-neutral buyer to a nyop seller as a function of the values that v and
c could take in the experiment.
Boldfaced values indicate cases in which a risk neutral buyer optimally
submits an aggressive, “risky” bid to thenyop seller that is strictly smaller
than the seller’s cost. In these cases it is strictly optimal for a risk neutral
buyer to buy from the nyop seller. If, on the other hand, a safe bid of
p = c is optimal, then the buyer may also buy from the posted-price
seller, provided that this seller charges pP = c.
In NCFlex the analysis is slightly more complicated. In this treat-
ment the seller chooses whether to use nyop a er privately observing
the realization of b. ¿us, his choice may signal information about the
realization of b to the buyer. ¿ere exists a pooling equilibrium in which
the exible seller always uses nyop and the buyer oers the prices given
by Lemma 2.3. However, there is also a separating equilibrium in which
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Valuation
Cost v = 10 v = 25 v = 40 v = 60 v = 120 v = 200
c = 10 0 10 10 10 10 10
c = 30 0 0 0 30 30 30
c = 50 10 10 10 10 50 50
Table 2.1.—Optimal Bidding Behavior
Notes: Table displays optimal bids for all cost-valuation combina-
tions, under the assumption of risk neutrality. Boldfaced values
indicate cases in which a risk neutral buyer optimally submits a
bid to the nyop seller that is strictly smaller than the seller’s cost.
the seller uses nyop if and only if b = 40. ¿us, if the buyers observe
that nyop is oered, they conclude in equilibrium that b = 40 and oer
p =max{c − 40, 0} for all realizations of v. ¿is separating equilibrium
is less protable for the seller than the pooling equilibrium because
prices and prots are lower, so sellers prefer the pooling equilibrium.
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that buyers interpret
nyop as a signal that b = 40 and therefore bid more aggressively than
they do inNCFix. But even in this case the nyop seller makes strictly
positive prots if 40 − c > 0.
¿is analysis is summarized in the following prediction for the nyop
treatments:
Prediction 2.2.
1. In all three nyop treatments a nyop seller sets the optimal threshold
t∗ = max{c − b, 0}. In the competition treatments a posted-price
seller sets pP ≥ c in equilibrium.
2. Buyers with a low valuation (v < min{2c, c + 40}) buy from the
nyop seller and oer p = max{c − 40, 0} which is successful in at
least 50 percent of all cases. If buyers with a higher valuation buy
from the nyop seller, they oer either p = max{c − 40, 0} or p = c
which is successful with probability one in equilibrium. ¿ey may
also buy from the posted-price seller, but only if the posted-price
seller oers pP = c.
3. nyop sellers make positive prots on average, while posted-price
sellers always make zero prots in equilibrium. Furthermore, nyop
2.4 results 53
sellers always have a higher expected market share than posted-
price sellers. If there is competition, the seller prefers nyop over
posted prices.
¿ese predictions rest on several assumptions. First, we assumed that
all subjects are rational and that rationality is common knowledge. ¿us,
buyers correctly anticipate the optimal threshold set by the nyop seller.
However, it is possible that some nyop sellers fail to understand what the
optimal threshold is and choose a threshold that is too high. Even if they
choose the threshold optimally, buyers may believe that sellers behave
irrationally with some probability.¿is may induce buyers to oer prices
that are higher than the optimal threshold. It may also induce buyers to
buy from the posted-price seller where they get the good with certainty.
Finally, buyers may not be fully rational and have diculties to compute
the optimal threshold themselves. Again, this may induce them to oer
a price that is higher than the seller’s cost or to choose the posted-price
seller.
Second, we assumed that buyers are risk neutral. If a buyer is risk
averse, he may prefer a “safe” oer p = c even if the expected prot
of a “risky” oer p = max{c − 40, 0} is higher. Furthermore, if there
is no common knowledge of rationality, risk aversion will exacerbate
the eects of strategic uncertainty discussed above, i.e., the buyer may
be inclined to oer even higher prices to the nyop seller or lean more
toward the posted-price seller where he can get the good with certainty.
Finally, we assumed that buyers are purely self-interested. If a buyer
cares about the utility of the seller, he may oer higher prices to the
nyop seller in order to achieve a more equal income distribution.
2.4 results
We rst analyze under what circumstances sellers choose to employ a
customer-driven pricing mechanism and how successful these mech-
anisms are in penetrating the market and in making prots. ¿en, we
analyze how buyers react to these mechanisms. Do they buy from a
pwyw or nyop seller or do they shy away from them? What prices do
they pay? Do they behave dierently if there is another posted-price
seller as compared to a situation where the pwyw or nyop seller is a mo-
nopolist? Finally, we analyze the competitive eects of sellers employing
pwyw and nyop relative to a posted price competitor.
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2.4.1 Performance of Customer-Driven Pricing Mechanisms
Under what conditions do sellers choose to delegate pricing power to
their customers?
Result 2.1 (Seller’s Choice of Customer-Driven Pricing Mechanism).
(a) InPCFlex almost all sellers choose to use pwyw if and only if pwyw
oers an additional benet and if production costs are not too high.
If pwyw is chosen, then the pwyw seller captures almost all of the
market and makes high prots, while the pp seller makes prots
close to zero.
(b) In NCFlex almost all sellers choose to use nyop if nyop oers an
additional benet. If there is no benet still about half of the sellers
choose nyop if costs are not too high. If nyop is chosen then the
nyop seller captures about 60 percent of the market. If nyop is cho-
sen, it is signicantly more protable than quoting a posted price.
nyop sellers choose a threshold close to the optimal threshold in 75
percent of all cases.
(c) Aexible seller who chooses pwywmakes prots that aremore than
twice as high as the prots made by a exible seller who chooses
nyop.
Support for Result 2.1 is provided by the descriptive statistics reported
below. Table 2.2 reports the percentage of cases in which sellers opt for
one of the customer-driven pricing mechanisms by cost and benet
levels. In both treatments all exible sellers entered the market.
In PCFlex almost all sellers shy away from pwyw if b = 0. If there is a
benet and if b > c all sellers choose pwyw, and 13 percent do so if c = 50
and b = 40. ¿is result conrms Prediction 2.1. It seems that sellers are
convinced that buyers are not going to make voluntary payments, so
sellers avoid pwyw if this may result in losses. Note, however, that in
the case where c = 50 and b = 40 there are twice as many sellers oering
pwyw than if c = 10 and b = 0, even though the “eective” marginal cost
is the same. ¿is suggests that sellers expect buyers to pay more if their
costs are high than if their costs are low.
InNCFlex almost all exible sellers choose nyop if there is a positive
benet. If there is no benet, still almost 50 percent of the sellers opt
for nyop if costs are 10 or 30, and 17 percent do so if costs are 50. ¿is
result is consistent with Prediction 2.2. Furthermore, it suggests that the
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PCFlex NCFlex
Cost b = 0 b = 40 b = 0 b = 40
c = 10 6% 100% 50% 100%
c = 30 0% 100% 43% 94%
c = 50 0% 13% 17% 100%
Total 2% 65% 40% 98%
Table 2.2.—Pricing Mechanism Choice
Notes: Entries in cells denote the percentage of cases in which
sellers opt for one of the customer-driven pricing mechanisms,
conditional on entering the market.
choice of nyop could be interpreted as a signal that the seller is more
likely to enjoy a high benet.
Using pwyw is highly protable. ¿e average prot of a pwyw seller
is 127.1 points, as compared to a prot of almost zero of the competing
pp seller. nyop is somewhat less protable with an average prot of 58.1
which is still much higher than the average prot of 15.7 of the corre-
sponding pp seller (see Table 2.3). However, because sellers could choose
whether or not to employ the customer-driven pricingmechanism, these
numbers have to be interpreted with caution. In PCFlex sellers opted for
pwyw only if the benet was high, while in NCFlexmany sellers also
chose nyop when there was no benet. But even if we restrict attention
to the cases with b = 40 and c ∈ {10, 30} where almost all exible sellers
opted for a customer-driven pricing mechanism the average prot under
pwyw is 145.1 while nyop sellers make only 95.6 on average.
¿e reason why pwyw is more protable than nyop if benets are
higher than costs is the fact that pwyw is much more successful in
market penetration. If the exible seller chooses pwyw he gets a market
share of 94.2 percent.17 If the exible seller chooses nyop his market
share is only 57.4 percent.18
¿e overall picture of pwyw does not change much when we look
at treatments PCFix and PM in which one seller had to use pwyw.
Note that this seller could still decide not to enter the market. In fact,
in PCFix the pwyw seller entered in only 51.7 percent of all cases (53.8
percent in PM). He stayed out of the market when there was no benet
17 ¿e pp seller gets only 3.3 percent of the market, 2.5 percent of the buyers do not buy.
18 ¿e pp seller gets 35.5 percent of the market and 7.1 percent of the buyers do not buy.
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Profits Market Shares
Treatment pwyw pp nyop pp pwyw nyop
Flexible Competition 127.1 0.9 58.1 15.7 94.2% 57.4%
Fixed Competition 76.8 4.7 69.7 22.4 90.0% 69.8%
Monopoly 52.7 83.2 98.6% 97.8%
Table 2.3.—Prots and Market Shares
Notes: Prots and market shares are conditional on market entry
of both sellers and choice of the customer-driven pricing mecha-
nism. Both prots and market shares are displayed as per period
averages.
(b = 0) and/or his cost was high (c = 50), so in the same situations in
which he opted for posted prices in PCFlex. If he entered, he again
captured almost the entire market (market share 90.0 percent). If b = 40
and c ∈ {10, 30} the prots of the pwyw seller in PCFix are virtually
identical to the prots inPCFlex. However, inPCFix some pwyw sellers
enter the market when b = 0. In these cases they make losses on average,
conrming the pessimistic beliefs of sellers in PCFlex. ¿is explains
why the average prot conditional on market entry is lower, see Table 2.3.
It is also interesting to note that prots are negative if b = 0 and c = 10,
but positive if b = 40 and c = 50, even though these two situations are
strategically equivalent. ¿us, it must be the case that buyers voluntarily
paid higher prices if the seller had higher costs. We will get back to this
question below.
nyop sellers’ prots in NCFix are not signicantly dierent from
prots in NCFlex. Moreover, we nd that buyers do not submit lower
bids in NCFlex as compared to NCFix. ¿is indicates that the choice
of nyop does not provide an informative signal about the level of the
benet.
Did nyop sellers set the thresholds optimally? By Proposition 2.1 it
is a weakly dominant strategy to set t = t∗ = max{c − b, 0}. Across
all treatments, 30.0 percent of the sellers choose exactly t∗, and 72.4
percent choose a threshold within 10 points of t∗. ¿ere is no signicant
dierence between treatments. On average the actually chosen threshold
is 8.7 points higher than the optimal threshold, but this dierence is
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decreasing over time suggesting that sellers learn to set the threshold
optimally as they gain experience.19
2.4.2 Buyers’ Reactions to Customer-Driven Pricing Mechanisms
How did buyers react if they were oered customer-driven pricing mech-
anisms?
pay what you want
Result 2.2 (Voluntary Payments under pwyw).
(a) Almost all buyers buy from a pwyw seller.
(b) ¿e majority of buyers (56.2 percent) pay positive prices and 26.2
percent pay prices greater than or equal to the seller’s cost. On aver-
age each buyer pays 9.8 points, which is a signicant contribution
to sellers’ prots.
(c) Buyers tend to pay more the higher their valuation and the higher
the seller’s cost. Payments are higher the higher the social value ori-
entation (SVO) of a buyer. Buyers also pay more if there is no com-
peting posted-price seller. Voluntary payments tend to decrease over
time.
¿ehighmarket share of more than 90 percent of pwyw sellers shows
that buyers do not hesitate to buy from a pwyw seller.¿e pwywmarket
share is higher compared to previous research which nds that there is
some fraction of buyers who prefer not buying from a pwyw seller. ¿is
has been explained by a reluctancy to engage in the moral deliberations
of how much to pay (Schmidt et al., 2015), self signaling (A. Gneezy,
Gneezy, Riener, & Nelson, 2012) or privacy concerns (Regner & Riener,
forthcoming).
In the current study, however, this fraction is lower presumably be-
cause of the additional benets that pwyw sellers enjoy. Buyers know
that a seller who chooses to enter the market and oers pwyw is likely
to enjoy this benet, so the buyer does not have to feel bad about ac-
cepting a pwyw oer even if he pays less than the seller’s cost. ¿us, the
19 A random-eects regression of the chosen threshold on the optimal threshold shows
that t∗ explains the actually chosen threshold very well. ¿e coecient of t∗ is 0.9.
¿e treatment dummies and the interaction eects are not signicant, but there is a
signicant negative time trend.
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additional benet helps to make pwyw a very eective instrument for
market penetration.
Table 2.4 reports the average prices paid as well as the fractions of
buyers paying positive prices and prices greater than or equal to the
seller’s cost in all three pwyw treatments. ¿ese voluntary payments are
a signicant contribution to the sellers’ prots under pwyw, contradict-
ing Proposition 2.1. Table 2.4 shows that social preferences do play an
important role.
PCFlex PCFix PM Total
Average price paid 4.9 7.6 12.1 9.8
Fraction of buyers paying p > 0 38.1% 50.4% 64.1% 56.2%
Fraction of buyers paying p ≥ c 15.9% 19.4% 32.2% 26.2%
Table 2.4.—Prices Paid under pwyw
Prices are lowest in PCFlex, higher in PCFix and highest in PM. A
possible explanation is that in PCFlex sellers had the outside option
to choose posted prices which they almost always did if b = 0 and/or
c = 50. ¿us, in PCFlex pwyw was protable even if no positive prices
were paid. In contrast, in PCFix and PM the outside option was to stay
out of the market, so sellers choose to enter with pwywmore o en, even
in situations in which they could make losses. ¿is may have induced
buyers with social preferences to be more generous. Furthermore, in
the monopoly treatment buyers had more reason to be grateful if the
pwyw seller entered the market. In the monopoly treatment, if the seller
did not enter, buyers got a payo of zero. In the competition treatment
they could still buy from the pp seller and get positive payos. ¿is is a
possible explanation for the higher payments observed in the monopoly
treatment. Finally, valuations are on average lower in PCFix and PCFlex,
due to the addition of a low-valuation market segment in these latter
treatments.¿erefore we should expect average pwyw prices to be lower
as well.
¿e regressions displayed in Table 2.5 show the driving forces of the be-
havior of buyers. Prices paid under pwyw are signicantly increasing in
the buyer’s valuation and in the seller’s cost.¿us, pwyw achieves endoge-
nous price discrimination, consistent with models of social preferences.
Panel 2.3a visualizes the increasing relationship between valuations and
prices for all cost levels.
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(1) (2) (3)
Price Paid Price Paid Price Paid
in PCFlex in PCFix in PM
Cost 0.058 0.212∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.094) (0.061) (0.037)
Valuation 0.092∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.009)
Posted Price of SP -0.001 -0.015
(0.026) (0.027)
Period -0.586∗∗∗ -0.650∗∗∗ -0.359∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.170) (0.112)
SVO 0.421 0.638∗∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗
(0.317) (0.227) (0.133)
Constant -19.701∗∗ -19.139∗∗∗ -18.431∗∗∗
(8.512) (6.493) (3.848)
Number of observations 226 335 763
Table 2.5.—Determinants of Behavior (pwyw)
Notes: Random-eects tobit regressions on buyers’ prices paid to
the pwyw seller (le -censored at minimum price of 0). ∗ p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 2.3.—Endogenous Price Discrimination
Notes:¿e upper panel displays average per unit prices paid to
pwyw sellers by cost levels. ¿e lower panel displays average sub-
mitted bids tonyop sellers by cost levels. In addition, bars show the
extent of overbidding relative to the theoretical optimum by valu-
ation, averaged over all cost levels (assuming common knowledge
of rationality and risk neutrality).
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¿e importance of social preferences is conrmed by the fact that
social value orientation (SVO) also has a highly signicant impact.20¿e
price of the competing posted-price seller in the competition treatments
has no signicant eect. Note that the variable “Period” has a signicantly
negative coecient. ¿is suggests that pwyw is more successful if it is
newly introduced and if buyers have not yet gotten used to it.
name your own price
Result 2.3 (Bidding Behavior under nyop).
(a) If nyop is oered under competitive conditions about 60 percent of
all buyers choose the nyop seller.
(b) Buyers are more likely to choose nyop the lower their valuation, the
lower the seller’s cost and the higher the posted price of the compet-
ing seller.
(c) Most buyers submit bids that are signicantly higher than the op-
timal threshold of the seller. On average they are also signicantly
higher than the actual thresholds chosen by sellers. Bids tend to in-
crease with the valuation of the buyer.
nyop is signicantly less successful in market penetration than pwyw
(see Table 2.3). Table 2.6 reports average bid amounts and the fraction
of successful bids in all three nyop treatments. Bids are higher in the
monopoly treatment than in the competition treatments.
NCFlex NCFix NM Total
Average bid 21.8 23.1 39.5 33.5
Fraction of successful bids 59.8% 61.4% 83.5% 75.5%
Table 2.6.—Bids Submitted under nyop
Regression (1) in Table 2.7 oers some insights into which buyers go
for nyop under which circumstances. ¿e regression shows that buyers
are less likely to choose a nyop seller if their valuation is high and if
the posted price of the competing seller is low. ¿is is very intuitive.
20 In PCFlex the seller’s cost and the buyer’s SVO are not signicant.¿is could be related
to the fact that a seller’s mechanism choice signals to buyers that the benet exceeds
the marginal cost, and hence pwyw is protable even if buyers pay a price of zero.
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Given that not all nyop sellers set the threshold optimally there is some
strategic uncertainty whether a buyer gets the good under nyop while
he can be sure to get it if he pays the posted price of the competing seller.
¿us, the higher his valuation (i.e., the more is at risk) and the lower the
competing posted price the more is a buyer inclined not to buy from a
nyop seller. Surprisingly, our measure of risk aversion does not have a
signicant impact on buyers’ choices.¿e buyers’ social value orientation
(SVO) is marginally signicant (at the 10 percent level) suggesting that
more socially minded buyers tend to use nyop less o en. ¿e signicant
positive time trend suggests that buyers becomemore prone to use nyop
as they get more experienced.
Regressions (2) to (4) in Table 2.7 show the driving forces of the
bids submitted if a buyer chooses the nyop seller. ¿e theoretically
optimal bid derived under the assumption of common knowledge of
rationality and risk neutrality (see Table 2.1) is highly signicant in the
NCFix and NM treatments. According to Prediction 2.2 the coecients
of “Optimal Bid” should be equal to 1, but they are much smaller.21 ¿e
buyer’s valuation also has a highly signicant positive eect. Again, this is
very intuitive. Given thatmany sellers choose thresholds that are too high,
buyers cannot be sure to get the good if they submit the theoretically
optimal bid.¿us they will bid higher themore is at stake.We do not nd
a signicant eect of our measure of risk aversion and of SVO. However,
Panel 2.3b lends descriptive support to the hypothesis that risk aversion
is the more important determinant of bids: since overbidding relative
to the theoretical optimum under risk neutrality increases (almost)
monotonically in valuation, individuals seem to becomemore risk averse
the higher the potential for losses. ¿ere is a signicant negative time
trend suggesting that buyers bid more aggressively as they gain more
experience in NM.
2.4.3 Customer-Driven Pricing Mechanisms as a Competitive Strategy
Howdo customer-driven pricingmechanisms aect competition? Figure
2.4 compares prots of the seller using pwyw or nyop to the prots of
his posted price competitor. In Section 2.4.1 we have already seen that
if pwyw is used it is highly protable and captures almost the entire
market. ¿us, not surprisingly, the prots of the competing posted-price
21 ¿e parameter estimates for Optimal Bid are signicantly dierent from 1 for specica-
tions (2)–(4) in Table 2.7. (2): χ2(1) = 104.84, p < 0.001; (3): χ2(1) = 128.83, p < 0.001;
(4): χ2(1) = 181.99, p < 0.001.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Choice of Buyer’s Buyer’s Buyer’s
nyop bid in bid in bid in
seller NCFlex NCFix NM
Cost -0.0447∗∗∗
(0.00838)
Optimal Bid 0.0701 0.320∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗
(0.0689) (0.0557) (0.0222)
Posted Price 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.0929∗∗∗
of SP (0.00835) (0.0407) (0.0162)
Valuation -0.0223∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.0402∗∗∗
(0.00164) (0.0191) (0.0151) (0.00597)
Risk Aversion 0.103 0.0319 0.456 -0.135
(0.0699) (0.284) (0.437) (0.369)
SVO Angle -0.0191∗ 0.0658 0.0802 0.00148
(0.0107) (0.0495) (0.0562) (0.0480)
Period 0.0612∗∗∗ 0.130 -0.111 -0.206∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0944) (0.0844) (0.0528)
Constant -0.489 -3.670 2.964 23.69∗∗∗
(0.602) (2.922) (3.700) (2.250)
Observations 1175 286 489 1409
Table 2.7.—Determinants of Behavior (nyop)
Notes: Entries in column (1) are point estimates from a random-
eects logistic regression on buyers’ choice of seller in treatments
NCFlex andNCFix.¿e dependent variable is 1 if the buyer opted
for the nyop seller and 0 otherwise. Entries in columns (2)-(6) are
point estimates from random-eects tobit regressions on buyers’
submitted bids to the nyop seller (le -censored at minimum bid
of 0). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
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seller are very close to zero. If, on the other hand, the exible seller also
chooses posted prices, then both sellers share the market equally and
make small prots.22 ¿us, the competing pp seller suers if the exible
seller chooses pwyw.
Perhaps surprisingly this is not the case with nyop. Prots of the pp
seller are unaected if the exible seller opts for nyop, while prots of the
exible seller go up signicantly.¿is suggests that nyop relaxes competi-
tion. In fact the markup charged by a pp seller competing against a nyop
seller in the two competition treatments is 18.8, which is signicantly
higher than the markup of 7.8 charged by pp sellers against a exible
seller who has chosen to use a posted price in NCFlex. nyop relaxes
price competition because the nyop seller does not quote a price. Fur-
thermore, because nyop is most attractive to low valuation customers,
pp sellers can focus on high valuation customers and charge them a
higher price.
Result 2.4 (¿e Eects on Competition). pwyw is an aggressive com-
petitive strategy driving a competing posted-price seller out of the market.
¿is is not the case for nyop. nyop leaves room for competing sellers and
it relaxes price competition. Both sellers are better o if one of them uses
nyop.
It is important to note that additional benets are an important pre-
condition for most pwyw sellers to enter the market in a competitive
situation. However, if these benets exist, then a pwyw seller captures
almost the entire market. ¿is is dierent for a nyop seller. nyop can
be protable even if there is no additional benet and if costs are high.
Furthermore, a nyop seller captures only about 60 to 70 percent of the
market, leaving (mostly high valuation) customers for a posted-price
competitor.
2.5 endogeneous benefits
So far we considered a setting in which the promotional benets of
customer-driven pricing mechanisms are exogenously given. ¿is setup
reduces the complexity of the experimental design and allows for mul-
tiple channels through which additional benets may come about. In
22 ¿e (combined) prot of 8.2 is higher than the theoretically predicted prot of zero.
However, many other experiments have already shown that sellers set prices somewhat
above marginal costs even if they are engaged in Bertrand competition. See, e.g.,
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000).
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Figure 2.4.—Eects on Competition
Note:¿e upper panel shows prot levels in PCFlex for the two
dierent competitive environments. ¿e two le -most bars indi-
cate competition between a pwyw and a pp seller, while the bars
on the right depict competition between two posted-price sellers.
Prot levels for theNCFlex treatment are depicted analogously in
the lower panel. ¿roughout, the error bars show standard errors
of the mean.
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this section we analyze direct promotional benets that arise if media
buzz and word-of-mouth recommendations induce more consumers to
buy the good. ¿e question is under what conditions these benets arise
endogenously.
2.5.1 Experimental Design & Procedures
Consider the following variation of our previous design. Each market
has two sellers and six buyers. However, we now split demand into two
groups: ¿ere are two well-informed buyers, who are fully aware of the
market structure, and four follow-up buyers, who have to rely on word
of mouth to learn which sellers are in the market. We model word-of-
mouth advertising in reduced-form: the purchasing decisions of the
well-informed buyers directly aect the market structure for follow-up
buyers. If both well-informed buyers purchase at the pwyw seller, for
example, only the pwyw seller is visible to follow-up buyers. However,
follow-up buyers may become fully informed about which sellers are
in the market if they pay an additional search cost. ¿us, there are four
roles that remain xed for the duration of the experiment: posted-price
sellers, pwyw sellers (nyop sellers, resp.), well-informed buyers and
follow-up buyers.
Furthermore, in the new nyop treatment we added the realistic feature
that buyers can still buy from the posted-price seller if the bid submitted
to the nyop seller was not successful. ¿us, if buyers submit a bid to a
nyop seller, they do not face the risk that they cannot consume the good
if their bid fails. ¿is should encourage more buyers to try out nyop and
to bid more aggressively.
Under the assumptions of common knowledge of rationality and risk
neutrality, this should not matter for the behavior of buyers and sellers:
for both sellers it is still a weakly dominant strategy to set their price
or threshold equal to cost. Given prices and thresholds, well-informed
buyers will therefore be indierent between purchasing at posted prices
and submitting a bid to the nyop seller and sellers should expect to each
attract three buyers in expectation.
However, if buyers are assumed to be risk averse and sellers do not
compete away all seller surplus (as our rst set of experiments indicate),
the possibility to purchase the good from the posted-price seller if the
bid submitted to the nyop seller was not successful will induce more
buyers to submit an oer to the nyop seller.¿e reason is that submitting
a bid is now riskless; hence, a buyer who believes that the nyop seller
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may have set a threshold lower than the competing posted price should
rationally submit a bid rst.
A total of 144 subjects participated in the second set of experiments,
72 in each treatment (PWYW Competition Endogenous Benet (PCEB)
and NYOP Competition Endogenous Benet (NCEB)). Sessions were
conducted at MELESSA. We restricted the subject pool to subjects who
had not participated in any session of the rst set of experiments. Ses-
sions lasted two hours and average earnings amounted to 25 Euros (about
27 US Dollars at the time of the experiment), including a show-up fee of
4 Euros.23
timing and information structure At the beginning of
each period, buyers and sellers are informed about production costs
(c ∈ {5, 10, 20, 30, 50}).24 In addition, buyers learn their valuations (v ∈{10, 25, 40, 60, 120, 200}).¿en, sellers decide on entry. Upon observing
the entry decisions, well-informed buyers decide whether and where to
purchase.
If at least one well-informed buyer has opted for the pwyw/nyop
seller, this seller will be available for follow-up buyers at no additional
cost. ¿e same holds true for posted-price sellers. If only one seller is
available to follow-up buyers, they can invest search costs (cs = 10) to
nd out whether the other seller has entered the market; if so, they can
also purchase from this seller.25 If the market for well-informed buyers
was split equally, both sellers are available at no additional cost.
A er observing the market structure follow-up buyers make their
purchasing decisions. If a buyer submitted an unsuccessful bid to a nyop
seller, he can turn to the posted price seller if this seller is available to him.
¿us, availability of sellers for follow-up buyers in the nyop treatment
depends on the interaction between well-informed buyers and sellers.
If one of the well-informed buyers submits an unsuccessful bid and
subsequently purchases at the posted price, both sellers are available to
follow-up buyers. If, however, both well-informed buyers interact with
23 As in the rst set of experiments, treatments were implemented using zTree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007) and subjects were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).
24 We expected that additional benets of using pwyw potentially exist only for low cost
levels. ¿erefore, we kept the original cost levels from the rst experiment and added
two low cost levels (5 and 20) to the set.
25 To keep the PCEB and NCEB treatments symmetric, buyers have to take the decision
whether or not to invest search costs before deciding where to purchase. In NCEB it is
also conceivable that the buyer invests the search cost if his purchase with the nyop
seller was unsuccessful, but because there is no “unsuccessful purchase” with pwyw
this cannot be implemented in the PCEB treatment.
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Figure 2.5.—Sequence of Events Endogenous Benets
only one seller, then only this seller is available to follow-up buyers. We
summarize this structure in Figure 2.5.26
2.5.2 Results
Table 2.8 reports the total prots and market shares achieved in PCEB
and NCEB. ¿e results are striking. If the pwyw seller chooses to enter,
then he is extremely successful in monopolizing the market. On average,
his market share is almost 90 percent. In fact, almost all well-informed
buyers choose the pwyw seller and follow-up buyers never get to see the
posted-price seller. However, this strategy is not very protable. If costs
are low (c = 5), the pwyw seller makes a small prot, but if costs increase,
pwywmakes losses because buyers do not pay enough voluntarily to
26 Due to space constraints we do not depict the nodes where buyers have the opportunity
to purchase a er having submitted an unsuccessful bid (given that both sellers are
available).
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PCEB NCEB
Prot Market Share Prot Market Share
pp pwyw pp pwyw pp nyop pp nyop
c = 5 3.4 8.9 11% 89% 22.5 50.5 32% 64%
c = 10 5.8 -5.8 11% 86% 21.9 38.6 28% 53%
c = 20 7.5 -54.4 25% 75% 18.8 36.8 27% 66%
c = 30 0 -97.5 0% 79% 16.4 29.6 23% 36%
c = 50 0 -174.0 0% 92% 15.2 21.5 11% 28%
Total 4.2 -9.0 10% 87% 20.4 38.8 27% 54%
Table 2.8.—Prots and Market Shares
Notes: Cells show average per period prots and market shares
generated by the dierent seller types in treatments PCEB and
NCEB, conditional on entry of both sellers.
cover the seller’s costs.27 ¿us, direct promotional benets alone are not
sucient to make pwyw protable.
A completely dierent picture arises in NCEB. If a nyop seller enters
the market his prots are substantial and 70 percent higher than the
prots of the posted price seller, but he monopolizes the market less
o en than a pwyw seller. We observe that a large majority (73 percent)
of the well-informed buyers make an oer to the nyop seller. However,
if their bids fail, they turn to the pp seller. ¿us, follow-up buyers get to
see the pp seller more o en. Even if they only see the nyop seller they
o en search for an additional seller before making their purchase. ¿e
average market share of the nyop seller is twice as high as the average
market share of the pp seller, but signicantly lower than the market
share of the pwyw seller.
Result 2.5 (Direct Promotional Benets).
(a) In PCEB, pwyw sellers capture 90% of the follow-up market. How-
ever, they fail tomake signicant prots from this highmarket share
even if costs are low. ¿us, word-of-mouth advertising alone gen-
erates benets in terms of market share but not in terms of prots.
27 It has to be noted that very few pwyw sellers entered themarket when costs where high.
¿us, the high average losses reported in Table 2.8 are based on very few observations.
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PCEB NCEB
pp pwyw pp nyop
c = 5 1.7 2.3 15.4 28.0
c = 10 3.7 -3.8 13.2 23.4
c = 20 2.5 -44.5 12.1 22.3
c = 30 0 -71.5 11.8 12.3
c = 50 0 -104.5 5.3 8.5
Total 2.4 -8.0 12.7 21.9
Table 2.9.—Endogenous Benets pwyw & nyop
Notes: Cells show average per period prots generated by the dif-
ferent seller types on the follow-up markets in treatments PCEB
and NCEB, conditional on entry of both sellers.
(b) In contrast, in NCEB there are additional monetary benets that
arise endogenously through word-of-mouth advertising. nyop sell-
ers attract a twice as large market share on the follow-up market as
compared to their pp competitors which translates into substantial
prots that are 70 percent higher than the prots of competing pp
sellers.
In order to measure the word-of-mouth benets consider the prots
obtained in the follow-up market which are reported in Table 2.9. In
PCEB the prots of the pwyw sellers from the follow-up consumers are
close to zero or strictly negative. Prots of the competing pp sellers are
also close to zero because their market share is very small. However, in
NCEB prots on the follow-up market of the nyop sellers are always
positive and almost twice as large as the prots of the competing pp seller.
Prots per transaction are very similar across seller types: a pp seller
makes 13.5 points on average, while a nyop seller gets 10.6 points. ¿is
suggests that higher prots are not driven by increased prot margins,
but by the increased sales volume due to word-of-mouth advertising.
2.6 concluding remarks
Our analysis shows that pwyw andnyop are eectivemethods of endoge-
nous price discrimination. Both of these marketing strategies delegate
(some) pricing power to buyers, and both strategies avoid setting a refer-
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ence price. However, despite these similarities the two pricing strategies
work very dierently and should be used under dierent circumstances.
pwyw price discriminates by appealing to social preferences. ¿ere
is a signicant fraction of the population that is willing to voluntarily
pay positive prices, which generates some revenues. Prices paid increase
with the consumer’s valuation, with his prosociality, and with the seller’s
cost. However, these revenues alone are o en not sucient to cover
costs - especially in large anonymous markets in which customers shop
only once and have no interest in keeping the rm in business. In such
situations, an additional promotional benet (such as increased press
coverage or word-of-mouth recommendations), as well as low marginal
costs may be necessary for pwyw to be viable. Because pwyw achieves
(almost) full market penetration, it is a very aggressive strategy driving
other posted-price sellers out of the market.
nyop achieves price discrimination by creating strategic uncertainty.
Low valuation buyers nd nyop very attractive because it oers a chance
to get the good at a lower price. High valuation buyers prefer a posted-
price seller, because they do not want to take the risk of not getting
the good if their bid is below the seller’s secret threshold. ¿us, nyop
can be employed to access new customer segments that did not buy the
good beforehand while most existing (high valuation) customers still
buy at the posted price. Notably, social preferences do not aect how
much consumers bid. nyop has the advantage that the seller can protect
himself against losses by setting an appropriate threshold. ¿erefore,
nyop can also be used protably if there is no additional benet and if
marginal costs are high.¿e drawback of nyop is that it is less successful
in penetrating the market and leaves room for additional posted-price
sellers. In fact, nyop is a strategy that relaxes price competition and
increases total industry prots.
We nd that direct promotional benets can arise endogenously
through a word-of-mouth channel. For pwyw the main benet is that it
monopolizes the market, but it fails in generating signicant prots, in
particular if costs are high. ¿is suggests that pwyw requires indirect
promotional benets (such as the promotion of complementary goods
oered by the same seller) to be viable. ¿e examples of Radiohead and
ibis, as discussed in the introduction, are a case in point. nyop is less
successful in terms of market share, but more successful in generating
prots. In fact, prots of a nyop seller are 70 percent higher as prots of
the competing pp seller in our experiment.
From a managerial perspective, pwyw is most likely to be successful
if capacity constraints are negligible, marginal costs are low and the
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seller prots from spillover eects on complementary products. It is a
very aggressive strategy that achieves high market penetration but low
prots. nyop, on the other hand, can be employed even if costs are high,
and it relaxes price competition. Furthermore, nyop can be used as a
complementary way to sell excess capacity via third-party intermediaries
on a permanent basis. It successfully segments the market into high-
valuation customers who are more inclined to buy at posted prices and
low-valuation customers who would not have bought the good at regular
prices. nyop can therefore be employed parallel to posted prices in order
to access new customer segments.
Our study raises several new questions and opens avenues for future
research. First, our laboratory analysis is well suited to identify causal
eects and to understand the functioning of customer-driven pricing
mechanisms. However, it does not tell us much about the magnitude of
the observed eects in real markets. ¿erefore, testing our predictions
in the eld would be very interesting. Second, we test word-of-mouth
as one channel for direct promotional benets. Further research should
explore indirect promotional benets in more detail. Finally, we ignored
some aspects of customer-driven pricing mechanisms, such as joint
bidding in nyop or public minimum/recommended prices, that merit
future research.
3
CONTEXT DEPENDENCE IN SPEED DATING
3.1 introduction
Cognitive psychologists propose that perception depends on context:
¿e same shade of grey is perceived as dark when viewed against a
light background and as light when viewed against a dark background.
Assuming that context dependence in perception carries over to the
domain of preferences implies that choice sets may aect preferences. A
number of puzzling phenomena in individual choice can be explained
when allowing for preferences to depend on context, among them attrac-
tion eects, preference reversals and certain patterns in intertemporal
decision making.
Context dependence essentially means that the composition of the
choice set aects the evaluation of its members; hence decision makers
may attach dierent utility values to the same option depending on
which other options are in the choice set. In the economic literature, two
recent theoretical frameworks endogenize decision weights by relating
them to the range of utility levels along a given attribute (Kőszegi &
Szeidl, 2013; Bushong et al., 2015).1 Somewhat disconcertingly, however,
these models are based on opposing assumptions about the mapping
from utility ranges to decision weights.
In this chapter, I propose a direct empirical test of context dependence
using data from a speed-dating experiment previously reported in Fis-
man et al. (2006), Fisman, Iyengar, Kamenica, and Simonson (2008)
and Bhargava and Fisman (2014).2 I argue that this experiment provides
1 Another class of models is due to Bordalo et al. (2012, 2013). ¿eir basic intuition is
that an attribute stands out more the farther it is away from some reference level of
that attribute in relative terms. Note that this model diers from Kőszegi and Szeidl
(2013) and Bushong et al. (2015) in important regards: rst, not the utility range along
a dimension itself determines how much weight it receives, but rather the comparison
of ratios across dierent dimensions. Second, and related, this implies that dierent
options can have dierent ‘salience rankings’, i.e. decision weights might dier across
alternatives. For these reasons I focus on the latter class of models and leave empirical
tests of Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer’s salience theory for future work.
2 All three papers are based on the same dataset. Fisman et al. (2006) describe gender
dierences in dating behavior, documenting that men focus more on attractiveness
of partners while intelligence is more important for women. In Fisman et al. (2008),
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an ideal setup to test for these types of context eects. First, and most
importantly, participants meet a sequence of partners and are asked to
evaluate them a er each date, along with deciding whether they would
like to meet that person again. ¿e evaluation stage is particularly inter-
esting formy purposes, since it allows to pin down attribute utility values.
Second, the sequential nature of speed dating generates within person
variation in utility ranges along attributes. ¿ird, the order in which
participants speed-date each other is eectively random.¿is property,
in combination with the within-person variation in utility ranges, en-
sures clean identication of context eects. Finally, dimensions used for
ranking potential partners are exogenously given, meaning that they
cannot be assumed ex post.
¿e empirical strategy I employ is informed by the central assump-
tions of focusing (Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013) and relative thinking (Bushong
et al., 2015) that relate utility ranges to decision weights. At the end of
each speed date, subjects report whether they would like to receive the
contact details of their respective partners in order to arrange future
dates. Due to the simultaneity and privacy of this binary yes/no-decision
(which is revealed to the partner only if he/she has indicated ‘yes’), it
is a dominant strategy to reveal preferences truthfully. ¿e decision to
date serves as dependent variable.
In addition to attribute values, I include attribute ranges as indepen-
dent variables in order to understand the eects of context on the like-
lihood to date. Put more succinctly, this empirical strategy allows for
previous observations (partners) to inuence the utility of the current
partner through their eect on the range of attribute values. Results
indicate that decision weights decrease in utility ranges, consistent with
the framework proposed by Bushong et al. (2015).¿is eect is more pro-
nounced for women than it is for men, and survives extensive robustness
checks.
To understand how individuals make choices is a fundamental ques-
tion with wide-ranging implications for economic theory and policy.
the authors examine whether dating behavior exhibits racial biases. ¿ey show that
same-race preferences are more prevalent for women. In addition, they document
determinants of such preferences. Finally, Bhargava and Fisman (2014) explore contrast
eects, a phenomenon whereby a potential partner, say, is perceived dierently depend-
ing on whether or not he or she is preceded by a very attractive man or woman. ¿ey
show that the bigger the contrast, the lower the likelihood of a positive dating decision
for the partner following immediately a erwards. Since contrast eects are a potential
confound of context eects, this paper is most closely related to the present work.
More details regarding how contrast eects are addressed in the empirical analysis are
provided in Section 3.4.3.
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Taking the canonical homo oeconomicus as a benchmark for rational
behavior, we expect economic agents to have a well-dened and stable
preference relation over a known set of alternatives, which in turn guar-
antees that preference can be revealed through choice. A number of
systematic deviations from this denition of rationality have been iden-
tied, and they question the validity of homo oeconomicus as a positive
model. ¿e purpose of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence for
a specic type of preference instability, which I will refer to as context
dependence. In short, an individual suers from context dependence if
she values an alternative dierently depending on the consideration set
she is facing.
Models of context dependence are useful to explain empirical puzzles
that cannot be easily reconciled with standard decision theory. One of
the most well-known anomalies in this regard are decoy eects, where
the presence of an inferior alternative changes choice behavior between
two pre-existing options. Models of context-dependent preferences can
also shed light on the famous jacket-calculator example advanced by
Tversky and Kahneman (1981), consisting of the observation that people
are more willing to spend a xed amount of time in order to save $5 on
a $15 rather than on a $125 purchase.
As pointed out before, Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et al.
(2015) dier in how they endogenize the decision weights placed on
dierent dimensions. Both models assume that decision weights depend
on the range of utility that can be experienced along a given dimension.
However, they make the exact opposite assumption on how weights are
related to the range: Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) argue that larger ranges
attract more attention, and are thus overweighted. In contrast, Bushong
et al. (2015) assume that xed dierences loom larger when viewed
against small ranges, hence decision weights are decreasing in the utility
range.
Tomake sense of this discrepancy, it will be helpful to review themain
arguments behind these two frameworks. Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) ar-
gue that people focus attention on those dimensions in which they
can experience the largest utility gains or losses. All else being simi-
lar, it pays to attend to attributes that dier because they generate the
largest variability in utility. Roughly speaking, Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013)
model behavior as a strategy of “going for large gains and avoiding large
losses”. ¿is strategy invariably bears the risk of missing ne dierences
between options. Dertwinkel-Kalt, Gerhardt, Riener, Schwerter, and
Strang (2016) lend some empirical support to the focusing hypothesis.
In a laboratory experiment designed to elicit time preferences, they vary
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both the distribution of total monetary payments across periods and
whether concentrated payments are made earlier or later (there are 9
payment periods in total). ¿eir ndings suggest that there is indeed
a bias towards concentration in intertemporal choice. Subjects behave
relatively more patiently when this results in a stream of small negative
consequences followed by a large, concentrated, positive consequence.
¿e converse is also true: when behaving impatiently results in small neg-
ative consequences that are preceded by a large positive payo, subjects
will give disproportionate weight to the concentrated advantage and
hence behave impatiently, even when compared with a present-biased
individual.
Bushong et al. (2015) take a dierent stand: When individuals are
asked to compare options along multiple attributes, they will tend to
think in relative terms.¿at is, a small utility dierence may appear large
when viewed against a relatively small range, and a large utility dierence
may appear small when evaluated relative to a large range. ¿ey argue
that several empirical observations are consistent with this notion: the
predictions of relative thinking coincide with experimental evidence on
attraction eects (Soltani, De Martino, & Camerer, 2012), are tentatively
supported by evidence on labor supply and wage expectations (Bracha,
Gneezy, & Loewenstein, 2015), and provide novel insights into “rst-of-
the-month eects” (Human & Barenstein, 2005).3
In summary, empirical evidence for the specic type of context de-
pendence proposed by these frameworks is mixed. Although intuitively
appealing and plausible, Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et al.
(2015) fundamentally disagree about the eects of the utility range along
one dimension on its decision weight. It is therefore important to shed
light on this issue from an empirical perspective. ¿e speed dating ex-
periment allows for a direct test of the central assumption underlying
the aforementioned models.
Given that the speed dating setting is relatively specic we might ask
whether the ndings generalize to other situations. A er all, choosing
a vacuum cleaner may be an altogether dierent experience than ex-
3 Bushong et al. (2015) note that focusing and relative thinking may both shape behavior,
despite their apparent contradictions. One way to reconcile these theories would be to
assume they inuence behavior at dierent points in the decision process: in order to
form a consideration set of a large number of options, individuals may nd it useful to
eliminate options with many similar attributes and keep only those which they can
expect to rank easily. In a second step, they may then use relative thinking to arrive at
a nal choice. Since I do not observe the entire decision process, but only nal choices,
the data at hand cannot speak to this hypothesis.
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pressing romantic interest in a potential partner. However, there is no
a priori reason to believe that individuals should behave dierently in
other areas of decision making. If anything, context eects may be more
pronounced: nding a suitable partner (for a lifetime relationship, or
even for a short-time aair) is a dicult endeavor. It involves a lot of
margins that are hard to foresee, yet immensely consequential. If we can
be inuenced by context in such important choices, it seems probable
that context eects are at least as relevant for less involved decisions.
3.2 related literature
Cognitive psychologists have identied several instances in which con-
text inuences perception (for an overview and classication, see Todor-
ović, 2010). More relevant for the purposes of this chapter, however, is
the fact that perceptual biases, caused by the context in which options
are presented, impact choice—thus aecting the domain of preferences.
Early demonstrations of context eects have been documented by Par-
ducci (1965, 1974), Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982) and Huber and Puto
(1983). Parducci (1965) develops a theory of perception that remains
inuential to this day. He postulates two conicting principles that guide
judgment: when presented with a set of stimuli, individuals tend to as-
sign them to categories of equal size by their relation to the range of
possible outcomes (for instance, very cold to very warm). At the same
time, stimuli are judged by the frequency with which they appear, and
hence more frequent stimuli should correspond to larger categories.
Whenever stimuli are presented disproportionately to their range, these
two principles disagree and decisions are made by compromising be-
tween them. Inspired by Parducci (1974), where range-frequency theory
is applied to context eects, Huber et al. (1982) and Huber and Puto
(1983) show that adding asymmetrically dominated alternatives (“de-
coys”) systematically distorts choice. Simonson and Tversky (1992) build
on this literature by developing a unied conceptual framework that can
accomodate most of the observed empirical ndings.
By now, interest in context dependence and salience has spread from
psychology to strands of literatures in business administration and polit-
ical science, as well as in international communication and economics.
Salience as a concept is of course dicult to pin down, and so the precise
meaning of the term varies across disciplines.4 However, it seems to be
4 I will be somewhat liberal in using the terms salience and context dependence inter-
changeably. To justify this, the theories outlined below dene salience as overweighting
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commonly accepted that a salient object is one that “stands out” relative
to some other object in a given choice context (likewise for attributes
of objects) (cf. Sullins, 1989; Jarvenpaa, 1990; Augoustinos, Walker, &
Donaghue, 2014; Kiousis & Wu, 2008; Bordalo et al., 2013).5
¿ere are several empirical demonstrations of salience eects in a
variety of choice contexts. Jarvenpaa (1990) shows experimentally that it
matters whether information is presented as text or in a visual display.
She argues that visualizing information triggers perceptual processes
that compare physical shapes of items, which may induce decision mak-
ers to act on salient features. By contrast, when presenting the same
information as numbers, it is much harder to identify and react to dis-
similarities.6 She then exploits the variation in information displays
to show that subjects react to features that stand out when presented
with the graphic display, but not when information is given as text. In
addition, she nds that prior ratings of the importance of attributes
are predictive for behavior in the alpha-numeric display, but not in the
graphic visualization.
Building on this line of research, Sun, Li, and Bonini (2010) explore
whether dierent graphical presentations aect evaluations of options
by making dimensions more or less salient. Like Jarvenpaa (1990), they
do not vary the informational content of the graphs. But rather than
juxtaposing textual and visual displays, their design directly exploits
biases in visual perception by manipulating axis scales. To be more
precise, they use a hypothetical choice between two scholarships that are
characterized by two dimensions, waiting time (in months) and amount
of money (in 100 Yuan), where the former is depicted on the horizontal
of a specic attribute of an option, which in turn depends on other options that are
present in the choice set. In other words, the choice context directly impacts which
attributes of an object are considered to be salient, and so it seems warranted to use
these two terms interchangeably.
5 Kiousis and Wu (2008) do not explicitly mention that an object needs to “stand out”
in order to be considered salient. However, in line with Jarvenpaa (1990) and Bordalo
et al. (2013), they dene salience in relative terms: “Object salience was dened as
the frequency of stories mentioning foreign nations in New York Times content [. . . ].”
(Kiousis &Wu, 2008, p. 65). ¿e frequency approach immediately implies that when
comparing two objects (say, stories mentioning foreign nations and stories mentioning
baby names), their salience will be judged in relative terms. For a comprehensive
overview of the concept of media salience, see Kiousis (2004).
6 ¿e following quote will further clarify the idea: “A bar representing an information
value of 2 is twice as large in appearance as a bar representing an information value
of 1. In contrast, a number of 2 versus a number of 1 in an alpha-numeric display
possesses fewer physical dissimilarities and does not consume any more display space.”
(Jarvenpaa, 1990, p. 251).
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Figure 3.1.—Visual Salience
Notes: Adapted from Sun, Li, and Bonini (2010).
and the latter on the vertical axis. ¿e rst graph makes waiting time
salient by extending the length of the horizontal axis, such that the
horizontal distance between the points is much larger than the vertical
one. In the second graph, axis lengths are reversed, but the options are
equidistant in both dimensions. Figure 3.1 illustrates the design.
¿eir ndings indicate that subjects preferAover Bwhenwaiting time
is salient (i.e., in the le panel of Figure 3.1), while they are indierent
between the two options when the problem is presented as in the right
panel of the gure. ¿is is an important nding for two reasons: rst,
it shows that perceptive errors can aect decision making; second, it
implies that preferences can be constructed, at least to some degree.
In subsequent experiments, Sun et al. (2010) validate that their main
nding is robust to including more than two options and to keeping
scale resolution constant across graphs.7
An implicit assumption of these ndings on visual salience eects is
that a dimension becomes more salient the further apart the values of op-
tions are. As shown by Sun et al. (2010), the dierence in attribute values
may not be measured in utility terms, but rather by means of a Euclidean
metric. ¿is alludes to a well-established literature on discriminability
7 See Sun, Li, Bonini, and Su (2012) for a more general discussion of graphical framing
eects that inuence decision making via perception.
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(cf. Archer, 1962; Trabasso, 1963; Imai & Garner, 1965). Kahneman (1973)
synthesizes their ideas as follows: “Some factors that make a particular
cue more salient than others have been identied. Discriminability is
such a factor. For example, if ellipses are presented which vary greatly
in overall size and only slightly in eccentricity, and both size and shape
are relevant, then size rather than shape will dominate behavior in a
concept-identication task [. . . ].” (p. 101). Like the previously described
experiments on visual salience eects, this denition argues that large dif-
ferences draw attention, and that heightened perception of a dimension
will inuence behavior.
3.3 theoretical framework
¿e following section presents a simple model of context-dependent
preferences, designed to guide the empirical analysis. It is based on
Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et al. (2015).
In the spirit of these twomodels, I assume that decision makers act on
context-dependent utility, where the weight attached to each dimension
is allowed to depend on other options in the choice set. Formally, let K
denote the number of attributes, with a generic attribute indexed by k.
Each option c ∈ C ⊂ RK is a vector of attribute levels: c = (c1, . . . , cK).
In line with Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et al. (2015), utility
is assumed to be additively separable. Yet instead of maximizing con-
sumption utility U(c) = ∑Kk=1 uk(ck), decision makers act on context-
dependent utility U˜ :
U˜(c,C) = K∑
k=1 дkuk(ck), (3.1)
where дk ≡ д(∆k(C)) denotes the decision weight placed on dimen-
sion k and ∆k(C) = maxck∈C uk(ck) −minck∈C uk(ck). ¿is reects the
assumption that each дk is a function of the range of options that are
present in the consideration set, as in Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and
Bushong et al. (2015). To account for the sequential nature of the speed
dating experiment, I include previous observations in the considera-
tion set (see Assumption 3.1). ¿at is, all options encountered up to the
current partner determine the range of options, and thereby the weight.
Assumption 3.1 (Consideration Sets). Consideration sets are time de-
pendent and contain all previously encountered options. Formally, CT ={ct}Tt=1.
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Assumption 3.2 (Decision Weights). Decision weights depend on the
utility ranges of attributes of options in CT : дTk ≡ д(∆k(CT)), where
∆k(CT) =maxc∈CT uk(ck) −minc∈CT uk(ck).
Assumption 3.2 states that weights are determined as a function of the
dierence between the highest and lowest attribute level encountered
along a given dimension. I will refer to this dierence as the range of
attribute levels, or range for short.¿e crucial dierence betweenKőszegi
and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et al. (2015) lies in the way the дk change
as the range increases: assuming that larger ranges attract more focus,
as in Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013), implies that д′k(⋅) > 0. If, however, xed
dierences seem bigger the more narrow the range, as in Bushong et al.
(2015), wewould expect д′k(⋅) < 0.¿e empirical analysis will concentrate
on identifying precisely the eect of larger ranges on the decision weight.
Assumption 3.3 (Linear Utility). All attribute utility functions are lin-
ear: uk(ck) = λkck∀ck∀k.
Linearity is a simplifying assumption that underlies most of the ex-
amples and applications in Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et
al. (2015). Attribute utility functions are parameterized by λk, allowing
for utility weights to vary by attribute. Importantly, linearity seems to
be reasonable with regard to the data at hand (see Figure 3.4 and the
discussion in Section 3.5.1).
Assumption 3.4 (Reference Dependence).
(a) Utility exhibits reference dependence. For a given threshold rk, it
can be written as
U˜T(c,CT) = K∑
k=1 д
T
k mk(ck , rk), (3.2)
where mk(⋅) ≡ uk(ck) − uk(rk).
(b) ∀ck, either ∂mk(⋅)∂ck > 0 or ∂mk(⋅)∂ck < 0 or ∂mk(⋅)∂ck = 0.
In an attempt to allow for the most general functional form, part (a)
of Assumption 3.4 introduces reference dependence into the setup.8
¿e aspiration (or reference) level is denoted by rk, and may thus vary
8 In an unpublished companion paper, Bushong et al. (2015) combine their theory of
relative thinking with reference dependence in the spirit of Kőszegi and Rabin (2006,
2007).
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across attributes. Below, I will argue that a subject’s own level of a given
attribute determines the reference point, but alternative specications
can be accomodated.9 Part (b) of Assumption 3.4 is a monotonicity
requirement, ensuring that attribute utility functions are increasing,
decreasing, or at over their entire domain.
Together, Assumptions 3.3 and 3.4 imply that
mk(⋅)
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
> 0 if ck > rk ,= 0 if ck = rk ,< 0 if ck < rk .
(3.3)
Intuitively, expression 3.3 asserts that there exist reference attribute
values rk, and receiving exactly the aspired level of a given attribute
is neutral in terms of utility. If one’s partner ranks above (below) the
threshold, this results in positive (negative) utility.
Previewing the estimation strategy, it is useful to consider some com-
parative static properties. ¿e focus here will be on the eect of a larger
range on the likelihood to say yes, which is in turn assumed to be a
monotonic and increasing function of utility. To be precise, if for a given
attribute level a larger range increases the likelihood to say yes, this
supports focusing (à la Kőszegi & Szeidl, 2013), while the opposite eect
is expected for the Bushong et al. (2015) framework to hold true.
Consider again expression (3.2). Keeping the attribute level constant,
the marginal eect of an increase in the range on utility is given by
∂U˜T(⋅)
∂∆k(CT) = д′k(∆k(CT))mk(ck , rk). (3.4)
¿us, if mk(⋅) < 0, that is if the evaluator ranks higher on an attribute
than her partner, Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) predict that overall utility
decreases since дk increases in the range. Conversely, overall utility
must increase if mk(⋅) > 0, since the higher weight on dimension k
contributes positively to U˜ . Due to the opposite assumption on how the
range relates to decision weights, Bushong et al. (2015) make the exact
opposite prediction. To summarize:
9 Subjects rate themselves on all attributes prior to the experiment. Due to self-serving
biases, these ratings might be biased upwards. To correct for this potential bias, I
use the average rating of all other participants in addition. Empirical support for this
approach is given in Section 3.5.1.
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Figure 3.2.—Comparative Statics
Prediction 3.1 (Impact of Range on Utility).
KS: ¿e likelihood to say yes increases in the range when mk(⋅) ≥ 0,
and decreases when mk(⋅) < 0:
∂U˜
∂∆k
= д′k(∆k(CT))mk(ck , rk)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
> 0 if mk(⋅) > 0,< 0 if mk(⋅) < 0 (3.5)
BRS: ¿e likelihood to say yes decreases in the range when mk(⋅) > 0,
and increases when mk(⋅) < 0:
∂U˜
∂∆k
= д′k(∆k(CT))mk(ck , rk)⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
< 0 if mk(⋅) > 0,> 0 if mk(⋅) < 0. (3.6)
Intuitively, the eect of a range increase changes sign depending on
whether the attribute’s contribution to utility is positive or negative.
To illustrate this graphically, suppose that a subject meets a sequence
of potential partners (a, b, c, d , e , f ). When she meets c, her range is
given by the distance between c and b. Continuing in the sequence,
her range steadily expands, until she meets partner d. Hence, although
e receives the same rating as c, the two decision situations dier in
terms of the range (which is ∣c − b∣ when deciding about c, but ∣c − d∣
when deciding about e). Similarly, b is rated the same as f , but the two
situations dier in the range experienced at this point. If ratings between
c and e (or b and f ) dier depending on the range, holding everything
else constant, preferences exhibit context dependence. If the eect of
the range diers in sign depending on whether we compare c and e or b
and f , preferences exhibit reference dependence. Finally, the sign of the
eect in combination with the slope of the utility function determines
whether utility is increasing or decreasing in the range.
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¿ese comparative static properties inform the estimation strategy
described in Section 3.4.4.
3.4 empirical analysis
3.4.1 Institutional Background
Speed dating was invented by Rabbi Yaacov Deyo in 1998 and has spread
rapidly since, with only minor variations to the protocol.10 Its express
purpose is to facilitate matching of potential partners by eliminating
concerns that a person might not reciprocate one’s advances and by
enabling people to get to know a large number of other people in a
relatively short time span. At a given event, roughly equal numbers of
males and females are present. Females are assigned to a table, where
they remain seated for the duration of the event.Men initially pick a table
and the pair engages in conversation. A er four minutes have elapsed,
men rotate to the next table, until every man has talked to every woman.
A er each speed date, all participants indicate whether they would like
to meet the person they have just talked to again. Importantly, the host
makes contact information available to the interested parties if and only
if both members of a pair agree.
3.4.2 Methods and Data
¿e data used in this chapter were previously reported in Fisman et al.
(2006, 2008) as well as Bhargava and Fisman (2014). I will argue below
that due to the specic protocol they used, these data are ideally suited
to answer questions about salience and focusing. First, however, I will
describe the data and the setup.
3.4.2.1 Data Description
A total of 21 speed dating sessions were conducted at a popular restaurant
on the campus of Columbia University, New York City. All environmen-
tal aspects, except group size, were held constant. In each session, women
were seated at separate tables and remained there for the duration of
the event. Men were given four minutes to talk to a woman in private,
before the organizers indicated the end of the date. Men then rotated
to the next table, and this continued until every man had seen every
10 See http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/magazine/who-made-speed-dating.html.
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Session ID Session Date Male Participants Female Partipants
1 October 16, 2002 10 10
2 October 23, 2002 16 19
3 November 12, 2002 10 9
4 November 12, 2002 18 18
5 November 20, 2002 10 10
7 March 26, 2003 16 16
8 April 2, 2003 10 10
9 April 2, 2003 20 20
10 September 24, 2003 9 9
11 September 24, 2003 21 21
13 October 8, 2003 9 10
14 October 8, 2003 18 20
15 February 24, 2004 19 18
17 February 24, 2004 14 10
Table 3.1.—Summary of the Speed Dating Sessions
woman. A er each speed date, participants were given one minute to
rate their counterpart on six attributes and indicate whether they would
be interested in receiving their contact details.
All analyses are restricted to 14 out of the 21 sessions. Sessions 6
and 16 have a substantially smaller than average group size (10 resp. 14
participants in total, compared to an average of 28.6 participants). In
session 12, participants faced an upper bound on the number of positive
decisions to date. In Sessions 18 to 21, participants were encouraged to
bring either a book or a magazine, whichmay have distracted them from
the actual speed dating experiment and introduces additional noise.11
Participants were also asked to allocate a total of 100 points to at-
tribute categories in order to measure their relative importance. If the
total diers from 100 points (presumably due to calculation errors), I
renormalize attribute weights.
In sum, this leaves 400 participants (200male, 200 female) and a total
of 6256 observations. Table 3.1 gives an overview of all sessions that are
included in the data analysis.
11 Including all sessions in the analysis leaves the main results qualitatively unchanged
(see Appendix C.1.1).
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3.4.2.2 Setup
¿e protocol described above closely resembles that of the largest com-
mercial speed dating agency in NewYork City at the time the experiment
was conducted, HurryDate.12 For the purposes of this study, it has several
attractive features.
First, participants rate each other on six dierent attributes in short
succession. ¿e attributes are attractiveness, sincerity, intelligence, fun,
ambition, and shared interests. ¿ese ratings can be interpreted as utility
values that participants (subjectively) attach to others. Hence, whenever
a participant meets another participant who is either better or worse
on some attribute than all other participants he has previously dated,
his utility range along this attribute increases. ¿e econometric analysis
will exploit precisely this within-person variation in utility ranges along
attributes.
Second, the order in which participants speed-date each other is eec-
tively exogenous. ¿ere may be some scope for choosing whom to date
rst, but the ensuing (mechanical) rotation ensures that participants
do not date in any particular order. ¿is assumption is empirically sub-
stantiated by Bhargava and Fisman (2014), who fail to reject the null of
random dater order for all six attributes using the same data set.
¿ird, the data include not only utility (as measured by ratings along
the dierent attributes), but a yes/no decision for each date. ¿e rules
specied that upon completing a follow-up survey the day a er the
experiment, the organizer would distribute email-addresses of other par-
ticipants if and only if both had indicated that they would be interested
in further meetings. ¿e presence of a third party should alleviate any
concerns regarding strategic behavior on the part of participants, since
it is a dominant strategy to reveal one’s romantic interest truthfully.
3.4.3 Preliminary Considerations
specification of the attribute range I assume throughout
the main text that participants have perfect memory, that is, they recall
every person they have dated during a session. It follows that the range
is given by the dierence between the best and worst attribute level
encountered in the sequence of decisions leading up to the current date.
Alternative specications are possible and serve as robustness checks
(see Section 3.5.4 and Appendix C.1.4).
12 For a more detailed description of the protocol see Fisman et al. (2006).
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men women∅ σ N ∅ σ N p-Values
Attractiveness 27.18 14.49 195 17.91 9.67 196 p < 0.01
Sincerity 16.21 7.05 195 17.88 6.78 196 p < 0.05
Intelligence 19.19 7.03 195 20.89 6.91 196 p = 0.52
Fun 17.75 7.11 195 17.54 5.69 196 p = 0.84
Ambition 8.65 5.97 195 13.47 5.47 196 p < 0.01
Shared Interests 11.01 6.70 195 12.31 5.86 196 p < 0.10
Table 3.2.—Importance Ratings
For most of the analysis, I leave the range at the rst date unspecied.
¿is implies that all regressions will be performed on subsamples starting
with the second date. Alternatively, it may be plausible to assume that
subjects’ own level of a given attribute (ci) serves as a reference and thus
as a starting point for the determination of the range. In this case, the
range for the very rst date is determined by the dierence between ci
and the attribute level of the partner who was encountered rst. Results
are qualitatively unchanged (see Appendix C.1.2). Since specifying the
attribute range at the rst date requires an additional assumption, I do
not pursue this approach.
importance ratings Participants in the speed dating events are
likely to dier in howmuch importance they assign to dierent attributes.
Not taking this heterogeneity into account would skew the interpretation
of the estimated coecients below. For instance, a one unit increase in
attractiveness may have a larger eect on the likelihood to say yes as
a one unit increase in intelligence. Without knowledge of the relative
importance of these two dimensions, we could not tell whether eect
sizes dier conditional on the prior weight put on a given attribute.
Fortunately, the data include importance ratings of the dimensions,
assessed prior to the start of the speed dating experience. Participants
were asked to distribute points among the six dierent attributes, with
the constraint that the sum of these weights must add up to 100. ¿e
results of this exercise are shown in Table 3.2, separately by gender.
It is apparent that men place a higher weight on attractiveness than
women. Conversely, women seem to nd ambition more important
in potential partners. To account for the heterogeneity in importance
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ratings, I weight all ratings (and, by implication, all ranges) by the subject-
specic rating (standardized to lie between 0 and 1).
time trends Another concern that may inuence the estimated
eects comes from the sequential nature of the speed dating experience.
As shown in Figure 3.3, there is indeed a slightly negative time trend in
the rate at which participants say yes. ¿is trend is more pronounced
for women than it is for men.13
Due to the assumption of perfect memory, the attribute range must
weakly increase in the number of dates one has encountered. Since this
happens concurrently with the overall negative trend in the yes rate,
there is a concern that estimating a negative eect of the range on the
likelihood to say yes is indeed due to the position of the date, not the
range. To eliminate this concern, I include round xed eects in all
subsequent regressions.
rescaling Due to the sequential setting of the speed-dating experi-
ment, response variables may be subject to rescaling over time. More
precisely, this means that context dependencemight directly aect stated
attribute utility levels instead of inuencing only nal outcomes (the
decision to date). In their work on contrast eects, Bhargava and Fisman
(2014) discuss these potential confounds and circumvent the issue by
using attractiveness ratings provided by two research assistants, whom
they presume not to be inuenced by contrast eects.14
While an attractive approach in principle, it is unclear why research
assistants’ ratings should suer from contrast eects any less than those
provided by evaluators. Furthermore, by relying on the average rating
of just two research assistants, there is indeed scope for systematic over-
or underrating of targets if the order in which targets are evaluated is
not perfectly negatively correlated. ¿eir methodology also forces them
to focus on attractiveness alone (as this is the only attribute that can be
assessed without further interaction with the target).
For these reasons I apply an additional, complementary strategy to
deal with potential rescaling issues.¿is strategy rests on the assumption
that evaluators cannot be inuenced by context eects in the very rst
13 In a simple OLS regression, the coecient on Round is −0.0028 for the whole sam-
ple, −0.0027 for men and −0.0029 for women. All three coecients are statistically
signicant at the 1%-level.
14 Bhargava and Fisman (2014) claim that due to using the attractiveness ratings of two
research assistants rather than evaluators’ own assessments, target values are assessed
exogenously (p. 445).
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Figure 3.3.—Yes Rates
Notes: Yes rates are averaged over rounds. Error bars display the
standard error of the mean, assuming a binomial distribution.
Upper panel displays yes rates for all participants. Lower panels
are split by gender.
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round; in which case we can take the assessment of the evaluator who
has dated the target in the rst round, and apply this rating to assess-
ments of that target in all subsequent rounds. More details regarding
this alternative strategy to deal with rescaling and results accounting for
this potential confound are reported in Appendix C.1.3.
calibration Imagine an evaluator who gives a very high attrac-
tiveness rating to the rst person he encounters, only to nd that as he
progresses through the sequence of targets, there are many others whom
he deems even more attractive. In this case, his initial evaluation may
have been too high ex post, and hence persons encountered in earlier
periods would be overrated. ¿e opposite could of course also be the
case, and I collectively refer to this issue as imperfect calibration. If there
are systematic patterns of over- or underrating over time, this could
compromise the identication of context eects. To deal with this issue,
I propose the following method.
First, I assume that for every target j, the ‘true’ attribute level is given
by the average of the ratings of all evaluators except j. I then calculate the
deviation of evaluator i’s rating to the true attribute level, for each i and
all attributes separately. Taking the mean over all deviations by round, I
derive a measure for over- or underrating per round.
¿is sequence can then be tested for stationarity using an augmented
Dickey-Fuller test. Doing so for each attribute and for the whole sample
as well as men and women separately reveals that the null hypothesis of
stationarity cannot be rejected for 16 out of 18 cases.15 Failure to reject
stationarity for 16 of the 18 time series implies that over- and underrating
follows a random walk, hence there is no systematic recalibration over
time.
¿ere is a signicant positive trend for seven of these time series,
meaning that subjects in earlier rounds are underrated, while those
in later rounds tend to be overrated. However, the presence of such a
trend should not bias the results reported below, as any round-specic
variation will be picked up by round xed eects.
15 ¿ere are 6 attributes (attractiveness, sincerity, intelligence, fun, ambition and shared
interests) and three subsamples (all, men, women) for a total of 18 augmented Dickey-
Fuller tests. Stationarity is rejected for attribute ‘fun’ when using the subsample consist-
ing only of women (MacKinnon approximate p-value < 0.05) and for attribute ‘shared
interests’ when using the subsample consisting only of men (MacKinnon approximate
p-value < 0.05).
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contrast effects To pin down the eect of context on dating de-
cisions, we need to eliminate contrast as a confounding factor. Contrast
eects refer to the phenomenon that judgment is comparative: how a
judge values the severity of a crime may dier depending on whether
she has been exposed to a particularly terrifying crime beforehand, or
whether the case is preceded by a similar crime (Pepitone & DiNubile,
1976).16 Considering the speed dating experiment, a person’s attractive-
ness may be judged less favorably when preceded by a very attractive
person. However, an attractive person is also very likely to expand the
range, and therefore we cannot discriminate whether the less favorable
rating is due to contrast or to the larger range.
Contrast eects have been studied by Bhargava and Fisman (2014),
using the same dataset. ¿ey document that the more attractive the
previous partner was, the less likely it is that the evaluator decides to
date the current partner. ¿ey also show that such contrast eects are
transient, i.e., they are driven to a large extent by the partner immediately
preceding the current one. In order to eliminate this confound, I follow
their methodology by including lagged attribute values in all regressions.
¿e interpretation of the results will thus be conditional on the presence
of potential contrast eects. Put dierently, any eect of the attribute
range on the decision to date should be regarded as an eect in addition
to contrast eects.
3.4.4 Empirical Strategy
To identify the eect of the attribute range on the likelihood to say
yes, it is important to distinguish whether the absolute attribute level
is regarded as a ‘good’ or as a ‘bad’. ¿is is because the attribute range
eectively inuences the decision weight placed on a given dimension,
and hence we should expect the eect to change sign depending on
whether the absolute level is above or below some threshold.
Put more succinctly, if subject i regards partner j as attractive, an
increase in the range along that dimension will make it either more or
less likely that i says yes to j, depending on whether the decision weight
placed on this dimension increases or decreases. Conversely, when j
is regarded as unattractive, changing the decision weight must have
precisely the opposite eect on the nal decision.
16 For a summary of contrast eects, see Bhargava and Fisman (2014) and the references
therein.
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As a largely realistic rst pass, I consider the evaluator’s own level
along an attribute as a natural threshold (Figures 3.4 and 3.5, described in
more detail below, lend support to this approach). Partners rated above
one’s own level are hence regarded as desirable, whereas a rating below
one’s own decreases desirability.
A er each date, participants are asked to rate their counterparts on
six attributes, using a Likert scale from one to ten. Besides these attribute
ratings, the data contain ratings of the relative importance of dimensions.
¿ese were assessed prior to the speed dating sessions. I use importance-
weighted attributes and ranges in the subsequent regressions to account
for heterogeneity across participants’ utilities derived from a change in
a given dimension.
¿is leads to a model of the form
Decisioni jt = αi + γt +∑
k∈K βk1 ⋅ Rangeikt+∑
k∈K βk2 ⋅ (Ratingi jkt >¿resholdik) ⋅ Rangeikt (3.7)+ ∑
k∈K+ βk3 ⋅ Ratingi jkt +∑k∈K βk4 ⋅ Ratingi jk,t−1 + εi j,
where K = {Attractiveness, Fun}, K+ = {Attractiveness, Sincerity, In-
telligence, Fun, Ambition, Shared Interests}, αi contains subject-specic
xed eects, γt are round xed eects, and Ratingi jk,t−1 captures lagged
attribute values in order to account for contrast eects. I estimate this
model using a linear probability specication with standard errors clus-
tered on the partner level.
All observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of partners
encountered in the course of a given session. ¿is ensures that subjects
in larger sessions do not receive undue weight.
3.5 results
3.5.1 Attribute Utility Functions &¿resholds
¿eestimation strategy relies on the assumption that there exist reference
attribute levels separating utility into ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Context eects
of the type proposed by Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) and Bushong et al.
(2015) are identied if the eects of the utility range on the decision to
date dier in sign depending on whether the evaluated person is rated
above or below the reference level.
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To get a better sense of the utility functions for each attribute, Figures
3.4 and 3.5 presents results of ve separate regressions of the decision to
date on each attribute, including time and individual xed eects. ¿e
solid black line plots linear predictions for every possible level of the
attribute, and corresponding 95% condence intervals are shown as grey
areas.
Horizontal red dashed lines depict average yes rates. I assume that an
attribute is perceived as a good if it leads to an above average propensity
to date, and as a bad if it entails a below average willingness to say
yes to a date. Given this assumption, we can ask which attribute level
marks the threshold that separates utility. For future reference, I show
two candidate thresholds, drawn as vertical lines: subjects’ own rating
of an attribute, averaged over all subjects (green dotted line); and the
average consensus rating of subjects, explained in more detail below
(blue dash-dotted line).
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 document two key insights: rst, sincerity, intel-
ligence and ambition seem to have very little predictive power for the
decision to date. In fact, the predicted eect is almost at, implying that
the levels of these attributes matter little for dating decisions. Second, the
propensity to date increases in attractiveness and fun. ¿e relationship
is approximately monotonic. Importantly, the reference level is very well
approximated by the average consensus rating, which lends support to
the estimation strategy discussed in Section 3.4.4.17 ¿ese observations
are summarized in the following result:
Result 3.1 (Attribute Utility Functions &¿resholds).
(a) Sincerity, intelligence and ambition possess little to no predictive
power for the decision to date.
(b) Utility increases monotonically in attractiveness and fun almost ev-
erywhere. Attribute levels above the average consensus rating are
perceived as ‘good’, while those below are perceived as ‘bad’.
Result 3.1 states that the predicted eect on the decision to date is
constant over attribute levels for three dimensions (sincerity, intelligence
and fun), while it is increasing in levels of attractiveness and fun. By
17 Given that ratings of one’s own attribute levels are likely subject to self-serving biases,
it is unsurprising that the blue and green lines do not overlap. A somewhat more
surprising nding is that even though individuals consistently report exaggerated own
ratings, their judgment seems to be accurately guided by the perceptions of others.
However, a more detailed analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this
chapter and should therefore be regarded as speculative.
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Figure 3.4.—Marginal Eects of Attribute Levels on Dating
Decision (Attractiveness & Fun)
Notes: Vertical axes display average predicted values of the de-
pendent variable (decision to date) for dierent attribute values.
Plotted values are derived from regressing the decision to date
on all ve attributes, including time and individual xed eects.
Marginal eects are obtained post estimation for each attribute
separately. Regressions are weighted by the number of observa-
tions in each session. Standard errors are clustered on the partner
level. Grey areas are 95% condence intervals. Horizontal red lines
depict average yes rates, vertical blue lines (dash dotted) are av-
erage consensus ratings of the respective attribute, and vertical
green lines (dotted) are average own ratings of the attribute.
3.5 results 95
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(a) Sincerity
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(b) Intelligence
2 4 6 8 10
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
(c) Ambition
Figure 3.5.—Marginal Eects of Attribute Levels on Dating
Decision (Sincerity, Intelligence, & Ambition)
Notes:¿e same notes as for Figure 3.4 apply.
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implication, the identication strategy proposed in Section 3.4.4 will only
be able to pick up dierences in the signs of range eects for the latter
attributes. All subsequent analyses will therefore focus on attractiveness
and fun.
3.5.2 Context Dependence
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the main result. ¿e dependent variable is the
decision to date. All regressions include round xed eects to account for
the slight negative time trend in the dependent variable. In addition, they
control for absolute attribute levels and lagged absolute attribute levels
in order to identify possible contrast eects. Subject-specic xed eects
are included to capture any remaining heterogeneity among participants.
All specications rely on the ratings made by participants at the end
of each date. In Table 3.3, one’s own attribute rating is used as threshold
for the denition of the indicator variable. ¿at is, the indicator is set to
one whenever the partner’s attribute level weakly exceeds one’s own level
of that attribute (assessed prior to the start of the speed dating sequence),
and to zero otherwise.
Table 3.4 diers from Table 3.3 only in that it uses the consensus rating
of all other evaluators as threshold for the indicator variable. ¿e same
methodology has been employed by Fisman et al. (2006) to account
for potential self-serving biases in the assessment of one’s own attribute
level.
Since consensus ratings appear to be cleaner both in terms of method-
ology and by way of indicating the correct reference level (see Figures
3.4 and 3.5), the following analysis will focus on the results in Table 3.4.
Recall that focusing in the spirit of Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013) predicts
that larger ranges attract more attention, and therefore the eect of the
range on the decision to date should be positive given that utility of
the attribute is above the reference level. Conversely, the eect will be
negative if below the threshold. ¿is is not what we see: in fact, for
attribute levels below the reference level, the eect is positive (for both
attractiveness and fun). ¿e range eect for attribute levels above the
reference level is given by the sum of the coecients on the attribute
range and the interaction between the attribute range and the indicator
for being above the reference level. For both attractiveness and fun, this
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Own Rating
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Attractiveness Range 0.0696∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗∗ 0.0264
(0.0236) (0.0266) (0.0481)
More Attractive 0.281∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗
(0.0240) (0.0340) (0.0352)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.120∗∗∗ -0.133∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.0219) (0.0270) (0.0399)
Fun Range 0.00982 -0.0272 0.0408
(0.0348) (0.0520) (0.0483)
More Fun 0.0947∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0708∗
(0.0253) (0.0342) (0.0368)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.0111 -0.0284 0.0120
(0.0290) (0.0405) (0.0422)
Constant -0.757∗∗∗ -0.810∗∗∗ -0.725∗∗∗
(0.0608) (0.0819) (0.0865)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4710 2401 2309
R2 0.552 0.554 0.539
Adjusted R2 0.509 0.508 0.490
Table 3.3.—Context Dependence (Own Rating)
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10. More Attractive andMore Fun are indicator variables
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the
respective attribute, as judged by the evaluator him- or herself.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Attractiveness Range 0.119∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0350) (0.0415)
More Attractive 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0963∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.0236) (0.0369) (0.0323)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.127∗∗∗ -0.0900∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗∗
(0.0210) (0.0269) (0.0357)
Fun Range 0.0641∗ 0.0279 0.100∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0551) (0.0491)
More Fun 0.0627∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ -0.00420
(0.0263) (0.0370) (0.0355)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.0951∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ -0.0556
(0.0278) (0.0392) (0.0390)
Constant -0.967∗∗∗ -0.967∗∗∗ -0.975∗∗∗
(0.0602) (0.0838) (0.0840)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4710 2401 2309
R2 0.538 0.539 0.531
Adjusted R2 0.494 0.492 0.482
Table 3.4.—Context Dependence (Consensus Rating)
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10. More Attractive andMore Fun are indicator variables
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the
respective attribute, as judged by all other subjects.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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eect is negative. However, the eects are jointly insignicant and thus
indistinguishable from zero.18
To probe further into these results, columns (2) and (3) split the
sample by gender.19 ¿ere are pronounced gender dierences: below the
reference level, bothmen and women are more likely to say yes the larger
the range. However, only female participants react to range increases
above the reference level as predicted by Bushong et al. (2015). ¿e joint
eect is signicantly negative in this case (F(1, 199) = 6.55, p < 0.05). It
is insignicant for men.20
¿ese eects are large and economically signicant. A one point in-
crease in the utility range increases the likelihood to say yes by 11 to 12
percentage points if the target is less attractive than the evaluator. Con-
versely, a one point range increase decreases the likelihood to say yes by
12 percentage points if the target is more attractive than the evaluator
and the evaluator is female.
Results for fun exhibit overall similar patterns. However, they are less
precisely estimated (all interaction eects are jointly insignicant). A
possible explanation lies in the considerably atter slope of the utility
function relative to attractiveness (see Figure 3.4). In combination with
the smaller eect size, this makes it more dicult to pick up the eect.
Result 3.2 (Context Dependence).
(a) ¿e decision to date increases in the indicators for ‘more attractive
than self ’ and ‘more fun than self ’, which implies that attribute lev-
els in excess of one’s own are valued positively.
18 Results are qualitatively unchanged when controlling for a linear time trend instead.
¿e joint eects on attractiveness in columns (1) and (3) of Table 3.3 and column (3) of
Table 3.4 are slightly less precisely estimated: conditional on the partner being above
the reference level, an increase in the attractiveness range is signicantly negative
on the 10% level in specication (1) of Table 3.3, insignicant in specication (3) of
Table 3.3, and signicantly negative at the 5% level in specication (3) of Table 3.4.
Magnitudes of coecients are very similar.
19 Psychologists and economists have identied several behavioral traits along which
men and women dier. ¿e evidence is not always conclusive: in the domains of risk
aversion and altruism, for instance, there does not appear to be a robust and replicable
gender gap, while the dierences are rather large with respect to attitudes towards
competition (for an excellent survey, see Niederle, 2016). To the best of my knowledge,
this study is the rst to nd a gender gap in context dependence, speaking to the
domain-specicity of such dierences.
20 Note that these results are not distorted by dierential utility functions of male and
female participants. Figure C.1 in Appendix C.2 shows that both men and women
exhibit utility functions that are monotonically increasing in attractiveness almost
everywhere. In addition, even though the average yes rate is signicantly dierent, the
consensus rating approximates the reference level very well.
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(b) Results for both attractiveness and fun are qualitatively consistent
with Bushong et al. (2015), whereby xed dierences loom smaller
the larger the range.
(c) ¿ere are marked gender dierences: female participants are more
susceptible to context eects than male participants.
Part (a) of Result 3.2 supplements and substantiates the graphical
analysis presented in Figure 3.4. Taken together, these observations imply
that utility increases over the relevant range of attribute levels.
Part (b) states that in the specic context considered here, Bushong
et al. (2015) has more traction than Kőszegi and Szeidl (2013). When
deciding about whom to date, individuals appear to view dierences in
attributes across potential partners relative to the range they have expe-
rienced up to this point. Since a given utility dierence appears smaller
when evaluated relative to a large range, decision weights decrease in
utility ranges. ¿is results in the nding that a larger range increases
the propensity to date when the evaluated partner ranks below some
reference level along this attribute, and vice versa if ranked above. Yet
this is not to say that relative thinking is the only determinant of behavior
in this context. Rather, future research should identify whether there
exist conditions that lead individuals to selectively focus on a subset
of dimensions, using the heuristic by which larger ranges imply higher
potential utility gains. If this were true, it is possible that both focusing
and relative thinking are decisive determinants that operate at dierent
stages of the decision process.
Finally, part (c) draws attention to the fact that there are marked
gender dierences in behavior according to the regressions using the
consensus rating of one’s own attribute level. Since the eect is stronger
formenwhen using the ‘own level’-specication (yet still jointly insigni-
cant), this could be an artifact of incorrectly specifying the reference level.
However, it could also point to a true gender dierence that remains to
be explained.
3.5.3 Uniqueness of the Reference Level
As pointed out before, the estimation strategy rests on the assumption
that there exists a reference level of utility. To give substance to this
assumption, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that indeed there appears to be a
switch at the intersection of the average yes rate, which can be interpreted
as the utility/disutility-threshold, and the average consensus rating. ¿e
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fact that the estimated utility function passes through the intersection
point and is monotonic suggests that the consensus rating serves as a
natural reference level for relative utility judgments.
In order to show that this reference level is unique, I conduct placebo
tests.¿e basic idea is as follows: if (i) there exists a utility reference level,
and attribute values below this reference level induce disutility, while
values above provide utility, and if (ii) the eect of the attribute range
on utility diers according to whether the evaluated person is above
or below the reference level, there must be a reference level at which
both eects are simultaneously discernible. If this is not the case, the
location of the reference level should not matter. Hence we would expect
to observe similar eect sizes for randomly chosen placebo reference
levels.
Figure 3.6 plots the results for attractiveness. I run regressions of the
same type as in Section 3.5.2, except for one crucial dierence: I hold the
interaction reference level for fun constant at the consensus rating, while
varying the reference level for attractiveness from 1 to 10.¿e dotted line
then plots the coecients on the attribute range for all placebo reference
level values, conditional on the attribute level being below this reference
level. Conversely, the dash-dotted line plots coecients on the attribute
range conditional on being above the reference level. ¿e grey areas
depict 95% condence intervals.
In addition to the coecients, I show the values of the average con-
sensus rating and the average own rating of the specic attribute (blue
and green vertical lines). Stars above the null-eect line (marked in red)
indicate whether coecients of the below reference level attribute range
are signicantly dierent from zero; analogously for stars below the red
line and coecients of the above reference level attribute range.
To interpret the ndings, it is useful to recall the theoretical predic-
tions. Presuming that subjects evaluate partners according to how well
they perform relative to some reference level, Bushong et al. (2015) pre-
dict that the likelihood to say yes will decrease when the utility range
along a dimension increases if and only if the partner’s utility level on
that attribute is above the reference level. Conversely, because an increase
in the range leads subjects to focus less on small utility dierences, an
attribute’s disutility will be underweighted when it is below the reference
level. Hence the prediction that a range increase will lead to a higher
propensity to say yes when the evaluated subject is below the reference
level, and to a lower propensity when it is above. If there were indeed
a unique threshold level of utility, we would therefore expect to nd a
signicant below reference level range coecient for values up to some
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Figure 3.6.—Placebo Tests of Attractiveness Ranges
Notes: Figure displays regression coecients of the decision to
date on attribute range (dotted line) and the sum of attribute range
and the interaction between attribute range and a dummy (dash-
dotted line).¿e dummy is set to one if the attribute level is higher
than k = 1, 2, . . . , 10 and set to zero otherwise, such that each line
consists of coecients from 10 separate regressions. Grey areas are
95% condence intervals. ¿e horizontal axis tracks the value of
the threshold k. ¿e two vertical lines indicate the averages of the
consensus rating of the attribute (blue line) respectively subject’s
own rating of the attribute (green line). Stars above the red line
indicate whether coecients of the dotted line are signicantly
dierent from zero; analogously for stars below the red line and
the dash-dotted line. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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reference level, a signicant above reference level coecient for values
above, and a null eect for all other levels of these two coecients.
Due to the marked gender dierences reported in the main part, per-
forming placebo tests separately by gender is informative. Panel 3.6b
provides evidence that for female evaluators, there is indeed a unique
reference level of attractiveness that separates the utility scale into areas
of utility and disutility. It is apparent that exactly at the consensus rating
(marked in blue), there is a switch both in the magnitude and the signif-
icance of the coecients on the range, conditional on being above or
below the reference level. For reference levels up to 6, the below refer-
ence level range coecient is highly signicant and positive, whereas for
reference levels 6 up to 10, the above reference level coecient is highly
signicant and negative.21
Result 3.3. Uniqueness of the Reference Level
(a) In case the evaluator is female, there exists a unique reference level
of attractiveness which coincides with the average consensus rating.
(b) For male evaluators, the uniqueness property is not satised: many
reference levels are consistent with the proposition that the eect
of the attribute range diers depending on whether the evaluated
partner ranks below or above the reference level.
(c) Results for the attribute fun are qualitatively consistentwith a unique
reference level, but the coecients are less precisely estimated (cf.
Appendix C.3).
To put this in plain words, Panel 3.6b tells us that if an econometrician
were to set an arbitrary reference level of the attribute attractiveness, she
would nd that in 8 out of 10 cases, increasing the range inuences the
outcome variable either positively or negatively, but not both.22 Only in
one case, namely when the reference level is set at 6, will an increase
in the range have both a positive eect when the evaluated attribute is
21 Performing the same type of analysis on the combined sample, Panel C.2a in Appendix
C.3 shows a pattern that is qualitatively consistent with this expectation, but fails to
hold up quantitatively. In particular, there is no apparent change in both the magnitude
and the signicance of the coecients at some value between the consensus rating and
the own rating. Furthermore, the below reference level coecient remains signicantly
positive even for values above the reference level. Recalling that there appears to be no
generalized context dependence across genders (cf. Table 3.4), this nding is expected.
22 At a reference level of 1, the eect cannot be estimated reliably for lack of power.
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below the reference level and a negative eect when it is above, and so
this must be the unique reference level separating disutility from utility.23
¿e intuition is fairly straightforward: if an evaluated partner is above
the placebo reference level at arbitrary levels below the true reference
level, range increases should have no impact on the decision to date,
because eects for attractive and unattractive evaluated persons will
cancel each other. Hence we should not expect to see an above refer-
ence level range eect. Conversely, individuals rated below the placebo
threshold are unambiguously unattractive, and so we expect to see an
unambiguous range eect. Naturally, the same mechanism applies to
the area to the right of the ‘true’ reference level.
3.5.4 Consideration Set Composition
Recall that by Assumption 3.1, all previous dates are included in the
consideration set at the time individuals decide about their current
partner. ¿e attribute range is hence determined by taking the largest
dierence between attribute values encountered from the rst date to
the current one. ¿is is paramount to assuming that context eects are
not transient, but permanent. However, it requires that subjects have
perfect memory, which may be unnecessarily demanding.
Table 3.5 reports regressions that vary in memory length. As reference
case, column (1) assumes perfect memory. Columns (2) to (4) succes-
sively implement shorter memory lengths, such that in specication
(4) the range is determined by taking only the previous partner as a
reference.
Table 3.5 indicates that context dependence is robust to varying the
composition of the consideration set.Qualitatively, results are unchanged.
Eect sizes dier across specications, but not substantially. For a mem-
ory length of 3 respectively 2 partners, (columns (2) and (3)), the eect
of attractiveness range conditional on the partner being more attrac-
tive is signicantly negative (F(1, 399) = 3.02, p < 0.1; F(1, 399) = 2.72,
p < 0.1).
With respect to gender, the dierences discussed in the main part
persist. If anything, they are even more pronounced: for all memory
lengths, the overall eect of a range increase if the partner is ranked above
23 Note that due to the coarseness of the evaluations, which were constrained to whole
numbers, it is not meaningful to use ner divisions of the reference level. ¿is implies
that estimates for the range coecients are lumpy, and the lines connecting these
estimates are merely interpolations between adjacent points.
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Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perf. Mem. 3 Partners 2 Partners 1 Partner
Attractiveness Range 0.119∗∗∗ 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.0853∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗
(0.0287) (0.0254) (0.0245) (0.0307)
More Attractive 0.125∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0751∗∗∗
(0.0236) (0.0216) (0.0217) (0.0201)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.127∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.124∗∗∗ -0.165∗∗∗
(0.0210) (0.0241) (0.0284) (0.0421)
Fun Range 0.0641∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.0980∗∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0297) (0.0276) (0.0308)
More Fun 0.0627∗∗ 0.0594∗∗ 0.0377∗ 0.0332
(0.0263) (0.0240) (0.0228) (0.0213)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.0951∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗∗ -0.142∗∗∗
(0.0278) (0.0327) (0.0359) (0.0494)
Constant -0.967∗∗∗ -0.944∗∗∗ -0.905∗∗∗ -0.865∗∗∗
(0.0602) (0.0597) (0.0582) (0.0555)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4710 4710 4710 4710
R2 0.538 0.537 0.536 0.538
Adjusted R2 0.494 0.493 0.492 0.494
Table 3.5.—Consideration Set Composition
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10. More Attractive andMore Fun are indicator variables
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the
respective attribute, as judged by all other subjects.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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the evaluator is insignicant for male evaluators, but highly signicant
(p < 0.01) and negative for female evaluators (cf. Appendix C.1.4).
Result 3.4. Consideration Set Composition
(a) For memory lenghts of three resp. two partners, range eects ex-
hibit the same pattern as in the reference case of perfect memory.
¿e eects are signicantly positive when the partner ranks below
the reference level (p < 0.01), and signicantly negative when he or
she ranks above (p < 0.1).¿e above reference level eect is insignif-
icant, but directionally consistent, in case individuals are assumed
to recall but one person.
(b) Dierential gender eects persist when varying consideration set
composition. For female evaluators, both the below and the above
reference level range eects are highly signicant for all memory
lengths. Male evaluators conform to this pattern only partially (cf.
Appendix C.1.4).
¿ese results imply that context eects do not rely on a particular
assumption regarding the composition of consideration sets, which in
turn determines attribute ranges. Due to the fact that inferring consid-
eration from choice data remains challenging, I adopt a mechanistic
approach, in which choice objects fade from consideration over time.24
¿e robustness of these results should therefore be jugded relative to the
validity of the approach upon which they are based.
3.6 concluding remarks
¿is chapter shows that choice depends on context, a notion that stands
in stark contrast to the canonical homo oeconomicus. A fully rational
agent is characterized by a set of stable preference relations on a given
set of options, and adding options or taking them away does not distort
preferences among the remaining ones. Exploiting a rich dataset from a
speed dating experiment that contains data on both attribute utility and
nal choice, I provide evidence for a specic type of context dependence,
rst formalized by Bushong et al. (2015).
¿eir intuition suggests that a xed utility dierence appears large
when the range of possible utility values to be realized is small; but this
24 Masatlioglu et al. (2012), Manzini and Mariotti (2014), and Masatlioglu and Nakajima
(2015) present theoretical advances regarding identication of attention and considera-
tion. However, these approaches struggle to uncover preference completely. For the
purposes of this chapter, I therefore rely on a simplied framework.
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same utility dierence receives less and less weight the larger the utility
range becomes. In the context of speed dating, the empirical analysis
supports this type of relative thinking.
Assuming for a moment that the ndings of this study are not particu-
lar to the speed dating context, but reect a more general phenomenon,
relative thinking has important policy implications. For instance, mar-
keting specialists could exploit context dependence for strategic product
placement, intentionally deemphasizing weaknesses of a product by
positioning it in markets in which the utility variation along the disad-
vantaged dimension is large. ¿e idea that product positioning aims at
distorting consumers’ perceptions of attributes is not alien to current
marketing practice (cf., for instance, Boone & Kurtz, 2013). ¿e ndings
of this study suggest ways in which such targets can be reached more
eectively.25
Other potential applications include political agendas. Imagine a race
between two candidates who have to decide where to locate on the
political spectrum on certain issues. Suppose one candidate advocates
stricter gun control, while the other prefers to maintain the more lenient
status quo. For reasons of consistency, both candidates will stay true to
their initial positions at least until election day. But what if the location
of the median voter changes over time?¿is study suggest that there are
subtle ways in which candidates may inuence the salience of particular
issues: if public sentiment leans more towards stricter gun control, for
instance, the advocate of the status quo might publicly contemplate
measures that lead to more deregulation in order to make his position
appear relatively less extreme.
In a similar vein, speakers of committees who have some discretion
over the order in which items of the agenda are presented, could use this
to their advantage. If votes are taken a er each item, as is usually the
case, and if items have at least partly overlapping dimensions, an agenda
setter can manipulate their perceived weights. Due to the large number
25 ¿e marketing literature stresses the importance of positioning products appropriately,
but is silent about ways to achieve this objective. With respect to brands, Batra, Myers,
and Aaker (2009) dene positioning as follows: “Just as segmentation involves the
decision to aim at a certain group of customers but not others, [positioning] involves
a decision to stress only certain aspects of our brand, and not others. [. . . ]. Such
positioning is achieved mostly through a brand’s marketing communications, although
its distribution, packaging, and actual product features can play major roles.” (pp. 192–
193). ¿at product positioning aims at altering perception was rst proposed by Ries
and Trout (2001): “[P]ositioning is not what you do to a product. Positioning is what
you do to the mind of the prospect.¿at is, you position the product in the mind of the
prospect.” (quoted fromhttp://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/product-positioning.html).
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of possible candidates that are o en evaluated along similar or identical
attributes, hiring committees may be particularly prone to such eects.
Although the above examples are deliberately simplistic, they serve
to show that incorporating context dependence in preferences can in-
crease both the explanatory and predictive power of models. ¿e central
contribution of this chapter therefore lies in elucidating one particular
mechanism through which context matters and in distinguishing this
mechanism from other potential channels.
Nevertheless, this study has several limitations that provide fruitful
areas for further research. First, the fact that decisions about potential
partners are frequent (at least in terms of hypothetical evaluation), fa-
miliar, and highly consequential should make us condent that context
dependence will also be apparent in less involved decisions. However,
there may be other reasons why the speed dating context is idiosyncratic,
and more research is needed to shed light on this issue.
Second, there appears to be a gender gap. While results are quali-
tatively and directionally similar for female and male evaluators, co-
ecients on attribute ranges are precisely estimated only for women.
Whether this reects a true gender dierence or an artifact of higher
heterogeneity among men remains to be shown.
Finally, the speed dating setup lacks experimental control over which
potential partners are members of the consideration set, in relation to
which the range is determined. Although some theoretical advances
have been made in order to allow for identication of considered op-
tions (cf. Masatlioglu et al., 2012; Manzini & Mariotti, 2014), inferring
consideration from choice data is still challenging. In an attempt to al-
leviate related concerns, I show that results do not depend on dierent
assumptions regarding memory length. However, seeing as the process
of consideration set formation is not well understood, mechanisms other
than forgetfulness might be at play.
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a.1 instructions
¿ank you for your participation!
For your participation you will receive a base amount of 4 Euros. You
will be able to earn additional money in the following experiment. You
will receive your money at the end of the experiment in an envelope.
Neither the other participants of this study nor the experimenters will
be able to see how much money you have received.
Please note: during the entire duration of the experiment, commu-
nication between participants is not allowed. If you have a question,
please raise your hand. Your question will then be answered privately.
Please note: all statementsmade in these instructions are true.¿is
is true for all experiments conducted at the Bamberg Laboratory for
Experimental Research, and also for this experiment. In particular, all
consequences that are described in the instructions will be carried
out exactly as described. If you wish, you may verify the correctness of
all statements made in these instructions a er the experiment.
In this experiment there are two options. Depending onwhich option
you choose, you will be able to earn dierent amounts of money. In
addition, therewill be dierent consequences for a laying hen, depending
on your chosen option.
Details Regarding the Laying Hen
In this study, a laying hen is entrusted to your care. It is a young and
healthy hen. ¿e hen is now old enough (18 weeks) to be put into a coop
with other laying hens on a Franconian farm. In this regard, there are
two options for the laying hen among which you may choose. ¿e hen
will live for another approximately 13 months from the time it is put into
the coop.
How do the options dier?
Conventional Option: If you choose option conventional, you will
receive an additional amount of money at the end of the experiment
and the hen will be put into a conventional farming environment.
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Figure A.1.—Pictures of a Chick and a Grown Hen
Organic Option: If you choose option organic, you will not receive
any additional amount of money at the end of the experiment and the
hen will be put into an organic farming environment.
Details Regarding the Living Conditions
Conventional Option: In the conventional farming environment, each
hen has an available average space of 0.17 square meters. ¿is amounts
to an area of 41 cm × 41 cm. A pawing area covers approximately one
third of the coop. In the remaining two thirds there is a fecal pit with
perches above it. Your hen does not have the possibility to go outside.
¿e feed is from conventional agriculture, antibiotics are allowed.
Organic Option: In the organic farming environment, your hen has
4 square meters of grassy outdoor runs as well as a canopied outdoor
area with air-conditioning at its disposition, in addition to the area in the
coop.¿us, it can walk around on the grass together with its fellows, take
a sand bath, pick the ground and experience the fresh air. In addition, it
receives organic feed that must satisfy strict standards. Antibiotics may
not be fed. ¿e conditions of the “Naturland”-certicate are in many
ways stricter than the regulations of the EU ecological certicate: for
example, the criteria for feed are stricter, the maximum amount of hens
per coop is lower and the animals have the opportunity for free-range
activity even in bad weather periods.
¿e following table gives an overview of the dierent living conditions
and provides you with additional information:
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Conventional Organic
grassy outdoor runs no ∼ 4m2 per hen
canopied outdoor area no available year-round,
possibility to sand-
and dustbathe
size of coop up to 6000 hens up to 3000 hens
feed antibiotics allowed no antibiotics allowed
Table A.1.—Comparison of Living Conditions
Details Regarding the Payment
In a fewmoments, you will be presented with a list of choices. On this list,
dierent amounts of money for choosing the option conventional will be
displayed: it starts out with 50 Cents and increases in 50-Cent-steps to 25
Euros. For each of these amounts you can choose between conventional
and organic.
Your choice for each of these amounts is important. ¿e computer
will randomly select one of the amounts at the end of the experiment.
Your choice for this amount of money will be executed with all con-
sequences. Should the computer choose 3 Euros and should you have
checked the box for conventional at 3 Euros, the laying hen will be put
into the conventional farming environment and you will receive an addi-
tional 3 Euros at the end of the experiment. Should the computer choose
22.50 Euros and should you have checked the box for conventional at
22.50 Euros, the laying hen will be put into the conventional farming
environment and you will receive an additional 22.50 Euros at the end
of the experiment. Should the computer choose 15 Euros and should
you have checked the box for organic at 15 Euros, the laying hen will be
put into the organic farming environment and you will not receive any
additional money at the end of the experiment.
Summary
You are provided with a list of decisions. ¿is list contains dierent
amounts of money for the choice of the conventional option. For each
amount of money, you choose between the conventional and the organic
option. ¿e computer randomly selects one of these amounts. If you
114 appendix to chapter 1
have chosen the conventional option at this amount, you will receive
the additional amount of money at the end of the experiment and the
hen will be kept in the conventional farming environment for the rest of
its life. If you have chosen the organic option at this amount, you will
not receive any additional money, and the hen will be kept in an organic
farming environment (Naturland) for the rest of its life.
a.2 priming effects
Before eliciting subjects’ willingness to pay for sustainability, we ran-
domly exposed them to three dierent texts.1 In the control treatment
(C), subjects received two texts, one taken from German magazine FO-
CUS online and one by the renowned physicist and biochemist Francis
Crick. ¿ese texts dealt with the concept of consciousness and its rele-
vance for medical applications and psychology.
In the second treatment (AFW), subjects were given two texts that
argued against the existence of free will. One of the texts was taken
from FOCUS online and explained, in a rather summary manner, the
basics of the Libet experiment in the 1980s (Libet, 1985) and a recent
contribution from a French group of researchers (Desmurget et al., 2009),
claiming that people do not have freewill.¿e other text, again by Francis
Crick, argued strongly in favor of a deterministic worldview, in which
intentional actions and hence free will are mere illusions.
In the third treatment, we introduced an anti-religion prime (AR),
consisting of texts by atheist authors Richard Dawkins and Christopher
Hitchens (Dawkins, 2009; Hitchens, 2008). ¿ese texts were primarily
concerned with outlining the wars and crimes that have been committed
in the name of religion, as well as arguing against God’s existence.
We expected that evoking anti-free will and anti-religious concepts
would alter subjects’ behavior on the subsequent animal welfare task
towards caring less for the living conditions of a hen.
Contrary to our expectations, priming subjects with concepts of de-
terminism and anti-religious thought did not have an eect on our
dependent or independent measures of interest. (See Table A.2 for an
overview.)
We therefore decided to retain the observations of all treatments (C,
AFW and AR) for analyzing the association of ethical behavior towards
humans and animal welfare.
1 All texts are available upon request.
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Variable p-Value
Switch Point .810
Openness .809
Agreeableness .474
Machiavellianism (Tactics) .991
Machiavellianism (Cynicism) .527
Feminism Score .061
Masculinism Score .647
Age .067
Gender .417
Vegetarian or Vegan .044
Religiosity Dummy .923
Table A.2.—Dierences Between Priming Treatments
Notes: Table reports p-values from Kruskal-Wallis tests under the
null hypothesis that there are no dierences in switch points, de-
mographics, and personality characteristics.
However, note that there are cross-treatment dierences in demo-
graphic variables like age and gender. ¿is suggests that our sample is
somewhat unbalanced across treatments in terms of observables. To ad-
dress this confound, we present results based on only the control sample
in the next section.
a.3 robustness
Table A.3 presents analyses performed on the control sample only, i.e.
those subjects that were given neutral text treatments.
Results are qualitatively similar.¿e eects of openness andMachiavel-
lianism (Tactics) are larger in magnitude and more precisely estimated.
Contrary to the ndings in the main text, being a vegetarian or vegan is
not predictive for a higher switch point when using the control sample.
¿ese results reinforce the point that demographic criteria seem to
have little predictive power for the decision about living conditions of
animals. On the other hand, variation in demographics may be larger
than that in psychographic criteria, and therefore a larger sample size
would have been needed to detect statistically signicant eects.
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(1) (2)
Excluding Multiple Switchers
Openness 0.957∗∗∗ 0.906∗∗∗
(0.315) (0.331)
Agreeableness 0.0390 -0.181
(0.485) (0.516)
Machiavelli (Tactics) -0.980∗∗ -1.038∗∗
(0.416) (0.446)
Machiavelli (Cynicism) 0.0306 -0.233
(0.613) (0.614)
Locus of Control -0.296 -0.104
(0.277) (0.275)
Feminism Score 0.0381 0.138
(0.235) (0.261)
Masculinism Score 0.0251 -0.189
(0.229) (0.223)
Age 0.457
(0.703)
Gender -0.106
(4.765)
Vegetarian or Vegan 6.969
(7.053)
Religiosity Dummy -4.454
(4.740)
Constant 31.19 30.45
(39.44) (42.63)
N 89 86
N (uncensored) 42 40
N (le -censored) 14 13
N (right-censored) 33 33
Pseudo R2 0.029 0.041
Log Likelihood -220.7 -208.8
Table A.3.—Control Sample
Notes: Tobit regressions with switching point as dependent vari-
able. Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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b.1 proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Because the threshold is set secretly it cannot aect
the behavior of the buyers nor of a competing seller. Note that the thresh-
old has to be nonnegative. Suppose that the seller sets a threshold tˆ > t∗.
Buyers oering a price p ≥ tˆ receive the good and pay the oered price
under both tˆ and t∗. Buyers oering a price p < t∗ do not receive the
good and do not pay anything under both thresholds. ¿us, in these
cases the threshold does not make a dierence. However, if a buyer
oers a price p such that t∗ ≤ p < tˆ, then the buyer does not get the
good under threshold tˆ and the seller makes zero prot, while the buyer
gets the good under threshold t∗ and the seller makes a positive prot
of p − c + b > 0 from this customer. ¿us, the seller is better o with
threshold t∗ than with threshold tˆ > t∗. Similarly, suppose that the seller
sets a threshold tˆ < t∗. Again, if p < tˆ or if p ≥ t∗ it does not make a
dierence whether the threshold is tˆ or t∗. However, if tˆ ≤ p < t∗ then
the buyer gets the good under threshold tˆ yielding a negative prot of
p− c + b < 0 for the seller, while the buyer does not get the good and the
seller’s prot is zero under threshold t∗. ¿us, setting t∗ =max{c − b, 0}
is indeed a (weakly) dominant strategy.
Proof of Lemma 2. Two cases have to be distinguished. (1) If both sellers
are posted-price sellers (which may happen in the exible competition
treatment) the unique (Bertrand) equilibrium of the this game is that
both posted-price sellers charge pP = c. (2) If a posted-price seller faces
a NYOP seller the NYOP seller sets the threshold t∗ = max{c − b, 0}
and all buyers buy from him if pP > c. In this case the posted-price seller
makes a prot of zero. If he sets pP = c some buyers may buy from him,
but his prot is again zero. Charging pP < c can only yield losses and is
dominated by pP = c.
Proof of Lemma 3. If the buyer makes an oer to the NYOP seller he
should either oer p = c which gets him the good with certainty or
p = max{c − 40, 0} which is successful with probability 0.5. ¿e safe
bid is optimal if vi − c ≥ 12 [vi −max {c − 40, 0}], which is equivalent to
vi ≥min{2c, c + 40}.
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b.2 instructions
general instructions
Welcome to the Experiment and¿ank You for Participating!
From now on, please do not talk to any of the other participants of the
experiment.
general information
¿e purpose of this experiment is to study economic decision behavior.
By participating, you can earn money. Following the experiment, you
will be paid out in cash.
During the experiment, you and the other participants will be asked
to make decisions. Both your own decisions and those of the other
participants determine your payo according to the rules explained
below.
¿e whole experiment will take about two hours. In the beginning
you will receive detailed instructions. If you have any questions a er the
instructions or during the experiment, please raise your hand. One of the
supervisors of the experiment will come to your cubicle and privately
answer your questions. ¿e question will be repeated and answered
publicly if it is relevant for all participants. You will have to answer
some control questions a er the instructions before we can start the
experiment.
For linguistic convenience we use male terms throughout.
Payment
We will talk about points and not Euro in the experiment. ¿ese points
will be converted into Euro at the end of the experiment. ¿e exchange
rate is:
120 points = 1 Euro
In addition, you will receive an initial endowment of 480 points (4
Euro) at the beginning of the experiment. ¿ere will be an additional
compensation for lling out a questionnaire at the end of the experiment.
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Anonymity
Your decisions and payos are anonymous: Neither will you receive any
information concerning the decisions or payos of the other participants,
nor will the other participants receive any information concerning your
own decisions or payos.Wewill analyze the collected data anonymously
and will never link names to data from the experiment. At the end of
the experiment you will have to sign a receipt stating that you received
your payment. ¿is receipt is used for accounting purposes only.
Miscellaneous
¿ere will be a pen on your desk. Please leave this pen on the table a er
the experiment.
instructions for first set of experiments
¿e following instructions were presented to subjects in the NCFix treat-
ment. All other instructions of the rst set of experiments were adapted
accordingly and are available from the authors upon request. Instructions
were succeeded by a set of control questions (not shown here) that were
checked by the experimenters a er the subjects had answered them in pri-
vate.
the experiment
Roles
¿ere are two roles in the experiment, which we will refer to as buyer
and seller in the following. Your role will be assigned to you randomly
and will stay the same for the duration of the experiment.
Decisions and Procedures
¿e experiment consists of 20 periods. In all periods the same kind of
decisions will have to be made.
At the beginning of each period, two sellers will be matched with
six randomly selected buyers. Each buyer is assigned to exactly two
sellers: one of them will be a posted-price seller and the other will be
a Name Your Own Price seller. Buyers can purchase exactly one unit
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of the oered good in each period if at least one seller has entered the
market. Buyers can thus decide from which seller he wants to buy or if
he does not want to buy at all.
How do the two sellers dier?
• If the posted-price seller oers his good, he sells it through the
posted price mechanism. ¿is means that the seller chooses a
price for which buyers can purchase the good. If a buyer decides
to buy the good, he pays the posted price. If he does not buy the
good, there will be no trade and both the buyer and the seller will
receive a payo of 0 points.
• If the Name Your Own Price seller oers his good, he sells it
through theNameYourOwnPricemechanism.¿is means that,
in a rst stage, the seller determines a price threshold that is known
only to him. Each buyer will then decide on his own which price
he wants to oer for the good. ¿e seller has to deliver the good
only if the buyer has oered a price greater than or equal to the
price threshold (which is still unknown to the buyer). If the price
is greater than or equal to the price threshold, the buyer will pay
exactly the amount he oered; if the price is lower than the price
threshold, there will be no trade and both buyer and seller will
receive a payo of 0 points.
Each period consists of 5 stages:
1. In the rst stage of each period, sellers are told their costs for pro-
ducing a unit. ¿ese costs are the same for both sellers. Moreover,
the Name Your Own Price seller learns about the benet that he
will receive every time he sells a good. Only the Name Your Own
Price seller can receive this benet; the posted-price seller neither
knows about the size of the benet nor will he receive it.
2. In the second stage of each period, sellers will independently
decide whether to oer the good or not. If a seller does not enter
themarket, he will receive a payo of 0 points; in that case, buyers
still have the chance to buy the good from the remaining seller. If
none of the sellers enter themarket, both sellers and their assigned
buyers will get a payo of 0 points and the period ends.
3. In the third stage of each period, sellers are informed whether the
other seller has entered the market or not.
B.2 instructions 121
4. If the posted-price seller has entered the market, he determines
the price at which the good is available to buyers in stage four of
the period. If the Name Your Own Price seller has entered the
market, he must specify a price threshold. Only oers that exceed
this threshold will lead to a transaction.
5. In the  h stage, buyers learn their valuation for the good. ¿is
translates to the payment a buyer will receive at the end of the
experiment if he has bought the good. In addition, buyers will
be informed about sellers’ costs of production for the good. Each
buyer now decides whether to buy the good and if he wants to
buy it, where to buy it. If he decides to buy from the Name Your
Own Price seller, he also has to make an oer for the good.
A er each period, two sellers (one posted-price seller and one Name
Your Own Price seller) will be assigned anew to six randomly selected
buyers.
Detailed Procedures
Each period proceeds as follows:
1. Sellers are informed about their costs of production for each sold
unit of the good. Costs can be 10, 30 or 50points and are randomly
drawn in each period. Moreover, the Name Your Own Price seller
receives a benet for each unit sold. ¿e Name Your Own Price
seller learns whether the benet is 0 or 40 points.
2. Sellers decide independently from each other whether to oer the
good in this period or not. If a seller does not enter the market,
he receives a payo of 0 points. In this case, buyers have the op-
portunity to purchase the good from the remaining seller. If none
of the sellers enter the market, both of them and their assigned
buyers get a payo of 0 points and the period ends.
3. Sellers are informedwhether the respective other seller has entered
the market or not.
4. If the posted-price seller has entered the market, he must now
determine a price. ¿is price is identical for all buyers on the
market and can vary between 0 and 200 points.
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If the Name Your Own Price seller has entered the market, he
must determine the threshold price. ¿is threshold price is also
identical for all buyers on the market. All integers between 0 to
200 points are valid thresholds.
5. Buyers are informed about their valuation for the good.¿is valua-
tion can be 10, 25, 40,60, 120 or 200 points and is drawn randomly
in each period. It is possible that multiple buyers have the same
valuation. In addition, buyers are informed about the unit costs
of sellers.
Subsequently, all buyers decide whether to buy the good and if yes,
where to buy it. If the buyer chooses the Name Your Own Price
seller, he also needs to decide which price he would like to oer
for the good. ¿e mount of this oer can be freely chosen. Each
amount between 0 points and the own valuation in points is valid.
6. Buyers learn their income that they have earned in the current
period. Buyers who opted for the Name Your Own Price seller are
informed whether their oer was successful or not.
posted-price sellers learn how many buyers bought at the posted
price, howmany buyers submitted an oer to the Name Your Own
Price seller and how much they earned.
Name Your Own Price sellers learn the prices oers submitted by
each of their buyers and whether these oers were successful. In
addition, Name Your Own Price sellers are informed about the
number of buyers who decided to buy from the posted-price seller
and learn their payo in the current period.
End of a Period
At the end of each period, sellers and buyers are separated and two
sellers (one posted-price seller and one Name Your Own Price seller) are
assigned to six new, randomly selected, buyers. Hence, a market always
consists of one posted-price seller, one Name Your Own Price seller and
six buyers. A er 20 periods the experiment ends.
calculation of income at the end of each period
If none of the sellers have entered the market in a given period, both
sellers and the respective six buyers in the market receive 0 points.
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buyers
Buyers can either buy from the posted-price seller, or from the Name
Your Own Price seller, or they can choose not to buy at all.
Transacting with the Posted-Price Seller
If a buyer purchases from the posted-price seller, his income equals his
valuation V minus the posted price PP.
Income = Valuation (V) − posted price (PP)
Transacting with the Name Your Own Price Seller
If a buyer purchases from the Name Your Own Price seller and if his oer
was successful, his income equals his valuation (V) minus the oered
price (PO).
Income = Valuation (V) −Oered Price (PO)
No Transaction
If the buyer does not trade in this period, which can happen when
• None of the sellers have entered the market, or
• ¿e buyer did not buy the good either from the posted-price seller
or from the Name Your Own Price seller, or
• ¿e price oer of the buyer was not greater than or equal to the
price threshold of the Name Your Own Price seller and was there-
fore not successful,
the income of the buyer equals 0 points.
posted-price seller
¿e income of the posted-price seller equals his revenues minus his
costs.
• His revenue is calculated by multiplying the posted price he deter-
mined with the number of goods sold.
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• His costs are calculated by multiplying the unit cost (C) with the
number of goods sold.
¿us, if the seller has entered the market and three buyers have pur-
chased from him:
Income = Sum of posted prices (3 ⋅ PP)− Sum of Unit Costs (3 ⋅ C)
If the posted-price seller has not entered the market, his revenue in
this particular period equals 0 points.
If a buyer does not buy the good from him, there will be no unit costs
for this buyer and the seller will not receive any money from this buyer.
name your own price seller
¿e income of the Name Your Own Price seller is his revenue plus the
benet and minus his costs.
• His revenue is the sum of the oered prices that are greater than
or equal to his price threshold, plus the benet (B) multiplied with
the number of goods sold.
• His costs are the unit costs (C) multiplied with the number of
goods sold.
¿us, if the seller has entered the market and the price oers of three
buyers are successful:
Income = Sum of Oered Prices(P1O + P2O + P3O)+ Sum of Unit Benets (3 ⋅ B)− Sum of Unit Costs (3 ⋅ C)
If the Name Your Own Price seller has not entered the market, his
revenue for this particular period equals 0 points.
If a buyer’s oered price is below the price threshold, there are no unit
costs and no benets and he will not receive a price from this buyer.
If a seller or a buyer incurs a loss in any given period, they have to
use their previous prots or their initial endowment, respectively, to
compensate for this loss.
Do you have any questions up to this point?
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instructions for second set of experiments
¿e following instructions were presented to subjects in the NCEB treat-
ment. ¿e corresponding instructions for the PCEB treatment are avail-
able upon request. Instructions were succeeded by a set of control ques-
tions (not shown here) that were checked by the experimenters a er the
subjects had answered them in private.
the experiment
Roles
¿ere are three roles in the experiment, which we will refer to as well-
informed buyer, follow-up buyer and seller in the following. Your role
will be assigned to you randomly and will stay the same for the duration
of the experiment. On the rst screen you will be informed to which
role you are assigned.
Decisions and Procedures
¿e experiment consists of 20 periods. In all periods the same kind of
decisions will have to be made.
At the beginning of each period, two sellers will be matched with
six randomly selected buyers (two well-informed buyers, four follow-
up buyers). First, every seller decides if he wants to sell on the market.
Buyers can purchase a maximum of one unit of the oered good.
How do the two sellers dier?
• ¿e posted-price seller chooses a price for which buyers can pur-
chase the good.
• ¿e Name Your Own Price seller determines a price threshold
that is known only to him. Each buyer will then decide on his own
which price he wants to oer for the good. If the price is greater
than or equal to the (unknown) price threshold, the buyer will
pay exactly the price he oered and gets the good. If the price is
lower than the price threshold, there will be no trade.
How do the two buyers dier?
• ¿e two well-informed buyers buy rst and may choose from
which the seller they would like to buy (if both sellers have decided
to sell).
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• ¿en, the four follow-up buyers make their purchasing decisions.
¿ey are only able to purchase from a seller if the seller has decided
to sell on the market and if one of the two well-informed buyers
has bought from that seller or submitted a price oer.
• Both well-informed and follow-up buyers can purchase the good
from the posted-price seller if the price oer they submitted to the
NameYourOwnPrice seller was not successful. For well-informed
buyers this possibility exists if the posted-price seller has entered
the market. For follow-up buyers this possibility exists only if the
posted-price seller is available, that is
– if he has entered the market and at least one well-informed
buyer has bought from him or
– if he has entered the market, no well-informed buyer has
bought from him, but the follow-up buyer paid search costs
of 10 points.
Each period consists of eight stages:
1. All participants are told the costs that accrue to sellers for every
unit sold. ¿ese costs are the same for both sellers. Costs can be 5,
10, 20, 30 or 50 points and are randomly drawn in each period.
Buyers are informed about their valuation for the good. ¿is val-
uation can be 10, 25, 40, 60, 120 or 200 points and is drawn
randomly in each period for every buyer. It is possible that multi-
ple buyers have the same valuation. Sellers are not informed about
these valuations.
2. Every seller decides whether to oer the good or not. If a seller
does not enter the market, he receives a payo of 0 points.
3. Sellers are informedwhether the respective other seller has entered
themarket or not. If the posted-price seller has entered themarket,
he must now determine a price. If the Name Your Own Price seller
has entered the market, he must determine the threshold price.
Only oers that exceed this thresholdwill lead to a transaction.¿e
posted and threshold prices are identical for all well-informed
and follow-up buyers in this period.
4. ¿e two well-informed buyers learn which sellers entered the
market and decide whether to buy the good and if yes, where to
buy it. If a buyer chooses the Name Your Own Price seller, he also
needs to decide which price he would like to oer for the good.
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5. If a well-informed buyer chose the Name Your Own Price seller
and his oer was not successful (because it was lower than the
threshold price), the buyer can purchase the good from the posted-
price seller, if he entered the market.
6. ¿e four follow-up buyers learn which sellers are available. If only
one seller is available, the follow-up buyers have the possibility to
pay search costs of 10 points to learn whether the respective other
seller has entered the market or not. In case of the posted-price
seller, the buyers also learn his posted price.
7. ¿e follow-up buyers decide whether to buy the good and if yes,
where to buy it. If a buyer chooses the Name Your Own Price
seller, he also needs to decide which price he would like to oer
for the good. If this oer was not successful, the buyer can decide
whether he wants to buy the good from the posted-price seller,
provided that the posted-price seller is available.
8. Buyers learn their income that they have earned in the current
period.
posted-price sellers learn howmany buyers bought at their posted
prices, how many buyers did not purchase, as well as their own
income.
Name Your Own Price sellers learn the price oers submitted
by each of their buyers and whether these oers were successful.
In addition, Name Your Own Price sellers are informed about
the number of buyers who did not purchase, as well as their own
income.
End of a Period
At the end of each period, sellers and buyers are separated and two
sellers (one posted-price seller and one Name Your Own Price seller) are
assigned to six new, randomly selected, buyers. Hence, a market always
consists of one posted-price seller, one Name Your Own Price seller, two
well-informed buyers and four follow-up buyers. A er 20 periods the
experiment ends.
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calculation of income at the end of each period
If none of the sellers have entered the market in a given period, both
sellers and the respective six buyers in the market receive 0 points.
well-informed buyer
Transacting with the Posted-Price Seller
If a buyer purchases from the posted-price seller, his income equals his
valuation V minus the posted price PP.
Income = Valuation (V) − Posted Price (PP)
Transacting with the Name Your Own Price Seller
If a buyer purchases from the Name Your Own Price seller, his income
equals his valuation V minus the price paid P.
Income = Valuation (V) − Price Paid (P)
No Transaction
If the buyer does not trade in this period his income equals 0 points.
follow-up buyer
¿e income of the follow-up buyers is calculated like the income of the
well-informed buyers. If a follow-up buyer has invested search costs,
these costs will also be deducted.
seller
¿e income of a seller equals his revenue minus his costs.
• His revenue are the prices he determined: these are the posted
prices multiplied with the number of sold goods for the posted-
price seller, and the sum of oered prices that are greater than or
equal to his price threshold for the Name Your Own Price seller.
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• His costs are calculated by multiplying the unit costs (C) with the
number of goods sold.
If a seller or a buyer incurs a loss in any given period, they have to
use their previous prots or their initial endowment, respectively, to
compensate for this loss.
Do you have any questions up to this point?

C
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c.1 robustness
c.1.1 Full Sample
¿e analyses presented in the main text are based on a restricted sample.
As described in more detail in Section 3.4.2.1, I exclude seven of 21
sessions, two because the group size diers substantially from the average,
one because a limit on positive decisions to date was in place, and four
because participants were asked to bring magazines or books, which
could have potentially distracted them from the task at hand.
Reassuringly, results are robust to including these omitted sessions.
As shown in Table C.1, coecients point in the same direction as in Table
3.4, and for female participants both the coecient on Attractiveness
Range and the interaction withMore Attractive are signicant.
c.1.2 Specication of the Range
Due to the sequential nature of the speed dating context, determining the
range is subject to specifying the process of consideration set formation.
In the main text I assume that participants enter the experiment with no
prior reference point, such that the range at the rst date is unspecied.
Table C.2 presents regressions that take into account one’s own at-
tribute level as reference point, relative to which the range at the rst
date is computed. ¿e coecients are not as precisely estimated, but
support the analysis in the main part.
c.1.3 Rescaling
As stated in the main text, estimated coecients could be biased if
stated attributed levels (i.e., evaluations of partners) are directly aected
by context eects. To deal with this issue, Bhargava and Fisman (2014)
substitute all ratings with evaluations by two research assistants seated in
the same room. Applying the same methodology to context dependence
faces some shortcomings: for one, it is impossible to control for attribute
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Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Attractiveness Range 0.109∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.0947∗∗
(0.0256) (0.0324) (0.0379)
More Attractive 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.0761∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
(0.0211) (0.0322) (0.0297)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.108∗∗∗ -0.0816∗∗∗ -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0178) (0.0233) (0.0306)
Fun Range 0.0348 0.0267 0.0403
(0.0337) (0.0502) (0.0455)
More Fun 0.0668∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.00250
(0.0238) (0.0333) (0.0328)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.0886∗∗∗ -0.106∗∗∗ -0.0522
(0.0251) (0.0357) (0.0350)
Constant -0.954∗∗∗ -0.994∗∗∗ -0.909∗∗∗
(0.0538) (0.0736) (0.0774)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5802 2985 2817
R2 0.532 0.538 0.521
Adjusted R2 0.489 0.493 0.473
Table C.1.—Full Sample
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10. More Attractive andMore Fun are indicator variables
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the
respective attribute, as judged by all other subjects.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Attractiveness Range 0.127∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.0975∗
(0.0323) (0.0390) (0.0496)
More Attractive 0.133∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(0.0254) (0.0399) (0.0342)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.129∗∗∗ -0.0917∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0285) (0.0371)
Fun Range 0.0752∗ 0.0243 0.110∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0690) (0.0527)
More Fun 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.00444
(0.0272) (0.0384) (0.0364)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.104∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗ -0.0633∗
(0.0271) (0.0382) (0.0376)
Constant -1.019∗∗∗ -1.008∗∗∗ -1.015∗∗∗
(0.0692) (0.0979) (0.0919)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4710 2401 2309
R2 0.538 0.539 0.531
Adjusted R2 0.494 0.492 0.482
Table C.2.—Dierent Starting Point for Range
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10. More Attractive andMore Fun are indicator variables
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the
respective attribute, as judged by all other subjects.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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levels other than attractiveness, since research assistants were unable to
rate these. Another concern is that ratings by research assistants might
be subject to similar biases (i.e., context dependence) than those of actual
participants, and hence their unbiasedness is questionable.
Nonetheless, Table C.3 presents results from a stripped-down regres-
sion of the decision to date on attractiveness and the attractiveness range,
as determined by average ratings of the two research assistants, includ-
ing only the lagged attractiveness rating as a contrast eect control and
round xed eects to control for time trends. ¿e results are largely
in line with the ndings reported in Section 3.5.2: for the combined
sample and the female evaluator subsample, the range eect is posi-
tive (yet non-signicant) if the evaluated person is below the reference
level, and signicantly negative if above (F(1, 399) = 4.02, p < 0.05;
F(1, 199) = 2.96, p < 0.1). Note that the negative coecient of the range
on the decision to date in case the partner is above the reference level is
also present for male evaluators (F(1, 199) = 2.85, p < 0.1).
As an additional robustness check, I propose a dierent strategy, which
rests on the assumption that evaluators cannot be inuenced by context
eects in the very rst round. In this case we can take the assessment of
the evaluator who has dated the target in the rst round, and apply this
rating to assessments of that target in all subsequent rounds.
¿e plausibility of this assumption strongly depends on whether par-
ticipants enter the speed dating experiment with some expectations
regarding reference attribute levels or not. If they do, they might eval-
uate even the rst target relative to their expectation, and hence be
inuenced by context eects even then. However, if reference attribute
levels are not present or carry suciently low weight, we can reasonably
expect that the rst rating is unimpeded by distortions due to context
eects. In this case, it would be natural to take the assessment of the
evaluator who has dated the target in the rst round, and apply this
rating to assessments of that target in all subsequent rounds.
One obvious drawback of this method relative to the one employed
by Bhargava and Fisman (2014) is that ‘true’ attribute levels are likely
to be measured less precisely, as they rely on the rating of one instead
of two persons. As pointed out before, however, context eects may be
present in research assistants’ ratings, whereas they are very unlikely if
we employ the rating of that evaluator who has dated a given target in
the rst round. An additional advantage of the method I propose is that
it yields undistorted ratings for all attributes, not just attractiveness.
Substituting all ratings with those of the subject who dated a given
person rst yields Table C.4. Results are qualitatively in line with Table
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Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Attractiveness Range 0.0424 -0.0190 0.141
(0.0518) (0.0613) (0.107)
More Attractive 0.266∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗
(0.0262) (0.0385) (0.0377)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.149∗∗∗ -0.0894∗∗ -0.321∗∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0399) (0.0618)
Constant -0.363∗∗∗ -0.317∗∗∗ -0.442∗∗∗
(0.0518) (0.0749) (0.0719)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5656 2831 2825
R2 0.401 0.399 0.395
Adjusted R2 0.354 0.349 0.344
Table C.3.—Rescaling (Research Assistant Rating)
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings
are adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on
a scale from 1 to 10; all ratings are replaced by the average of two
research assistants’ ratings.More Attractive is an indicator variable
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of this
attribute, as judged by all other subjects. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3)
All Male Female
Attractiveness Range -0.00475 0.0000181 0.0199
(0.0294) (0.0330) (0.0579)
More Attractive 0.231∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.0295) (0.0395) (0.0459)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.0325 -0.0314 -0.0927∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0251) (0.0444)
Fun Range -0.00383 -0.0315 -0.0106
(0.0543) (0.0713) (0.0787)
More Fun 0.234∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.0755
(0.0410) (0.0531) (0.0622)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.0731∗ -0.150∗∗∗ 0.0630
(0.0381) (0.0469) (0.0606)
Constant 0.0187 -0.0446 0.104
(0.0938) (0.131) (0.136)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes
Round Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4447 2239 2208
R2 0.385 0.396 0.376
Adjusted R2 0.320 0.328 0.304
Table C.4.—Rescaling (First Rating)
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10; all ratings are replaced by the assessment of the evalu-
ator who has rated the partner in the rst round. More Attractive
and More Fun are indicator variables set to one if the partner
surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the respective attribute, as
judged by all other subjects. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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3.4, but are not signicant. However, considering that there is a substan-
tial variation in the perception of attributes across subjects, which this
method fails to capture, this loss in precision is expected.
c.1.4 Consideration Set Composition
¿is section complements the analysis in Section 3.5.4. In order to evalu-
ate whether there are dierential eects of consideration set composition
on context dependence, Tables C.5 and C.6 split the sample into male
and female evaluators.
c.2 gender differences in utility
¿e results presented in Section 3.5.2 suggest that the eect of utility
ranges is stronger for women than for men, and loses signicance when
considering only the data generated by male evaluators. One possible
explanation for this nding is that men do not care about how attrac-
tive their counterparts are, implying that utility is at over all levels of
attractiveness. In this case the proposed identication strategy would
not work, since it is based on dierential reactions to range increases
depending on whether the level of attractiveness is regarded as desirable
or repelling.
Figure C.1 documents that this rationalization does not hold: if any-
thing, the positive slope of attractiveness utility is even steeper than for
women. In addition, note that for both women and men, the consensus
rating approximates the utility threshold very well.
c.3 uniqueness of the reference level
¿is section complements the analysis presented in Section 3.5.3 in the
main part.
Figure C.2 displays the results for placebo regressions performed on
the combined sample. As discussed in themain part, if there were indeed
a unique reference level of utility, we would expect to nd a signicant
below reference level range coecient for values up to some reference
level, a signicant above reference level coecient for values above, and
a null eect for all other levels of these two coecients. Panel C.2a shows
a pattern that is qualitatively consistent with this expectation, but fails to
hold up quantitatively. In particular, there is no apparent change in both
the magnitude and the signicance of the coecients at some value be-
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Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perf. Mem. 3 Partners 2 Partners 1 Partner
Attractiveness Range 0.116∗∗∗ 0.0870∗∗∗ 0.0953∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0350) (0.0304) (0.0318) (0.0376)
More Attractive 0.0963∗∗∗ 0.0704∗∗ 0.0652∗ 0.0545∗
(0.0369) (0.0350) (0.0341) (0.0292)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.0900∗∗∗ -0.0858∗∗∗ -0.0941∗∗ -0.113∗∗
(0.0269) (0.0320) (0.0363) (0.0466)
Fun Range 0.0279 0.0996∗∗ 0.0715∗ 0.0781
(0.0551) (0.0441) (0.0423) (0.0511)
More Fun 0.110∗∗∗ 0.0990∗∗∗ 0.0888∗∗∗ 0.0769∗∗
(0.0370) (0.0362) (0.0341) (0.0315)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.112∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.130∗∗ -0.162∗∗
(0.0392) (0.0498) (0.0556) (0.0745)
Constant -0.967∗∗∗ -0.930∗∗∗ -0.901∗∗∗ -0.886∗∗∗
(0.0838) (0.0855) (0.0842) (0.0808)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2401 2401 2401 2401
R2 0.539 0.538 0.538 0.541
Adjusted R2 0.492 0.491 0.491 0.494
Table C.5.—Consideration Set Composition (Men)
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10. More Attractive andMore Fun are indicator variables
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the
respective attribute, as judged by all other subjects.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
C.3 uniqueness of the reference level 139
Consensus Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Perf. Mem. 3 Partners 2 Partners 1 Partner
Attractiveness Range 0.112∗∗∗ 0.0825∗∗ 0.0912∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗
(0.0415) (0.0389) (0.0331) (0.0407)
More Attractive 0.176∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.0323) (0.0284) (0.0282) (0.0262)
More Attr. × Attr. Range -0.226∗∗∗ -0.218∗∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗
(0.0357) (0.0411) (0.0462) (0.0668)
Fun Range 0.100∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.0491) (0.0388) (0.0356) (0.0359)
More Fun -0.00420 -0.00380 -0.0320 -0.0240
(0.0355) (0.0295) (0.0283) (0.0275)
More Fun × Fun Range -0.0556 -0.0865∗ -0.0441 -0.0862
(0.0390) (0.0439) (0.0472) (0.0646)
Constant -0.975∗∗∗ -0.962∗∗∗ -0.920∗∗∗ -0.867∗∗∗
(0.0840) (0.0799) (0.0782) (0.0751)
Attribute Level Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contrast Eect Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Order Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2309 2309 2309 2309
R2 0.531 0.529 0.527 0.529
Adjusted R2 0.482 0.479 0.477 0.479
Table C.6.—Consideration Set Composition (Women)
Notes: Linear probability model with standard errors clustered on
the partner level (in parentheses). In all regressions, the dependent
variable is the Decision to Date. All observations are weighted by
the inverse of the number of observations per subject; ratings are
adjusted using importance weights. Attribute ratings are on a scale
from 1 to 10. More Attractive andMore Fun are indicator variables
set to one if the partner surpasses the evaluator’s own level of the
respective attribute, as judged by all other subjects.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure C.1.—Gender Dierences in Utility
Notes: Vertical axis displays average predicted values of the de-
pendent variable (decision to date) for dierent attribute values.
Plotted values are derived from regressing the decision to date
on all ve attributes, including time and individual xed eects.
Marginal eects are obtained post estimation for each attribute
separately. Regressions are weighted by the number of observa-
tions in each session. Standard errors are clustered on the partner
level. Grey areas are 95% condence intervals. Horizontal red lines
depict average yes rate, vertical blue lines (dashed) are average
consensus ratings of the respective attribute, and vertical green
lines (dash-dotted) are average own ratings of the attribute.
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tween the consensus rating and the own rating. Furthermore, the below
threshold coecient remains signicantly positive even for levels above
the threshold. Recalling that there appears to be no generalized context
dependence across genders (cf. Table 3.4), this nding is expected.
Results for the attribute fun are less clear-cut. Some of the below
reference level estimates are consistent with the logic outlined above:
namely, that there is a negative range eect for placebo reference level
values up to approximately 6, and that the eect is indistinguishable from
zero above. However, the above reference level estimates do not conform
to this logic. ¿is pattern is consistent with the insignicant ndings
reported in Result 3.2: it appears that there is no unique reference level of
fun, but that there are many. Hence we cannot expect to nd meaningful
results when taking the consensus rating as a benchmark.
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Figure C.2.—Placebo Tests of Attribute Ranges
Notes: Figure displays regression coecients of the decision to
date on attribute range (dotted line) and the sum of attribute range
and the interaction between attribute range and a dummy (dash-
dotted line).¿e dummy is set to one if the attribute level is higher
than k = 1, 2, . . . , 10 and set to zero otherwise, such that each line
consists of coecients from 10 separate regressions. Grey areas are
95% condence intervals. ¿e horizontal axis tracks the value of
the threshold k. ¿e two vertical lines indicate the averages of the
consensus rating of the attribute (blue line) respectively subject’s
own rating of the attribute (green line). Stars above the red line
indicate whether coecients of the dotted line are signicantly
dierent from zero; analogously for stars below the red line and
the dash-dotted line. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Figure C.3.—Placebo Tests of Fun Ranges
Notes: Figure displays regression coecients of the decision to
date on attribute range (dotted line) and the sum of attribute range
and the interaction between attribute range and a dummy (dash-
dotted line).¿e dummy is set to one if the attribute level is higher
than k = 1, 2, . . . , 10 and set to zero otherwise, such that each line
consists of coecients from 10 separate regressions. Grey areas are
95% condence intervals. ¿e horizontal axis tracks the value of
the threshold k. ¿e two vertical lines indicate the averages of the
consensus rating of the attribute (blue line) respectively subject’s
own rating of the attribute (green line). Stars above the red line
indicate whether coecients of the dotted line are signicantly
dierent from zero; analogously for stars below the red line and
the dash-dotted line. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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